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Background: How do governance interventions that engage citizens in public service
delivery planning, management and oversight impact the quality of and access to services
and citizens’ quality of life? This systematic review examined high quality evidence from
35 citizen engagement programmes in low‐ and middle‐income countries that promote
the engagement of citizens in service delivery through four routes: participation
(participatory priority setting); inclusion of marginalised groups; transparency (information
on rights and public service performance), and/or citizen efforts to ensure public service
accountability (citizen feedback and monitoring); collectively, PITA mechanisms. We
collected quantitative and qualitative data from the included studies and used statistical
meta‐analysis and realist‐informed framework synthesis to analyse the findings.
Results: The findings suggest that interventions promoting citizen engagement by
improving direct engagement between service users and service providers, are often
effective in stimulating active citizen engagement in service delivery and realising
improvements in access to services and quality of service provision, particularly for
services that involve direct interaction between citizens and providers. However, in
the absence of complementary interventions to address bottlenecks around service
provider supply chains and service use, citizen engagement interventions alone may
not improve key wellbeing outcomes for target communities or state‐society
relations. In addition, interventions promoting citizen engagement by increasing
citizen pressures on politicians to hold providers to account, are not usually able to
influence service delivery.
Conclusions: The citizen engagement interventions studied were more likely to be
successful: (1) where the programme targeted a service that citizens access directly from
front‐line staff, such as healthcare, as opposed to services accessed independently of
service provider staff, such as roads; (2) where implementers were able to generate
active support and buy‐in for the intervention from both citizens and front‐line public
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service staff and officials; and (3) where the implementation approach drew on and/or
stimulated local capacity for collective action. From a research perspective, the review
found few studies that investigated the impact of these interventions on women or other
vulnerable groups within communities, and that rigorous impact evaluations often lack
adequately transparent reporting, particularly of information on what interventions
actually did and how conditions compared to those in comparison communities.
1 | PLAIN LANGUAGE SUMMARY
Citizen engagement improves access to public services in low‐ and
middle‐income countries, but evidence on development outcomes is
limited
Interventions promoting citizen engagement in public service
management involve participation, inclusion, transparency and
accountability (PITA) mechanisms. In low‐ and middle‐income
countries (LMICs), these interventions are effective in improving
active citizenship and service delivery, and may improve the
responsiveness of service provider staff for services provided directly
by public servants (for example, in health).
In contrast, interventions providing information to stimulate
pressure on politicians are not usually effective in improving provider
response or service delivery. There is insufficient evidence to
conclude whether these interventions are effective in improving
wellbeing or the relationship between citizens and the state.
2 | WHAT IS THIS REVIEW ABOUT?
Failures in governance lead to the exclusion of large portions of society
from public services and to waste, fraud and corruption. This review
assesses evidence for interventions promoting better governance of
public services: participation (participatory planning), inclusion (involve-
ment of marginalised groups), transparency (information about citizen
rights or performance of public officials), and accountability (citizen
feedback) mechanisms, known collectively as PITA mechanisms.
3 | WHAT IS THE AIM OF THIS REVIEW?
This Campbell systematic review examines the effects of interven-
tions to promote citizen engagement in public service management.
The review synthesises evidence from 35 impact evaluations and 36
related studies of interventions promoting participation, inclusion,
transparency and accountability (PITA) mechanisms.
4 | WHAT STUDIES ARE INCLUDED?
The review includes impact evaluations relating to 35 PITA
programmes from 20 LMICs. In addition, 36 qualitative and
programmatic documents were included to strengthen understand-
ing of implementation context and programme mechanisms.
5 | WHAT ARE THE MAIN FINDINGS OF
THIS REVIEW?
Citizen engagement interventions (i) are usually effective in improv-
ing intermediate user engagement outcomes, for example, meeting
attendance and contributions to community funds; (ii) improve access
to and quality of services but not service use outcomes; (iii) can lead
to improvements in some wellbeing outcomes such as health and
productive outcomes; (iv) may improve tax collection; but (v) do not
usually lead to changes in provider action outcomes such as public
spending, staff motivation and corruption. There may be an exception
where there is direct interaction between citizens and service
providers in the regular delivery of services. Interventions providing
performance information do not generally improve access or lead to
improvements in service quality.
Only interventions focused on services delivered by front‐line
staff (e.g., in health) achieve positive outcomes. Those delivered
without public interaction (e.g., roads) do not. However, engagement
with civil society organisations and interest groups may lead to
better outcomes for services accessed independently of providers.
Inclusive citizen engagement programmes have at least as big an
effect on user engagement and access to services as less inclusive
approaches.
Many interventions experienced challenges stemming from a lack
of positive engagement with supply‐side actors, whose power the
interventions often sought to diminish. Interventions implemented
with the strong support of the targeted service providers were better
able to realise positive impacts.
Approaches to citizen‐service provider engagement appear to
work more effectively when implemented through phased, facilitated
collaborative processes rather than one‐off accountability meetings
that are seen as confrontational.
Only four studies present any data on intervention costs. This
limited the potential for any analysis of comparisons across
programmes and settings.
In interpreting the findings, it must be noted that each individual
outcome is reported in only a few studies and that included studies
have important methodological weaknesses with risks of bias arising
from weak design, analysis and reporting.
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6 | WHAT DO THE FINDINGS OF THIS
REVIEW MEAN?
6.1 | For policy and programme managers:
A collaborative rather than confrontational approach with the
service providers whose services are under scrutiny is more likely
to be effective. Engaging communities may require using civil society
organisations to facilitate the community’s participation. Programme
design should ensure positive engagement with supply‐side actors
within the intervention setting.
6.2 | For researchers:
More high‐quality studies are needed, comparing different ap-
proaches to improving service delivery, paying attention to complete
description of the different approaches being compared. Since
implementation is a crucial factor, mixed methods studies should
be the norm, and will help focus on equity considerations which have
been neglected. Finally, there should be standardisation of indicators
in PITA studies.
6.3 | How up‐to‐date is this review?
The review authors searched for studies up to March 2018. This
Campbell systematic review was published in June 2019.
7 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
7.1 | Background
Public services – health care, social protection, justice and physical
infrastructure – are critical to enabling the large‐scale development
of populations, and thus the focus of significant development aid.
Sustainable Development Goal 16 recognises the centrality of
effective, accountable and transparent institutions that engage in
inclusive and participatory decision‐making to ensure the sustain-
ability of global development investments.
The repercussions of failures of governance – the processes and
manners in which people implement policies and programs – are well
documented: exclusions of large portions of society from public
services is correlated with violent conflict, while fraud and corruption
lead not only to wasted investments but to negative impacts on
people’s quality of life. Interventions aiming to strengthen govern-
ance operate across three domains: between the state and citizens;
between the state and service providers; and between citizens and
service providers.
In this review, we examined interventions that strengthened
governance through the “short route” between citizens and service
providers, and interventions that improved governance by shortening
the “long route” by providing information about the performance of
elected officials to improve service provision. Following an Evidence
Gap Map study on interventions to promote State‐Society Relations
(Phillips et al., 2017), the Centre of Excellence on Democracy, Human
Rights and Governance (DRG) at USAID commissioned this systema-
tic review to answer the question, “to what extent are programmes
that incorporate PITA characteristics into their design effective, as
compared to otherwise similar programmes that do not?”
7.1.1 | Objectives
This systematic review includes projects and programmes that aim to
change the ways citizens engage in the planning, running and
oversight of public services, and investigates the subsequent impact
of these efforts on the quality of and access to public services, and
ultimately on people’s quality of life and satisfaction with the State.
The review applied an innovative approach that sought to under-
stand the mechanisms and processes through which change happens,
and to systematically identify the key factors that influence whether
an intervention may be effective in a given context.
The review aimed to answer the following five questions:
1. What are the effects of interventions that aim to strengthen PITA
mechanisms on social and economic wellbeing of participants
(intermediate and final outcomes)?
2. What are the effects of interventions that aim to strengthen PITA
mechanisms on participatory, inclusive, transparent or accountable
processes (immediate outcomes)?
3. To what extent do effects vary by population group and location?
4. What factors relating to programme design, implementation,
context, and mechanism are associated with better or worse
outcomes along the causal chain?
5. What evidence is available on programme costs and incremental
cost effectiveness in included studies of effects?
7.2 | Search methods
The systematic review was carried out according to a protocol that
was peer reviewed and published in the Campbell Collaboration
library. To identify all potential relevant published and unpublished
evaluations to include in the review, the authors carried out a
systematic search of key academic databases, donor and practitioner
websites, including potential results in all languages, and from any
low‐ or middle‐income country, drawing also on an evidence gap map
on state‐society relations (Phillips et al., 2017). The searches were
carried out between February and April 2018.
7.3 | Selection criteria
To identify the direct contribution of interventions promoting citizen
engagement on service delivery improvements, the review included
evaluations in low‐ and middle‐income countries (L&MICs) that
compared the impact on service delivery access and quality in
participating communities against similar communities where citizens
received “standard public services,” which did not have access to the
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same opportunities or support for citizen engagement in the planning
or oversight of those services. The review included quantitative
causal studies (randomised and non‐randomised impact evaluations)
and also drew on information about mechanisms from the pro-
grammes contained in the included impact evaluations (e.g. pro-
gramme documents, qualitative studies).
7.4 | Data collection and analysis
Authors conducted a detailed critical appraisal (risk of bias) and
external validity assessment of the included studies, to assess the
credibility of the findings. To answer Review Questions 1‐3, the
authors extracted effect size data measuring the change in outcomes
in consistent units from each included impact evaluation. We used
statistical meta‐analysis to synthesise the findings. To structure the
meta‐analysis, authors used a conceptual model for outcomes along
the results chain relating to immediate outcomes (citizen and service
provider engagement), intermediate outcomes (access to services
and service uptake), and final outcomes (citizen welfare and state‐
society relations).
To answer Review Question 4, a framework synthesis of all
included studies plus supplemental qualitative and programmatic
documents was conducted, to systematically identify the key
barriers, facilitators and moderating factors that could explain why
an intervention was more likely to achieve its expected results in a
given context. Authors identified five intervention groups for the
analysis; interventions promoting rights information, performance
information, participatory planning, community feedback mechan-
isms and community‐based natural resource management. Finally,
evidence on costs from the included impact evaluations and
supplemental documentation was collected to answer Review
Question 5.
8 | RESULTS
The search returned over 10,000 papers, from which 50 impact
evaluation reports corresponding to 35 programmes that met the
criteria for being included in the review, alongside an additional 11
on‐going studies, were identified. For the 35 programmes identified,
authors undertook a targeted search and identified 36 qualitative
and programmatic documents that were used to strengthen under-
standing of the context and implementation of the programmes.
Authors identified five specific intervention types across the 35
programmes.
Sixteen citizen engagement programs evaluated citizen participa-
tion in the design and implementation of public services, grouped into
two intervention sub‐groups:
• nine participatory priority setting, planning or budgeting interven-
tions, wherein citizens participated in setting the priorities for and/
or planning of local services. These include support for participa-
tory budgeting in municipal governments in Brazil, Mexico and
Russia, and support for participatory planning in India, Pakistan,
Guinea and Kenya. It also included requirements for inclusive
participation in two fragile contexts, Afghanistan and DRC.
• seven community‐based natural resource management (CBNRM)
interventions, wherein citizens form local collectives and take over
the management of a shared resource, for forest management in
Nepal, Madagascar and Tanzania, and water user associations in
Brazil, China and the Philippines, and Namibia.
Eleven citizen engagement programs evaluated transparency
mechanisms, which specifically aimed to disclose and/or disseminate
information that would shift the power balance between service
providers and users, comprising two intervention sub‐groups:
• five evaluations of rights information interventions, which enable
users to demand minimum standards for access to services, such as
for social protection services in Indonesia (food subsidies) and
India (public works), maternal and child health care in India and
freedom of information in Pakistan.
• six evaluations of public official or service provider performance
information interventions, such as the dissemination of municipal
government performance scorecards in Afghanistan, Brazil, the
Philippines and Uganda, and monitoring information provided in
police stations in India.
Ten evaluations of accountability mechanisms were included,
which specifically comprised citizen feedback or monitoring mechan-
ism interventions, i.e. those that solicited feedback regarding and/or
actively engaged citizens in the monitoring of service delivery, to
hold public service providers and institutions responsible for
executing their powers and mandates according to appropriate
standards. These included community report cards in infrastructure
(Afghanistan, Indonesia and Colombia), health (Ghana, Malawi and
Uganda), agriculture (Uganda) and the security sector (DRC), and
individual citizen “feedback loops” in Guinea, Kenya and Uganda.
Finally, nine of these citizen engagement programs also
addressed inclusion of marginalised groups. Studies in Afghanistan
and DRC focused exclusively on the mandated incorporation of
women into community groups. Other programs targeted inclusion of
women or poorer groups in Brazil, Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico,
Pakistan and Uganda.
Risk of bias assessment was done of all included impact
evaluations at the outcome level. Around 35 per cent of the findings
for the 19 randomised evaluations were found to be of low risk of
bias, 20 per cent had some concerns, and 35 per cent were of high
risk of bias. Of the 16 non‐randomised evaluations, almost 90 per
cent of outcomes had high risk of bias, 11 per cent had some
concerns and only 1 outcome was assessed as being of low risk.
8.1 | Review question 1
Authors found, on average, that citizen engagement interventions
improved access to and quality of services by an overall average
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pooled effect size of 0.10 standard deviations (95% confidence
interval=0.04, 0.16), compared to standard service delivery. Out-
comes tended to be of similar magnitude when service access was
measured in physical terms or quality of service. Only outcomes
relating to reducing staff absenteeism and embezzlement were not
systematically different for citizen engagement interventions, as
compared to standard public service delivery. When disaggregating
by intervention sub‐groups, the pooled effects for rights information
and citizen feedback mechanisms were of similar magnitude.
However, interventions providing performance information about
public officials or service providers did not tend to lead to changes in
access to services or improvements in service quality.
Turning to the rest of the causal chain, the results indicated that
citizen engagement interventions incorporating PITA mechanisms
did not systematically improve service use, whether measured as use
of health services (e.g. immunisation, antenatal care), social protec-
tion services (employment services), or attitudes to services (user
satisfaction and complaints). These findings were consistent for
intervention sub‐groups (participatory priority setting, CBNRM,
performance information, rights information, and citizen feedback
mechanisms).
The findings also indicated that citizen engagement interventions
can lead to improvements in some wellbeing outcomes, where
wellbeing is measured using health outcomes (morbidity, mortality,
nutrition) or productive outcomes (agriculture yields, income/
expenditure, asset ownership). However, these overall changes
tended to be small in magnitude (around 0.10 standard deviations
increase in the outcome) and were not observable consistently across
all outcomes analysed. The outcomes measured were diverse, and
sample sizes for each outcome small, hence it is not possible to draw
strong conclusions. In addition, interventions providing performance
information about public officials or service provision did not
increase wellbeing outcomes.
Outcome measures of state‐society relations included public
confidence in institutions, institutional sustainability and taxes paid.
Some study results suggested citizen engagement interventions may
improve tax collection. There were no improvements for the other
state‐society relations outcomes (corruption perceptions or con-
fidence in institutions), although only two studies were identified for
each. It is therefore not possible to draw strong conclusions.
8.2 | Review question 2
In order to examine effects on immediate outcomes, service user and
service provider engagement were analysed separately. The main
finding from the analysis of user engagement outcomes is that
interventions incorporating PITA mechanisms are usually effective in
engaging service users, for example by improving meeting atten-
dance, contributions to community funds and general knowledge
about services. The average pooled effect on user engagement was
an increase of 0.23 standard deviations across all outcome measure.
When the findings were disaggregated by citizen engagement
intervention, the results indicated that pooled effect magnitudes
were similar and statistically significant for some intervention sub‐
groups (participatory priority setting, CBNRM, rights information,
citizen feedback mechanisms). Hence, in general, this review found
that interventions usually lead to improved citizen engagement
outcomes, as compared to standard public service delivery.
However, the effects of interventions promoting citizen engage-
ment on provider action outcomes are very limited. Overall, provider
responsiveness to the intervention tended to be small, by a small
pooled effect which was statistically insignificant. No significant
pooled effects were found for specific outcome measures such as
public spending, staff motivation, corruption or responses as
perceived by service users. Nor were there significant pooled effects
for intervention sub‐groups (participatory priority setting, CBNRM,
performance information, rights information, or citizen feedback
mechanisms). In sum, this review found that citizen engagement in
public services interventions do not usually trigger service provider
actions.
8.3 | Review question 3
Diversity and equity of impacts differ across population groups in
three ways. Overall, few of the studies reported disaggregated
intervention approaches and/or analysis of results for different
population groups. Nine programmes incorporated specific measures
within the intervention to extend the engagement to vulnerable
groups. These inclusive citizen engagement programmes tended to
have as big or bigger effects on user engagement and access to
services as other citizen engagement programmes. Across the whole
pool of included studies, 12 conducted sub‐group analysis to
differentiate impacts for different population groups, most commonly
by socio‐economic status and by sex of participant, yet these were
spread widely across intervention type and geography. This review
identified only one mixed‐methods study that conducted equity‐
oriented causal chain analysis to differentiate impacts for women.
Analysis by global region was not able to find consistent differences
by intervention or outcomes along the results chain. Ultimately, due
to the small sample of studies across a wide range of interventions
and outcomes, it was difficult to conclude anything systematically for
different population or geographic groups.
8.4 | Review question 4
Through the realist‐informed framework synthesis, this review
assessed the key contextual and implementation factors, along with
the barriers, facilitators and moderating factors that were influential
in shaping the results chains for each of the five intervention sub‐
groups. The initial results chain framework was further developed for
each intervention sub‐group, moving towards “best‐fit” framework
synthesis, to better reflect the different factors and steps in the
intervention causal chains.
Amongst participatory planning interventions, three facilitating
factors were identified that may improve the likelihood of achieving
results along the causal chain. First, strong local buy‐in for the
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participatory process, particularly where communities self‐selected
into the intervention may encourage more active and effective
engagement. Second, the incorporation of specific, culturally appro-
priate measures that address local barriers to the participation of
vulnerable groups may be key to ensuring that decisions taken reflect
pro‐poor values and outcomes. Finally, participatory planning
processes that engaged and/or stimulated the growth of local civil
society and capacity for collective action may be more sustainable
and more likely to achieve long‐term results.
Four contextual factors were identified that mediated results
chains amongst community‐based natural resource management
(CBNRM) interventions. Where interventions required large shifts in
control over the resource, representing a relinquishment of power
from local officials to community groups, lack of engagement and
buy‐in from local officials was a frequent barrier to the full
implementation of the CBNRM policy. Critically, this barrier often
resulted in situations in which community groups took on additional
responsibilities for resource management, but did not gain access to
the corresponding promised benefits. A related factor is the clarity of
the national CBNRM policy context; where there were multiple
vague and overlapping policies governing natural resource use,
officials were more able to adjust or block full implementation of
CBNRM in a way that preserved their power and control over
resource benefit access. External support to change resource use was
a key facilitating factor: even in the absence of full policy
implementation, access to alternative livelihoods such as tourism
may still enable communities to realise the joint socio‐economic and
environmental objectives of CBNRM. Finally, the type and intensity
of local resource use were key moderating factors influencing the
effectiveness of CBNRM; community management may not be
appropriate in contexts prone to illegal logging or poaching, where
attempts to enforce regulations may endanger community members.
Across citizen feedback and monitoring mechanism interventions,
four key facilitating factors were identified. First, there was a strong
distinction between projects targeting services delivered directly to
citizens by front‐line providers, such as healthcare, versus those that
citizens access independently of staff who implement and manage
the services, such as infrastructure. The social sanction threat of
individual citizens’ voices was not strong enough to spur improve-
ments amongst providers who do not interact with users on a regular
basis. Building on the criticality of sustained, direct engagement, the
findings suggest that interventions that took a phased, facilitated
approach to engaging citizens and service providers jointly in the
monitoring of service delivery may be able to trigger intrinsic
motivation within service providers and create a sense of working
towards a common goal, which may be more effective compared to
more confrontational town‐hall‐style meetings. The incorporation of
performance benchmarks was also a frequent facilitating factor to
enable community monitors to identify realistic opportunities for
local improvements in service delivery. Finally, ensuring the creation
of common knowledge around feedback or monitoring results, and
working through local community organisations were identified as
further facilitating factors that strengthened the weight of citizens’
voices and their power to hold service providers to account.
Rights information interventions were more likely to be
successful where they targeted the provision of services that
citizens access through interactions with service provider staff;
created a sense of common knowledge about people’s rights to the
service amongst both citizens and providers; and created an
appropriate level of social sanction risk for providers. An initial
critical factor is whether citizens’ lack of knowledge of their rights
was the key barrier preventing them from accessing services, as
opposed to an issue on the “supply” side of service delivery, such
as a lack of capacity amongst service providers to deliver the
service. Because rights information interventions rarely engage
with service providers, even where service use may change as
citizens effectively bargain for access, improvements in service
delivery quality are unlikely.
Finally, amongst performance information interventions, a key
facilitating factor was the extent to which implementers secured the
support of and buy‐in from the individuals whose performance was
being analysed and disseminated. Without such support, the findings
suggest that the targeted individuals may be able to avoid
accountability by either preventing full implementation of the
intervention, or by successfully undermining the credibility of the
performance information disseminated. Most of these interventions
targeted political actors’ performance (as opposed to sector‐specific
public services), in attempts to “shorten the long route” of citizen‐
state accountability by increasing citizen engagement with politicians
outside of elections. While interventions were at times successful in
eliciting some improvements in politician performance, the findings
suggest that, ultimately, this route remains too long to identify short‐
term effects on service delivery. Politicians may claim plausible
deniability of their individual capacity to influence service delivery
change, and such interventions do not engage many key actors
involved along the public service delivery supply chain.
A key factor influencing progression along the causal chains for
accountability and transparency‐for‐accountability interventions
in the framework synthesis was found to be whether interventions
targeted public services that were delivered to citizens directly by
front‐line providers, typically merit good services such as
healthcare, versus those that targeted purely public good services
delivered indirectly to citizens, such as roads. Disaggregating the
meta‐analysis amongst accountability interventions targeting
merit versus pure public good services suggested that citizen
engagement improved across all services. However, interventions
targeting directly delivered merit‐good services were better able
to elicit positive responses amongst service providers, a difference
which appeared to trigger a break in the causal chain for
interventions targeting indirectly‐delivered, pure public good
services. The findings showed positive effects for outcomes of
service quality and access amongst directly delivered services, but
insignificant findings on outcomes amongst interventions targeting
indirectly delivered pure public goods.
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8.5 | Review question 5
Cost effectiveness is a key question for decision making, yet it is
rarely incorporated into impact evaluations. Only four studies
presented any data on intervention costs, usually at highly
aggregated level (e.g. total cost of intervention) and only the study
of report cards in health in Uganda presented cost effectiveness
information (cost per under‐5 death averted). This limited the
potential for any analysis of comparisons across programmes and
settings.
9 | AUTHORS ’ CONCLUSIONS
9.1 | Implications for policy makers and
practitioners
The findings suggest interventions to improve governance through
citizen engagement in public services may be effective in stimulating
active citizen involvement and improving access to and the quality of
public services. Sustained, direct engagement between citizens and
service provider staff appears to be key: the biggest effects were
seen for interventions that targeted public service governance
through the “short route” of direct engagement between citizens
and service providers, and which targeted services that citizens
access directly from front‐line providers, typically merit goods such
as healthcare.
However, citizen engagement interventions alone do not typically
improve use of services and may not also lead to better wellbeing
outcomes for citizens or state‐society relations. The authors
hypothesise that this may be due to the absence of complementary
interventions to address bottlenecks over which citizens can have
limited access, such as service provider budgets and supply chains or
technical capacities.
Citizen engagement interventions were less successful where
there was less engagement between citizens and front‐line providers.
This occurred where interventions aimed to shorten the “long route”
of improving governance by increasing citizen pressures on politi-
cians to improve public services through politician performance
information, or where interventions targeted services such as
infrastructure, which citizens access independently of service
providers.
Interventions that work through local civil society groups and
stimulate capacity for collective action, particularly amongst vulner-
able groups, may be more effective than those that rely on engaging
unorganised citizens. This is particularly critical for public good
services such as infrastructure, wherein citizens must overcome the
collective action issue.
Interventions that obtain and sustain buy‐in from local public
service providers at the point of citizen engagement may be more
effective at creating appropriate threats of social sanctions and
stimulating intrinsic motivation to stimulate behaviour changes
amongst service providers to improve service delivery quality. This
is particularly critical in CBNRM, to ensure interventions do not do
unintentional harm by increasing the burden on communities for
resource management without enabling them to realise full access to
the benefits in return.
Interventions that do not incorporate specific measures to
facilitate the inclusion of vulnerable groups may not realise equitable
outcomes for those groups in the short‐term. Barriers to vulnerable
groups’ inclusion varies widely by context, and inclusion components
should be adapted in response to local contexts and needs.
9.2 | Implications for research
Impact evaluations need to “open intervention black boxes” by being
more transparent in reporting of intervention design and implemen-
tation fidelity, as standard. This also includes clearer reporting of the
comparison conditions received by groups outside of the interven-
tion. Authors may draw on frameworks for intervention reporting
guidelines, such as TIDieR in health sector research. Impact studies
also need to engage more consistently with equity issues, either by
evaluating intervention components specifically targeting equity,
collecting outcomes relevant for certain vulnerable groups, or at the
very least reporting outcomes subgroups for vulnerable groups. Most
studies collected outcomes data shortly after intervention, usually
within 5 years. There may be opportunities to examine outcomes
over longer periods cost‐effectively, for example by conducting more
follow‐up studies of existing trials, or by conducting ex post
evaluations using natural experiments.
In this review, the authors used theory‐based mixed‐methods
approaches to examine a wide range of interventions promoting
citizen engagement in public services governance, taking the PITA
mechanism as the unit of analysis. Further synthesis research
adopting this broader approach may focus on interventions to
improve other domains of governance (e.g. the compact between
state and service provider), combinations of domains (e.g. citizen
engagement plus compact), or by comparing citizen engagement with
other approaches to increase state capacity such as through better
monitoring of public service delivery agents. The authors also note
that systematic reviews usually focus on the effectiveness of
particular interventions, and new systematic reviews of specific
interventions (e.g. participatory budgeting, water user associations)
and updates of existing reviews (e.g. community monitoring,
education sector govnernance) are needed.
10 | THE PROBLEM: UNACCOUNTABLE
GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS AND POOR
SERVICE DELIVERY
10.1 | Background
The sustainability of global development investments depends on
strong institutions, citizen engagement, accountable governments,
and equitable economic growth (World Bank, 2017). Goal number 16
of the Sustainable Development Goals explicitly recognises the
importance of the development of effective, accountable and
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transparent institutions at all levels, and of ensuring responsive,
inclusive, participatory and representative decision‐making at all
levels (UNDP, 2016). In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,
donor and partner countries committed to improving their mutual
accountability and transparency in the use of development resources,
with partner countries further committing to systematically involve
diverse stakeholders in national development priority setting
processes (OECD/DAC, 2005). Many development challenges, such
as poor service delivery, corruption and slow growth, persist because
of the political context around them; they are as much about power
dynamics as they are technical challenges.
Improving the governance of public institutions and service
delivery has long been a central tenet of strategies for achieving or
supporting development; World Bank World Development Reports
since the late 1990s have included elements of improving govern-
ance as central to their theories of change (Grindle, 2004). In the
decades since, mainstream approaches to realising good governance
have shifted in focus, away from privatisation of service delivery and
towards a focus on increasing the engagement of constituents,
particularly vulnerable groups, with public institutions and service
providers in such ways to increase the effectiveness, appropriate-
ness, and quality of service delivery. The 2004 World Development
Report (WDR) highlighted the insight that public spending on service
delivery in developing countries often primarily reached the better‐
off minority of citizens; for example, in India, curative health
subsidies were primarily going to the richest 20 per cent of the
population, who received three times the subsidies of the poorest 20
per cent (World Bank, 2004). This insight remains pertinent. For
example, a recent evaluation of an e‐governance intervention in India
that aimed to improve transparency in a fiscal transfer system for a
social benefits programme suggested that while the intervention was
successful at reducing leakages, the savings did not translate into
improved outcomes for beneficiaries (Banerjee, Duflo, Imbert,
Mathew, & Pande, 2017). One of the authors later posited that this
may have been because the intervention did not empower the
ultimate beneficiaries to ensure that financial gains from reduced
corruption were converted into increased outcomes for poor people
(Page and Pande, 2018).
There are many definitions of governance. For the purposes of
this review, we use the recent definition employed by the World
Bank, where governance is defined as “the process through which
state and non‐state actors interact to design and implement policies
within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and are
shaped by power” (World Bank, 2017). Where characteristics of good
governance are weak or absent from public processes and service
delivery, the effectiveness and sustainability of development inter-
ventions is likely to suffer (World Bank, 2016). Barriers to access to
public services for vulnerable groups exacerbate inequality, with
potential long‐term repercussions for a society’s development (East-
erly, 2007). Fraud and corruption are pervasive across low‐ and
middle‐income countries, and the negative consequences on quality
of life and core development outcomes are well documented (Molina,
Carella, Pacheco, Cruces, & Gasparini, 2016; Svensson, 2005). Where
state and public actors cannot be effectively held accountable, a
culture of impunity develops that normalises fraud and rent‐seeking
practices. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2017 high-
lighted key repercussions of power asymmetries, including: exclusion
of large portions of society from services, institutions or resources,
which is correlated with violent conflict: elite and/or interest‐group
capture of policies in order to serve interests, resulting in poor
targeting and ineffective or inappropriate policies, which can lead to
poor or stagnant growth, condemning economies to an under‐
developed state; and clientelism, which often leads to rent‐seeking
and poor service delivery, which have long‐term repercussions on
societies’ growth (World Bank, 2017).
Despite the decades of acknowledgement of the importance of
good governance, progress has been slow; the Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators show limited to none or even negative progress on
key governance indicators amongst aggregates of low and lower‐
middle income countries from 2006 to 2016 (World Bank, 2018). The
repercussions of continued governance failures are high, and well
documented; for example, in Nigeria, unabated corruption led to the
squandering of billions of dollars by the National Petroleum
Company, jeopardizing the country’s long‐term growth potential
and financial stability (World Bank, 2017).
Approaches to improve governance have generally either focused
on mechanisms to strengthen the effectiveness and institutionalisa-
tion of public institutions, or on external pressures to improve service
delivery despite weak institutions. While each approach has yielded
valuable insights, translating insights from theory into practice has
been challenging. There is some evidence that at times, failures could
be due to an over‐emphasis of the demand side of governance by
service users, citizens and civil society, which ignores the constraints
faced on the supply side by politicians, bureaucrats and service
providers (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015), or of the power of
information (Wibbels & Keohane, 2018). More recently, insights are
emerging into the value of system‐based approaches that look at
both the supply and demand sides of governance as actors in a single
system, drawing on power analyses and social network theories (Fox,
2014; Halloran, 2015; Mcloughlin & Batley, 2012; Wibbels &
Keohane, 2018).
USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRC)
Center identified participation, accountability, transparency and inclu-
sion (PITA) as critical principles that could be incorporated into
interventions within and across sectors to improve development
outcomes, and in line with the Doing Development Differently global
initiative (USAID, 2016). We define participation as efforts to involve
citizens in the design, monitoring and delivery of policy and
programmes upstream (Quick & Feldman, 2011). Transparency is a
“characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and indivi-
duals of being open in the clear disclosure of information rules, plans,
processes and actions” (Transparency International, 2009: 44).
Accountability is the concept that individuals, agencies and organisa-
tions are held responsible for executing their powers according to a
certain standard downstream (McGee & Gaventa, 2011). Finally,
inclusion means a particular focus on marginalised and vulnerable
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citizens in policy and programming upstream or downstream (Quick
and Feldman, ibid).
10.2 | Interventions to strengthen good
governance
A recent evidence gap map (EGM) on interventions to improve
“state‐society relations” highlighted a number of interventions to
improve governance (Phillips et al., 2017). These were broadly
grouped into interventions for inclusive political processes and
leadership (e.g. community‐driven development, electoral monitoring,
and quotas for women and minority representation in political
institutions), and interventions for responsive and accountable
institutions and service delivery (e.g. audits, land reform and public
servant performance incentives).
Drawing on Phillips et al. (2017), and also insights from the
literature, we theorised good governance can come about through
sustained improvements across three domains: within the political
system; within the management and administration of public sector
offices and institutions; and in the ways in which public officials and
service providers engage with service users (external engagement)
(Waddington, Stevenson, Sonnenfeld, & Gaarder, 2018). In this
framing, good governance interventions attempt to influence the
social contract that mediates the relationships between government
and citizens, regarding who has access to what power and in return
for what accountability for service provision, through three
accountability domains:
• Influencing how the broader political system functions: The broader
political system dictates access to and contestability of the policy
arena (World Bank, 2017). This primarily comprises the checks and
balances, or “horizontal accountability” between institutions,
yet also includes political representation systems and thus, as an
extension, elements of “vertical accountability” that are exercised
through electoral systems (Transparency and Accountability
Initiative TAI, 2017). Increasingly, good governance interventions
seek to influence how this system functions, rather than the
specific form it takes (World Bank, 2017).
• Influencing how a specific public service or institution’s system
functions internally: Many good governance interventions aim to
improve service delivery through the institutionalisation of public
services and institutions. These interventions foster “internal
accountability” of institutions, and include, but are not limited to,
strengthening human resources management, systems of upwards
accountability of staff and management or between different levels
of government, and supply chains for infrastructure, goods, and
financial flows (Finan, Olken, & Pande, 2015).
• Influencing how a specific public service or institution engages
externally with constituents: These interventions aim to mediate
the ways that citizens engage with government and public service
providers outside of the “long route” of electoral processes (World
Bank, 2004). They work to improve service delivery through
“external accountability”, by increasing the engagement between
service providers and service users to improve the responsiveness
and effectiveness of public services. This comprises the informal
processes of vertical accountability, through which citizens, CSOs
and the media may attempt to influence political and public service
actors directly, as well as efforts towards “diagonal accountability,”
formalised processes in which citizens are engaged in horizontal
accountability efforts (Transparency and Accountability Initiative
TAI, 2017). In addition, it may include approaches which aim to
“shorten the long route” by providing information on performance
of public servants.
Many good governance interventions are designed to improve
service delivery for citizens. This is often done through interventions
that embody one or multiple PITA characteristics, which seek to
address power dynamics between the state, civil society and citizens
to make service delivery more effective and equitable (USAID, 2016).
PITA characteristics influence the functioning of the social contract
and its systems throughout each of the three accountability domains,
and thus, good governance interventions may target one or more of
these (Figure 1). For example, within the political system domain, the
PITA characteristics have a direct impact on who has access to the
electoral systems and who can contest the policy arena. Elected
officials must exercise some basic level of downwards accountability
towards the constituents who elected them (or, in non‐democratic
states, who grant them legitimacy), and sideways accountability to
their fellow statesmen through the checks and balances built into the
system. Interventions targeting PITA mechanisms in this domain tend
to focus on creating a fair system. Within the internal system domain,
interventions tend to focus on creating an efficient system, such as
through improving the upwards accountability of officials and service
providers to management, or through improving the relevance of
service provision at local levels through decentralisation. Finally, in
the external engagement domain, the PITA characteristics of a
service or institution mediate the means through which it engages
with citizens, civil society, and business/interest groups. These
interventions aim to address a more diverse set of system attributes,
primarily the relevance, effectiveness and inclusivity of the service
delivery system, and are further differentiated from those in the
previous domains through their reliance on soft power. The following
figure (Figure 1) provides some examples of interventions which
target the different domains of good governance.
The effectiveness of interventions that target the PITA char-
acteristics within one domain will be mediated by the context of the
other domains as well, the power relations and constraints, and also
by other interventions aiming to improve good governance and
service delivery, particularly those that target service delivery supply
chains. There is increasing scholarship that suggests that while
interventions improving the PITA characteristics of public services
and institutions, particularly in the external engagement domain, may
be necessary for achieving sustainable improvements in service
delivery and a stable social contract, they may not be sufficient (e‐
Pact Consortium, 2016). On the other hand, while interventions that
target strengthening PITA characteristics within internal institutional
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systems may be sufficient for improving governance within the
system, the impact of those governance improvements may not reach
the ultimate beneficiaries (citizens/service users) without the
incorporation of interventions strengthening the system’s external
PITA characteristics (Page & Pande, 2018).
10.3 | The focus of this review on citizen
engagement interventions
While recognising the interactions of interventions promoting PITA
mechanisms across each domain and with complementary good
governance and service delivery initiatives, it has been pointed out
that to attempt to cover the entirety of good governance interven-
tions in a single review would be “exceedingly ambitious” (Sáez,
2013). Thus, this review analysed the value‐addition of interventions
in the third domain, external PITA interventions targeting public
service and institution engagement with citizens.
Interventions promoting PITA mechanisms can be implemented
as stand‐alone interventions or as part of a larger programme
working to strengthen governance and service delivery. They may be
implemented either on the supply or demand side of service delivery,
or may target both simultaneously, such as a public audit process that
trains community members on tools to hold public officials
accountable, and works with public officials to increase their
understanding of the importance of downwards accountability. An
intervention may strengthen one or multiple PITA characteristics of
the ways public services and institutions engage with their
constituents.
For the purposes of this review, the definitions of PITA were
operationalised as follows:
• Participation: The intervention promotes or formalises continuous
citizen input in the design and implementation of public services,
processes or policies. Participation interventions create specific
opportunities or processes for citizens to provide meaningful input
into public policy or strategy design and planning. An example of a
participation intervention is the introduction of participatory
budgeting so that citizens may directly contribute to the
development of a budget proposal (Touchton & Wampler, 2014).
A community‐level example could be the creation and capacity
building of a representative community‐based natural resource
management committee that is mandated to develop and monitor
locally agreed standards and regulations for the use of common
property.
• Accountability: The intervention encompasses monitoring and soft/
social accountability mechanisms to encourage or actively hold
individuals, public service providers and institutions responsible
for executing their powers and mandates according to a certain
standard. Accountability interventions create opportunities or
processes for constituents to monitor the government and public
service providers. An example is a project to encourage and build
the capacity of civil society to hold government accountable for
the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources
(USAID, 2016), or a citizen report card intervention, in which a
community group is taught the quality standards to which they are
entitled and how to monitor the quality and performance of
service delivery, and then to work with the service providers to
address any identified issues through a mutually agreed action
plan.
• Transparency: The intervention involves the disclosure and/or
dissemination of information about rights of public service users,
to promote participation, and/or performance of public service
providers, to promote accountability. Transparency interventions
included in our review have the explicit aim of changing the way
that citizens and service providers or public officials interact and
the power relations between service providers and users. An
F IGURE 1 PITA throughout the three
domains of good governance Notes: P:
Participation | I: Inclusion | T:
Transparency | A: Accountability. Source:
Authors
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example is local clinics posting information about patient
rights, service fees and standards, and budget execution (USAID,
2016), which restricts the scope for service providers to charge
bribes.
• Inclusion: The intervention includes particular strategies to
promote the opportunities and capacities of marginalised and
vulnerable groups such as women, ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people to engage with
the management of public institutions and service providers.
Hence, we define inclusion specifically as a component of an
intervention that targets a change in participation, transparency or
accountability. An example of an intervention to promote inclusion
is ensuring that a certain proportion of places in a community
governance group are reserved for women (Humphreys, de la
Sierra, & van der Windt, 2012).
The intervention categories are described in more detail below
(see Table 4 in the Methodology section). While most interventions
contribute primarily to a single PITA mechanism as described above,
there is often significant interplay between the PITA characteristics
to which an intervention contributes. Though efforts have been made
to make the definitions mutually exclusive, a single intervention may
contribute to strengthening multiple PITA characteristics. The
obvious cases here are interventions for transparency and inclusion.
For example, a transparency intervention that improves access to
information about users’ rights may aim ultimately to improve user
participation, while one aiming to improve information about public
service performance ultimately aims to improve accountability.
Further, interventions included in the review that are designed to
improve the access of a marginalised group of citizens (inclusion) to a
decision‐making process aim, at an intermediate outcome level, to
improve the group’s input into the process by providing increased
opportunities for consultation (participation), or service delivery
monitoring (accountability).
10.4 | How citizen engagement interventions might
work
We developed a stylised model showing an indicative theory of
change for how the interventions may work at the protocol stage
(Figure 2). The theory of change is represented as a series of “blocks,”
though the authors recognise that change is not always linear and
may be multi‐directional. The numbers represent typical hypothe-
sised progression, and enable signposting to the key stages of the
change process in the text. Circles are used to represent underlying
assumptions and key factors that facilitate, moderate or create
bottlenecks along the casual chain. This preliminary theory of change
developed in the systematic review protocol (Waddington et al.,
2018) drew on insights from the literature and programmatic best
practices. In particular, the framework built on the 2004 World
Development Report (World Bank, 2004) theory of change, which
articulated the importance of pro‐poor governance practices that
actively engage end users for effective outcomes, and Rahman and
Robinson (2006) who articulated the importance of local ownership
and long‐term support. The assumptions and moderating factors
drew on insights from Fox (2014), Page and Pande (2018), and the
2017 WDR (World Bank, 2017), among others. We have not taken a
“rights‐based approach” that views improvements in PITA character-
istics as the end objective. While recognising the value of PITA
characteristics in and of themselves, the focus of this review is on the
value‐add they bring to improving development outcomes through
improved service delivery.
We note here a useful distinction between the demand and
supply side of governance. Implementers may target stakeholders on
the demand‐side of governance, such as through efforts to improve
the capacity of civil society to monitor government service delivery,
or the supply‐side, such as by training public officials on pro‐poor
development planning. Other interventions may be geared to
affecting both demand‐ and supply‐sides, such as a participatory
budgeting process in which government officials are trained on the
TABLE 1 Summary of criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies
Criteria Inclusion definition
Population Programme participants in LMICs were included. Programme participants in high‐income countries were excluded.
Interventions Interventions with PITA components that targeted the means and mechanisms through which public institutions and services
engage with constituents (service users) were included. Interventions that bundled PITA components alongside other
programme components such as block grants (e.g. community‐driven development), or that aimed to strengthen internal or
sideways PITA, or those in the education sector were excluded.
Comparisons Populations that received “business as usual” service access, or an intervention with a different type or degree of PITA were
included.
Outcomes Intermediate and endpoint, intended or unintended outcomes at participant and project level were included. Outcomes relating
to political processes (e.g. voting) were excluded. Immediate outcomes relating to citizen engagement (e.g. participation in
meetings) or public service response (e.g. public spending) were eligible for the review provided that outcomes relating to
access to services (e.g. facilities construction) or intermediate outcomes (e.g. service use) or final outcomes (e.g. health,
nutrition, state‐society relations) were also reported.
Study designs Counterfactual studies (review questions 1‐4), including relevant programme and project documents providing information on
design and implementation (review question 4) and cost evidence provided in counterfactual studies (review question 5) were
included.
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TABLE 3 Reasons for inclusion and exclusion of similar interventions
Include Exclude Rationale
Intervention: Tuungane Humphreys et al. (2012) Intervention: Mandated political
representation for women (Iyer et al., 2011)
Both these interventions incorporate quotas to
ensure women’s participation. However, in
Humphreys et al. (2012) the intervention
creates quotas for women’s participation in an
external citizen engagement intervention,
whereas the Iyer et al. 2011 study targets the
“I” characteristics of the formal political
system, which is not the governance domain
of focus for this review.
Country: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Country: India
PITA: P, I PITA: I
Summary: The Tuungane evaluation measures
the impact of the social mobilisation
interventions of this CDR project through an
experiment in which both treatment and
control communities receive a small grant, and
their inclusive decision‐making capacities are
evaluated (P). Further, intervention
communities were randomly assigned to
require gender parity in decision‐making
groups or not, and thus the value‐add of
quotas for women’s participation can be
isolated (I). In this case, the quotas ensure
women citizens are able to contribute to
community decision‐making, on par with male
citizens.
Summary: This paper looks at the impact of
introducing quotas for women’s participation
in local government councils (I). However,
these are elected positions wherein the
incumbents are formal government
employees. Thus, while such a change may
impact women citizen’s access to public
officials, it does not create specific
opportunities for private citizens to engage
with public officials.
Intervention: Joint Forestry Management
Persha and Meshack, (2016)
Intervention: Decentralisation of Water
Supply Asthana (2012)
Though both cases focus on the management of
common‐good natural resources, and both
look at the impact of decentralisation, the
Asthana (2012) study only devolves power
from one level of government to a lower level,
and thus resides within the sphere of internal
systems management, as citizens are not
engaged in the process. The Persha and
Meshak 2016 study, in contrast, empowers
communities to create their own rules for
managing natural resources, which may differ
from state‐level rules.
Country: Tanzania Country: India
PITA: P PITA: T
Summary: This study evaluates
Summary: This intervention devolves control
over common resource management
completely, from the government to
communities (P). Thus, communities are
empowered to create their own rules for
natural resource use, and they share
accountability with the government for the
enforcement of those rules.
the impact of decentralisation from state‐level
government to local government. Thus,
though the intervention was designed to
reduce corruption, it does not engage citizens
in the process or create specific opportunities
for them to engage.
Intervention: Citizen Report Cards Björkman,
Reinikka, and Svensson (2006)
Intervention: MIRA Makwanpur Manandhar
et al. (2004)
Though both of these health‐sector interventions
work to identify challenges and develop action
plans to improve outcomes, the Björkman,
Reinikka, and Svensson (2006) study enables
citizens to hold public health providers
accountable for delivering services, and jointly
develops strategies for improvement to which
the health providers are accountable. In
Manandhar et al. (2004), the women’s groups
are empowered to take responsibility for their
own healthy practices; there are no
requirements on the health service providers to
take responsibility for addressing challenges the
women identify. The intervention aims to
change health outcomes outside the sphere of
public service delivery.
Country: Uganda Country: Nepal
PITA: A PITA: P
Summary: This study looks at the impacts of an
intervention in which “report cards” of health
service provision were disseminated amongst
communities (T), and a series of interface
meetings between service providers and
citizens were organised to review the reports
and identify an action plan for improvements
(A).
Summary: This intervention formed
community‐based, participatory women’s
health groups with the aim of identifying key
local challenges and potential solutions (P),
with the ultimate goal of improving birth
outcomes.
Intervention: Raskin subsidy identification cards
Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle, Olken, and Sumarto
(2018)
Intervention: Ciudad Mujer (Women’s City)
Bustelo, Martinez, Millard, and Silva (2016)
Both of these interventions aim to increase
citizens’ knowledge of their rights to access
services (or public subsidies). However, the
intervention in Bustelo et al. (2016) was
purely about access to services; it did not aim
to change the way that women engaged with
public service providers, except to encourage
them to take advantage of the services. In
contrast, the experiment in Banerjee et al.
Country: Indonesia Country: El Salvador
PITA: T PITA: T
Summary: This study presents the results of an
experiment in which recipients of the Raskin
food subsidy were sent cards confirming their
Summary: This intervention created “one stop
shops” for a variety of public services
targeted to women, under the auspices of a
(Continues)
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value of participatory budgeting, while community members are
trained and supported to participate in the process.
The indicative theory of change presents the hypothesised causal
chain for citizen engagement interventions, from changed opportu-
nities for and capacities of citizens, followed by behavioural changes
on both the supply and demand side of governance, ultimately
leading to improved service delivery performance and enhanced
quality of life outcomes for citizens. The indicative causal chain was
developed in the systematic review protocol stage to articulate the
main causal pathways through which interventions targeting public
services’ and institutions’ external engagement with citizens may
lead to improved development outcomes. Some interventions may
contribute to all the pathways; others may only contribute to
particular ones. We build on, and further refine, theories of change
for specific intervention sub‐groups in the framework synthesis
(Review Question 4).
Beginning with the intervention on the left‐hand side, the figure
follows a primary causal chain, with immediate, intermediate and
endpoint outcomes indicated in boxes, and key assumptions in
bubbles. The theory of change starts with critical assumptions of the
design, inception and implementation phases: first, that the inter-
vention designed is relevant and addresses an identified local need;
second, during inception that wider community acceptance for the
intervention has been sought and received from key social, religious
and political leaders; and finally, that community mobilisation
activities are undertaken during implementation. Similar to how the
quality of PITA characteristics in the public planning and service
delivery spheres contributes to strengthening the corresponding
development outcomes, the strength and quality of the PITA
characteristics of the intervention itself are suggested to contribute
to its efficacy.
The exact form of the intervention (Block 1) will vary widely, yet
the majority aim to create an enabling environment for increased and
mutually empowering interactions between service providers and
citizens through changes to their knowledge, attitude and practices
(KAPs). On the demand side, this may include efforts to improve
citizens’ knowledge of the services to which they are entitled; their
capacity to demand those services through key tools; and/or their
sense of self‐efficacy and empowerment to do so effectively. An
intervention focused on a technical skill such as participatory
TABLE 3 (Continued)
Include Exclude Rationale
(2018) had the explicit aim of attempting to
reduce corruption in the subsidy programme
by limiting service providers’ ability to direct
who received the subsidy and who didn’t.
Thus, in this latter case, the change in
knowledge changes the power relations
between service provider and user.
right to the subsidy; an alternative
intervention in which lists of eligible
households in communities were publicly
displayed; and a control set where there were
no changes in publication of eligibility for the
subsidy. The aim was to test the effect of these
different transparency initiatives on reducing
corruption in subsidy provision.
health facility. When women arrived, they
would take part in an orientation that
explained all of the different services they
could access at the facility, improving their
knowledge of their rights to services (T).
Intervention: random federal government
audits of transfers to sub‐national government
and publication of results to citizens Timmons
and Garfias (2015)
Intervention: increase in the number of
government audits (Olken (2007), audit arm)
Both interventions use a “top‐down” audit to
improve accountability. In the case of Olken
(2007), the audit is undertaken by the
government auditor (which constitutes an
“internal accountability” intervention by our
definitions) and is presented to communities
(which constitutes a transparency
intervention for “external accountability”).
The probability of being audited is known to
be very low in control arms, whereas it is
known to be 100 per cent in treatment arms.
Hence the study is not able to disentangle the
effect of the internal and external
accountability interventions and is therefore
excluded from the review.
Country: Indonesia
Country: Brazil PITA: A
PITA: T
In contrast, the probability of audit in Timmons
and Garfias (2015) is randomly determined;
the threat is equal in all municipalities. We
therefore consider that the main mechanism
being evaluated is the publication of the
results of the audit to citizens. The study thus
evaluates the effect of providing performance
information to enable citizens to hold public
officials accountable, with the aim of changing
power relations between public officials and
citizens.
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TABLE 4 Included interventions and associated PITA mechanisms
Intervention type Intervention definition PITA Mechanism(s) Included studies
Rights information provision Provides information about citizen rights to access
services or rights to participate in participatory
processes
Transparency for
improved
participation
• Olken (2007) – Indonesia,
invitations only intervention
group
• Kassim (2016) – Pakistan
• Ravallion et al. (2013) – Bihar,
India
• Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle, Olken,
and Sumarto (2016) – Indonesia
• Pandey et al. (2007) – India
Performance information
provision
Provides citizens with information about
performance of politicians or public service
providers, including report cards
Transparency for
improved
accountability
• Humphreys & Weinstein (2012)
– Uganda
• Grossman & Michelitch (2018) –
Uganda
• Timmons & Garfias (2015) –
Brazil
• Capuno & Garcia (2010) –
Philippines
• Banerjee et al. (2014) –
Rajasthan, India
• Fiala & Premand (2017) –
Uganda, scorecard only group
Citizen feedback and
monitoring
Interventions to allow citizens to feedback
concerns or priorities around service delivery to
providers, and / or to monitor the delivery of
public service delivery. This includes community
scorecards and social audits.
Accountability • Olken (2007) – Indonesia,
invitations + feedback group
• Berman et al. (2017) –
Afghanistan
• Alhassan et al. (2016) – Ghana
• Grossman et al. (2017) –
Uganda
• Björkman et al. (2009; 2017;
incorporating Donato & Garcia,
2016) – Uganda
• Bradley & Igras (2005) – Kenya
& Guinea
• Palladium (2015) – DR Congo
• Gullo et al. (2017) – Malawi
• Fiala & Premand (2017) –
Uganda
• Molina (2014) – Colombia
Participatory planning Interventions to introduce or facilitate public
participation in public institutions' decision‐
making processes, priority setting or
budget allocation decisions, including
participatory budgeting
Participation (+
inclusive planning*)
• Touchton & Wampler (2014) –
Brazil
• Gonclaves (2013) – Brazil
* inclusive planning * Interventions that mandate the participation of
the whole community or marginalised groups into
planning processes
• Diaz‐Cayeros et al. (2014) –
Mexico
• Beuermann & Amelina (2014) –
Russia
• Ananthpur et al. (2014) –
Karnataka, India
• Giné et al. (2018) – Pakistan
(Continues)
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budgeting may start with capacity building on budgeting processes
and the role that citizens can play; interventions that aim to increase
inclusion of marginalised groups often start with community
campaigns to raise awareness amongst the target households.
On the supply side, either in addition to demand‐side efforts or
independently, interventions aim to strengthen openness from and
active engagement with supply‐side stakeholders in efforts to
improve service delivery. These may target the actors implementing
or managing the service in question, but also other key stakeholders
in the community and throughout the system. Seeking and attaining
community acceptance prior to implementation is a widely‐applied
best practice for ensuring that development projects do no harm and
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Intervention type Intervention definition PITA Mechanism(s) Included studies
• Humphreys et al. (2014) – DR
Congo*
• Beath et al. (2013) –
Afghanistan*
Community‐based natural
resource management
(CBNRM) committees
Devolution of some part of the management of a
natural resource to a community group while the
government retains some powers. This includes
Water User Associations (WUAs) and
Community‐Based Forest Management (CBFM)
organisations
Participation • Bandyopadhyay et al., (2004) –
Namibia
• Bandyopadhyay et al., (2010) –
Philippines
• Persha & Meshack. (2016) –
Tanzania
• Rasaalofosen et al., (2015) –
Madagascar
• Tachibana & Adhikari (2009) –
Nepal
• Barde (2017) – Brazil
• Huang (2014) – China
F IGURE 2 Indicative theory of change
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that they will have sufficient buy‐in from the community to be
successful. There is some evidence that suggests that this may be
particularly critical for PITA mechamisms. Securing buy‐in from
stakeholders at the point of intervention, upstream and downstream
along the service delivery / good governance supply chain may create
an enabling environment for interventions to successfully navigate
the social network and power differences within which the
intervention is implemented (Mcloughlin & Batley, 2012).
Different tools implemented as elements of citizen engagement
interventions may require different conditions to be effective; the
framework synthesis process aimed to identify these. The context
also influences what works and how; for example, if a political player
can increase his or her own personal power through framing an
improvement in service delivery as a personal “win,” then she or he
may be more motivated to work for its improvement (e‐Pact, 2016).
The first immediate outcome (Block 2) posits that through
engaging in the interventions, citizens will increase their engagement
with State and public service officials. This is often an explicit aim of
citizen engagement interventions, as it is a critical precursor to the
higher‐level outcomes. Through the increased engagement, the next
level of change (Block 3) posits that citizens develop a better
understanding of processes, services, and the constraints faced by
service providers, while simultaneously, service providers gain a
deeper understanding of the needs of their constituents and
appreciation for the engagement process.
In subtle ways, these changes reflect renegotiations of power
relations between the State, civil society and citizens, mitigating the
power imbalances. This happens as the citizen engagement inter-
ventions shift the dynamics of power by drawing on collective and
representative voice.
• Participation interventions address power relations by building in
meaningful opportunities for citizens to provide input over the
direction of policies that affect them and the supply of services
they rely on.
• Inclusion interventions address power relations by bringing
marginalised voices to the table.
• Transparency interventions address power relations by limiting the
government and public service providers’ capacities to use their
positions for personal gain, and addressing the power difference
caused by knowledge gaps.
• Accountability interventions address power relations by increasing
the risk and severity of informal social sanctions against poorly
performing bureaucrats and service providers.
Power relations are dynamic; they can change quickly, both for
the better and worse, and gains are not necessarily secure. A key
assumption here is that supply‐side actors are fully engaged
throughout the process; otherwise, the attempts to increase soft
power by citizens may be seen as confrontational rather than
collaborative, which could de‐incentivise service providers from the
process to avoid being seen to give up any of their power (World
Bank 2004). Where PITA processes are seen as collaborative, they
can be mutually empowering, creating changes in the interactions
between state and society that simultaneously give citizens greater
input into the provision of the services they rely on, and strengthen
the standing of the service providers in the community (Fox, 2014).
Where interventions are unsuccessful at building coalitions to
facilitate an enabling environment for change, they may not be
successful at changing power relations, as actors may adapt to new
systems (Halloran, 2015). For example, though advancements in the
field of information and communications technology (ICT) offer
exciting possibilities for strengthening external PITA characteristics,
a change in technology that is not complemented by supporting
interventions that create an enabling environment may fall flat
(Hogge, 2010).
As the power relations are shifting and engagement is increasing,
a core intermediate outcome of the interventions will emerge (Block
4): public service delivery will improve in efficiency, effectiveness,
and equity. Once public officials and service providers are taking into
account the input of community members, the selection and
targeting of services will improve. This will improve the effectiveness
and appropriateness of public service delivery. Inclusion interven-
tions improve the equality of service provision, as they increase
access to services and processes for the most vulnerable community
members. Transparency initiatives increase the efficiency of public
service delivery, as they streamline costs and processing times, and
make it harder for politicians and officials to demand inflated
payments for services. Finally, accountability initiatives can have
direct benefits to the performance of public service delivery, as
citizen feedback mechanisms such as Public Audits end with joint
workshops between the service provider, citizen representatives, and
other key stakeholders to come up with an actionable plan to which
all parties can be held to account for how they will address the major
issues identified and improve service delivery.
The key assumption here is that institutions have the capacity to
respond to priorities requested and issues raised by constituents.
This is a critical assumption, because in its absence, the interventions
risk doing harm by having a negative consequence on perceptions of
State effectiveness resulting from raised and then unmet expecta-
tions. For example, the 2017 WDR highlights the risk that
investments in service provider capacities may not be enough to
improve service delivery, if power relations within the institution are
not addressed (World Bank, 2017). Further, depending on the
structure of the intervention, improvements may be related to a
one‐off change in the situation that is not sustained; many citizen
engagement interventions are designed as experiments, whose study
design may capture short‐term gains that revert back to the baseline
conditions with time. Fung et al. suggest that transparency interven-
tions contribute to improvements only when the information
provided becomes embedded in the decision‐making process (2005).
In some cases, citizen engagement interventions, particularly
those that focus on improving access to services for marginalised
groups (inclusion), may not lead to the active, empowered engage-
ment between citizens and service providers that leads to mitigated
power differences and improved services. However, they could still
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lead to increased access to public services, particularly amongst
vulnerable populations (Block 5). This comes about as a direct result
of citizen engagement interventions relying on inclusion and
transparency (information dissemination) mechanisms, but also
through the other interventions; as communities are mobilised to
engage with their local government and services, they become more
invested in the services that they are attempting to improve. And
thus, they are more likely to take advantage of those services, as they
understand the importance of ensuring high quality service provision
for themselves and their families. However, increased access for
marginalised groups is not a given outcome of citizen engagement
interventions; there likely needs to be concerted, targeted efforts to
reach and engage these groups in order for the impacts to reach
them (E‐Pact Consortium, 2016). Similarly, interventions targeting
services where changes are relatively immediate and visible may be
more likely to encourage buy‐in and support from supply‐side actors
(ibid.).
The joint effects of changes from Blocks 4 and 5 lead to improved
use of public services anduser satisfaction (Block 6). Further along
the causal chain, wellbeing outcomes may also improve (Block 7).
Wellbeing outcomes will vary by intervention sector (e.g. health,
social protection, justice, natural resource management), and are
more likely to improve in complementary enabling environments. In
the majority of citizen engagement programmes, the PITA character-
istics interventions are add‐ons to core interventions and outcomes
in a public service sector. In the long run, all three intermediate
outcomes contribute to wellbeing outcomes. A key assumption is that
sustained support is provided to the institutions or service providers
charged with maintaining the implementation of the intervention,
such that it becomes institutionalised. As noted above, power
differences are dynamic and constantly evolving. Thus, a short‐term
project may well change outcomes in the short‐term, but without
proper support those gains may easily be lost.
Finally, it is increasingly thought that citizen engagement
interventions, through the immediate outcomes increasing engage-
ment with government and public officials and mitigating the power
differences, can have a positive impact on perceptions of state
effectiveness – or state‐society relations – when services and
development outcomes improve as a result (World Bank, 2017)
(Block 8). As citizens engage with public processes and services, they
learn more about the constraints under which these institutions
operate. As they see increased responsiveness of public officials, and
subsequent real improvements in the quality of services they receive,
their perceptions of State effectiveness and legitimacy will increase.
This is particularly critical in fragile and post‐conflict Sates, where the
State may still be vying with other actors for legitimacy over
governing and control. There may also be reinforcing feedback from
improved state‐society relations (block 8) to use of services (block 6).
The context in which this theory of change, or elements of the
same, are implemented has strong ramifications for the ways in
which the interventions must be designed, implemented and
supported in order to ensure success. Governance programmes are
generally implemented in resource‐poor contexts, where there are
entrenched problems around low levels of education and capacity,
high turnover amongst public officials, and endemic corruption.
Target communities are frequently difficult to access, either due to
remoteness and extreme weather, or to conflict and insecurity. It is
precisely because of these challenges that governance interventions
are so strongly needed in such areas, but they must be taken into
account during the design phase to ensure risks are appropriately
mitigated. These factors breed vicious cycles of weak public service
supply, which leads to weak demand, which in turn facilitates weaker
public financial management, and so on. In an ideal world, the citizen
engagement interventions would create a virtuous circle of active
community engagement in their government and service provision.
Interventions tailored to the specific context in which they are
implemented, that target both the demand and supply sides of good
governance, are more likely to be successful, particularly when the
interventions are supplemented by complementary ones that target
the technical side of service delivery and/or service delivery supply
chains. For example, in the Philippines, a project focusing on
improving access and quality of maternal and child health and family
planning included social accountability mechanisms in the form of
Quality Assurance Partnership Committees, which Brinkerhoff and
Wetterberg (2015) argue led to more effective service delivery that
improved the client‐focus of providers and increased service use.
Additional factors that may influence an intervention’s results
include top‐down political will, which is key to ensuring that local
government officials and service providers have the capacity to
implement the changes they agree to with their constituents is
having the support of the higher levels of government, which can
ensure that funds are appropriately allocated. Political will further
influences the sustainability of the results, and the possibility of a
change in administration poses a risk to programmes that may be cut
due to high association with the outgoing regime.
It is important at this point to also highlight two broad issues
which determine the effectiveness of programmes, relating to
intervention design and implementation fidelity. There are two main
reasons why we might not expect to see the intended impacts of a
programme implemented in the “real world” (Bamberger et al., 2010).
The first is that the programme design is inappropriate – that is the
underlying mechanisms that drive change are not appropriate for the
context in which the programme is based, or for particular groups of
participants in that context (Pawson, 2006). According to van der
Knaap et al. (2007: 3), “mechanisms are the engines behind behavior,
which are often not immediately recognizable… They [include]
people’s efforts to give way to group pressure (groupthink), people’s
efforts to be status‐congruent with others or to avoid or reduce
cognitive dissonances, or people’s desire to be an early adopter of an
innovation. [T]he action of mechanisms to some extent depends on
the context in which they are used… Behavioral change is achieved
through this context”.
An example would be a community driven development
programme that is supposed to rely on community participation to
foster social cohesion, but is unable to support the appropriate level
of participation, and therefore cohesion, because people are not
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comfortable speaking in public meetings due to elite capture (White,
Menon, & Waddington, 2018). Similarly, interventions to decentralise
decision making in schools are less likely to be effective in low
income, low education contexts where communities have low status
relative to school staff (Carr‐Hill et al., 2018). Another example
would be a women’s empowerment programme which is ineffective
in reaching a particular group of participants (e.g. women from
Muslim households) because it does not take into consideration the
need to involve community leaders in design of the programme
targeting strategy.
Such “failure mechanisms” will vary based on intervention design
and targets; for example, in some cultures, traditional community
leaders may be critical stakeholders to engage in interventions
seeking to change the equity of or access to services, despite the
disconnect between their de facto and de jure power – but only
depending on the service targeted. Baldwin and Raffler (2016)
argued that traditional leaders are often highly socially accountable
for public services such as conflict resolution or natural resource
management, but less so for services such as education or health
care. In that case, an intervention targeting equitable access to and
use of public land may fail if it does not engage traditional leaders,
but a similar intervention simply targeting equitable access to and
use of health services may still be successful. Failures may also come
in the form of unintended consequences; for example, Chong et al.
(2014) found that increasing the dissemination of corruption
information to voters in Mexico decreased support not only for
exposed corrupt politicians, but also for all political parties, and led to
a decrease in voter turnout.
The second reason is due to implementation failures for a
programme that otherwise (in theory) would be effective in the
implementation context. Examples would be technical and logistical
problems relating to project delivery (e.g. inadequate training and
support to practitioners); weaknesses in implementer systems (e.g.
human resource, financial or monitoring); or due to external factors
(e.g. conflict, natural disasters).
10.5 | Why it is important to do this review
The 2017 World Development Report (World Bank, 2017) posits that
rather than asking which policies to implement, the global develop-
ment community needs to ask what enables policies to achieve
sustainable outcomes, the answer to which being better governance.
This report is timely in a context in which donors are actually moving
away from funding governance projects. Data from the OECD
Creditor Reporting System of Official Development Assistance
(ODA) shows declining funding in the government and civil society
sector, from US$ 14.5 billion in 2009 to around US$ 12 billion in
2015, a decrease of almost 20 per cent. During the same time period,
overall ODA increased from US$ 103 billion to US$ 118 billion
(OECD, 2017). Therefore, it appears that the share of aid to
governance and civil society also fell from around 14 per cent to
10 per cent, or an increasing share that was traditionally counted
under governance is instead being incorporated into sector program-
ming (health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, etc).
Governance programmes are implemented in complex socio‐
political contexts, and involve many challenges in realising, demon-
strating, and attributing improvements towards key outcomes.
USAID (2017) notes that the lack of consistent definition of
governance and poor understanding and weak documentation of
evidence of governance‐related interventions contribute to a
reticence to invest in such programmes. This could explain why
donors are shifting their attention towards other sectors; over the
same time period (2009 to 2015), funding for economic infrastruc-
ture and services increased by US$ 7.5 billion, while funding for
health programmes increased by US$ 700 million (OECD, 2017).
In addition, prominent single study evidence has questioned the
viability of bottom‐up, community‐based approaches, as compared to
top‐down government accountability (Olken, 2007). However, it is
not clear whether the findings from single studies are transferable to
other contexts. This points to the need to strengthen the synthesis
and dissemination of the evidence base, and to encourage decision
makers to draw on systematic evidence collected from the
implementation of programmes in multiple contexts.
This systematic review examines interventions that promote
more effective and responsive public services and institutions,
defined under Sustainable Development Goal number 16 as institu-
tions that “deliver equitable public services and inclusive develop-
ment at the central and local levels, with a particular focus on
restoring core government functions in the aftermath of crisis and
attention to local governance and local development” (UNDP, 2016).
The review makes two main contributions. The first is to provide
systematic evidence on PITA for citizen engagement in development
programming (outside of the education sector) in L&MICs. Molina
et al. (2016) presented a systematic review of community monitoring
studies in L&MICs. King, Samii, and Snilstveit (2010) and White et al.
(2018) systematically reviewed community driven development.
Hanna, Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler, and Durlacher (2011) systematically
reviewed anti‐corruption interventions and Lynch et al. (2013)
reviewed of the effect of interventions that improve community
accountability on service delivery and corruption.1 Other systematic
reviews have focused on education governance (Guerrero, Leon,
Zapata, Sugimaru, & Cueto, 2012; Carr‐Hill et al., 2015; Snilstveit
et al., 2015). Relevant non‐systematic evidence syntheses include
Olken & Pande (2013), Azulai et al. (2014), Dal Bó and Finan (2016),
Brinkerhoff, Jacobstein, Kanthor, Rajan., and Shephard (2017) and
the Metaketa project (EGAP 2018).
The second main contribution of the review is to undertake the
systematic review and meta‐analysis to Campbell Collaboration
standards while also aiming to extract the mechanisms underlying
programmes and reporting those systematically. We did so by
including certain types of comparison groups that would enable us to
1Killias et al. (2016) are registering a review on the effectiveness of anti‐corruption
measures. The study protocol is available from the Campbell library: https://www.
campbellcollaboration.org/media/k2/attachments/Killias_Corruption_Protocol.pdf.
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extract the effect of the PITA mechanism over standard access to
public services (or a different PITA mechanism). We also system-
atically extracted information about the contextual factors and
mechanisms and through which programmes operate systematically,
based on the included studies and related programme and project
documents, and synthesised those using a framework synthesis
approach.
As policy makers and implementers work to ensure the sustain-
ability of their investments and interventions, institutionalising good
governance practices will become increasingly important. This systema-
tic review assesses the effectiveness of interventions that target
participation, inclusion, transparency and accountability in the design
and delivery of public services and institutions on development
outcomes. Analysis of causal pathways and mechanisms will shed light
on the contexts in which these interventions can be successful and
corresponding enabling factors. The review aims to provide evidence on
what is generalisable, what is context specific, in what ways, and for
whom in external accountability governance programming.
11 | OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this review was to identify, appraise and
synthesise evidence that answers the question: to what extent are
programmes in low‐and middle‐income countries targeting effective
and responsive public services and institutions that incorporate PITA
characteristics into their design effective in achieving their objec-
tives, as compared to otherwise similar programmes that do not?
Authors compared the effectiveness of different types of pro-
grammes that incorporate PITA characteristics, both by intervention
sub‐group and by which PITA mechanism(s) the intervention
incorporates, using an innovative, integrated mixed‐methods ap-
proach that drew on both quantitative meta‐analysis (Review
Questions 1‐3) and qualitative realist‐informed framework synthesis
approaches that were then reintegrated with the meta‐analysis
(Review Question 4).
The secondary objectives were to assess how effects varied by
population group and location, to identify the factors relating to
programme design, implementation, context, and mechanism that are
associated with better or worse outcomes along the causal chain and
assess the evidence on programme costs. To address these last two
objectives, the review included additional programme design and
implementation documents as well as cost data where possible. The
review aimed to answer the following specific questions:
Primary review questions
1) What are the effects of interventions that aim to strengthen the
PITA characteristics of public services or institutions on social and
economic wellbeing for participants? (Review Question 1).
2) What are the effects of interventions that aim to strengthen the
PITA characteristics on participatory, inclusive, transparent or
accountable processes? (Review Question 2).Secondary review
questions
3) To what extent do effects vary by population group and location?
(Review Question 3).
4) What factors relating to programme design, implementation,
context, and mechanism are associated with better or worse
outcomes along the causal chain? (Review Question 4).
5) What evidence is available on programme costs and incremental
cost effectiveness in included studies of effects? (Review Question 5).
12 | METHODS
As described in the protocol published in the Campbell Library
(Waddington et al. 2018), the review followed Campbell and
Cochrane Collaborations guidance for systematic reviews (The
Steering Group of the Campbell Collaboration, 2016; Higgins &
Green, 2011; Kugley et al. 2017; Shadish & Myers, 2004). The
approach also drew on previous approaches to incorporate theory
into systematic reviews by analysing the causal chain and drawing on
qualitative evidence (e.g. Snilstveit et al., 2015; Waddington et al.,
2014; White et al., 2018). To address review questions 1, 2 and 3,
authors used counterfactual evidence provided in quantitative causal
studies (impact evaluations) and used analysis of effect size data
(statistical meta‐analysis) to explore the central tendency and
heterogeneity for outcomes measured along the causal chain. To
address review question 4, the approach drew on realist synthesis
(Pawson, 2006; Van der Knaap, Leeuw, Bogaerts, & Nijssen, 2008)
and framework synthesis (Carroll et al., 2013), and incorporated
multiple types of evidence, including programme and project
documents to provide information about context and mechanism
characteristics. The review also presents cost data from included
impact studies (question 5).
12.1 | Criteria for considering studies for this
review
The criteria determining eligibility of studies in the review are
summarised in Table 1.
12.2 | Types of studies
To answer Review Questions 1, 2 and 3 the review included
counterfactual studies that used an experimental or quasi‐experi-
mental design and/or analysis method to measure the net change in
outcomes that were attributed to an intervention or policy. The
review included randomised and non‐randomised studies that were
able to take into account confounding and selection bias (Reeves,
Wells, & Waddington, 2017; Waddington et al., 2017). Specifically,
the following study types were includable:
• Randomised controlled trials (RCTs), with assignment at individual,
household, community or other cluster level, and quasi‐RCTs using
prospective methods of assignment such as alternation.
• Non‐randomised studies with selection on unobservables:
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o Regression discontinuity designs, where assignment was done
on a threshold measured at pre‐test, and the study used
prospective or retrospective approaches of analysis to control
for unobservable confounding.
o Studies using design or methods to control for unobservable
confounding, such as natural experiments with clearly defined
intervention and comparison groups, which exploit natural
randomness in implementation assignment by decision makers
(e.g. public lottery) or random errors in implementation, and
instrumental variables estimation.
• Non‐randomised studies with pre‐intervention and post‐interven-
tion outcomes data in intervention and comparisons groups, where
data were individual level panel or pseudo‐panels (repeated cross‐
sections), which used the following methods to control for
confounding:
o Studies controlling for time‐invariant unobservable confounding,
including difference‐in‐differences, or fixed‐ or random‐effects
models with an interaction term between time and intervention
for pre‐intervention and post‐intervention observations;
o Studies assessing changes in trends in outcomes over a series of
time points (interrupted time series, ITS), with or without
contemporaneous comparison (controlled ITS), with sufficient
observations to establish a trend and control for effects on
outcomes due to factors other than the intervention (e.g.
seasonality).
• Non‐randomised studies with control for observable confounding,
including non‐parametric approaches (e.g. statistical matching,
covariate matching, coarsened‐exact matching, propensity score
matching) and parametric approaches (e.g. propensity‐weighted
multiple regression analysis).
Analysis under Review Question 4 addressed programme design,
implementation, context and mechanism in greater detail. Authors
extracted descriptive information about each programme evaluated
in included counterfactual studies, as well as from additional
programme and project design and implementation documents
relating to each of these. Information on underlying context and
behavioural mechanisms drew on information contained anywhere in
included study reports, whereas evidence on outcomes drew on
effects data from relevant study arms in quantitative counterfactual
estimation only.
Analysis under Review Question 5 aimed to address unit cost,
cost‐efficiency, cost‐effectiveness or benefit‐cost evidence on inter-
ventions in particular contexts. This review aimed to incorporate
economic evaluations of included programmes drawing on standard
approaches to synthesis of economic appraisal evidence (Shemilt
et al., 2011). However, authors only identified four studies that
reported any cost information. They are reported descriptively in the
results (Review Question 5).
Eligible comparators for review questions 1‐3 included groups
that received normal service delivery (“business as usual”) without
improved PITA characteristics, or groups that received an interven-
tion testing the inclusion of different PITA design characteristics or
weaker or less intensive implementation of PITA design character-
istics.
12.3 | Types of participants
This review included any participants from low‐and middle‐income
countries (L&MICs), including participants from the general popula-
tion and those from specific population sub‐groups. Authors collected
data on differential effects and experiences for sub‐populations
available and coded information according to the PROGRESS‐plus
criteria, where progress stands for place of residence, race/ethnicity,
occupation, gender, religion, education, socioeconomic status, and
social capital, and “plus” represents additional categories such as age,
disability, and sexual orientation (O’Neil et al. 2014).
12.4 | Types of interventions
This review included interventions that aimed to increase the
external engagement by public institutions and services with citizens
and service users. Authors defined external engagement interven-
tions as either stand‐alone interventions or interventions that
formed part of a larger programme that inherently or by definition
sought to improve the PITA‐characteristics of engagement between
public services and institutions and citizens. They could be
implemented either on the supply or demand side of service delivery,
or target both simultaneously, for example through the introduction
of public‐service audits that worked with both the community and
civil servants.
To be included in the review, the intervention needed to improve
the effectiveness and responsiveness of institutions’ engagement
with constituents. Authors grouped eligible interventions as follows:
• Participation: The intervention promoted or formalised continuous
citizen input in the design and implementation of public services,
processes or policies. Eligible interventions were:
o Participatory priority setting, planning or budgeting, including
participatory budgeting and healthcare committees, where a
specific group of citizens participates in the health priority setting,
planning and management of local health services.
o Community‐based natural resource management (CBNRM) com-
mittees such as forest user groups (FUGs), participatory forest
management (PFM), water user associations (WUAs).
• Transparency: The intervention involved the disclosure and/or
dissemination of information (rules, plans, processes, prices and
actions) regarding the governance of public services or institutions,
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with the aim of changing power relations between service
providers and users. Included interventions were:
o Rights information, where information provided about service
user rights that allows users to demand better quality or
minimum quality services.
o Performance information, including score cards, in which
information is disseminated about the quality of services, and
public audits, in which a government line department presents
their budget and achievements to their constituents.
• Accountability: The intervention encompassed monitoring to
encourage or actively hold individuals, public service providers
and institutions responsible for executing their powers and
mandates according to a certain standard. Included interventions
were:
o Citizen feedback mechanisms, which allow citizens to feedback
concerns or priorities around service delivery to providers, and /
or to monitor the delivery of public service delivery. This category
also includes social audits, whereby public forums bring together a
service provider with local authorities, neighbours, and represen-
tatives, to monitor the delivery of a specific project.
• Inclusion: This covers the promotion of participation, transparency
and accountability for marginalised and vulnerable groups such as
women, ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay bisexual, transgender and
intersex (LGBTI) people. Eligible interventions are:
o Quotas for women or minority group representation in participa-
tory budgeting (participation) or community development com-
mittee (accountability), or information provided about service user
rights of women or minority groups (transparency).
12.5 | Types of outcome measures
This review included studies that reported outcomes measuring
improvement in access to services, service behaviours, attitudes
towards services, including user satisfaction, social and economic
quality of life improvements for the proposed intervention, and “state
legitimacy” (state‐society relations). The inclusion criteria for out-
comes were broad in order to be able to provide a full picture of the
effects of the included interventions along the causal chain, described
in Table 2.
12.5.1 | Primary outcomes:
intermediate outcomes were eligible that measured service access or
quality (block 5 in the theory of change), use or user satisfaction
(block 6) and endpoint outcomes measuring social or economic
wellbeing for individuals in the relevant sector (block 7) or state
legitimacy (block 8). Examples of wellbeing outcomes include:
morbidity or mortality; income, wealth or poverty status; nutritional
status or food security; resilience to shocks; crime rates. Studies
needed to report primary outcomes relating to service delivery,
wellbeing or state‐society relations to be included in the review.
12.5.2 | Secondary outcomes:
“immediate outcomes” measuring citizen engagement with public
institutions and services, such as participation in decision‐making,
inclusion, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness of
public services and public service delivery agents, such as public
spending, leakages and corruption.
12.5.3 | Duration of follow‐up
The review included any follow‐up duration, coding multiple out-
comes where studies report multiple follow‐ups. Several studies
presented multiple follow‐ups, which are reported in the descriptive
results section.
12.5.4 | Types of settings
Interventions could be implemented in any low‐ or middle‐income
country, as defined by the World Bank at the time the intervention
was implemented.
12.5.5 | Other
The review included both completed and ongoing studies, including
protocols of ongoing studies that met all other inclusion criteria and/
or studies listed in registries of ongoing impact evaluations.
The review included studies published in any language, although
all included studies were in English. The review was limited to
included studies published in 2000 or after, following Phillips et al.
(2017) and because authors did not expect to identify any impact
evaluations that met the criteria from before this date.
Table 3 gives some further examples of decisions for including
and excluding similar types of studies.
12.6 | Search methods for identification of studies
Authors developed the systematic search strategy in consultation
with an information specialist (John Eyers) to cover comprehensively
the published and unpublished literature, following systematic search
guidelines in Kugley et al. (2017). The review also drew upon, and
expanded, the search terms used in the evidence map by Philips et al.
(2017) and harvested terms from the papers included in that map
that were eligible for inclusion in this review. To reduce the potential
for publication bias, the search included both academic databases as
well specialist organisational websites, websites of bilateral and
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multilateral agencies and repositories of impact evaluations in
international development. The full list of databases searched is
below. The substantive scope of this review is cross‐sectoral and
therefore in addition to general sources of social science research,
authors searched several sector specific databases, for example
databases of health, governance and public management. Authors
searched for studies published in 2000 or after up until 5th February
for the bibliographic databases and 3rd March 2018 for the grey
literature databases.
Search terms for the academic databases can be found in
Appendix 1. Separate search strings were developed for the two
academic health databases to capitalise on MeSH terms, to remove
non‐health related terms and add some specific health‐related
intervention terms (Medline and Global Health). The search strings
combine specific intervention terms, study design terms and terms
for low‐and middle‐income countries.
A simplified series of search strings was developed for searching
the grey literature, wherein the search engines are not as
sophisticated as the academic databases and cannot handle the
same detailed strategy. Due to the broad scope of the review, and in
order to ensure the grey literature search was exhaustive, a series of
PITA search strings were developed. These focused on PITA terms
such as participatory or participation. An intervention‐based strat-
egy, more similar to the academic database strategy, was piloted, but
discarded due to the number of individual searches per site that were
required for an exhaustive search, rendering it inefficient. Population
and study type terms were not included, because the advanced
search options within the grey literature search engines were not
sophisticated enough to allow for an “or” limiter for each L&MIC and
methodology. The broad study type term “impact evaluation” was
added alongside each search to improve the relevance of results. See
Appendix 2.
12.7 | Electronic searches
Authors searched the following academic databases in January and
February 2018:
• CAB Global Health (Ovid): http://www.ovid.com/site/catalog/
databases/30.jsp
• Econlit (Ovid): http://www.ovid.com/site/catalog/databases/52.jsp
• Medline (Ovid): http://www.ovid.com/site/catalog/databases/901.
jsp
• Scopus: https://www.scopus.com/
• Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) (via Web of Science): https://
webofknowledge.com/.
Authors searched the following specialist organisational data-
bases between 5 and 20 March 20182:
• CARE International: http://www.careevaluations.org/
• Catholic Relief Services: https://www.crs.org/our‐work‐overseas/
research‐publications
• Centre for Public Impact: https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/
observatory/
• Chemonics International: https://www.chemonics.com/technical‐
areas/democracy‐and‐governance/
• EGAP (Evidence in Governance and Politics): http://www.egap.org/
• International Growth Centre (IGC) at LSE: https://www.theigc.org/
publications/
• International Rescue Committee (IRC): https://www.rescue.org/
reports‐and‐resources
• Mercy Corps: https://www.mercycorps.org/research
• Oxfam International: https://policy‐practice.oxfam.org.uk/
publications
• RTI International: https://www.rti.org/publications
• Samuel Hall (evaluations): http://samuelhall.org/category/
publications/
• Transparency International (TI): https://www.transparency.org/
• U4 Anti‐Corruption Resource Centre: http://www.u4.no/
publications/
Authors searched the following bilateral and multilateral agencies
and general repositories of impact evaluations in international
development from 5 to 29 March 2018:
• 3ie Repository of Impact Evaluations http://www.3ieimpact.org/
en/evidence/impact‐evaluations/
• 3ie RIDIE (Registry for International Development Impact Evalua-
tions): http://ridie.3ieimpact.org/
• African Development Bank (AfDB): https://www.afdb.org/en/
documents/publications/
• Asian Development Bank (ADB): https://www.adb.org/publications
• BREAD: http://ibread.org/bread/papers
• Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA): http://cega.berkeley.
edu/evidence/
• Design, Monitoring and Evaluation for Peace: www.dmeforpeace.
org/learn/resources/
• DFID Research for Development (R4D): http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/
• GEF (Global Environmental Facility) evaluation database: http://
www.gefieo.org/evaluations/all?f[0]=field_ieo_grouping%3A312
• Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery: https://www.
gfdrr.org/en/publication
• Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA): http://www.poverty‐action.
org/projectevaluations
• Inter‐American Development Bank Publications: https://
publications.iadb.org/facet‐view?locale‐attribute=en&field=type_
view
• J‐Poverty Action Lab (J‐PAL): https://www.povertyactionlab.org/
evaluations
• Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery: https://www.
gfdrr.org/en/publications
2See appendix 2 for the full details of the grey literature search.
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• Locus (International Development Coalition): https://locus.ngo/
resources
• Prevention Web (UNIDSR): https://www.preventionweb.net/
english/professional/
• RePEc (via EBSCO Discovery): https://www.ebscohost.com/
discovery
• World Bank E‐Library (via EBSCO Discovery): https://www.
ebscohost.com/discovery
• United Nations Evaluation Group: http://www.uneval.org/
evaluation/reports
• USAID Development Clearing House: https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/
home/Default.aspx.
12.8 | Other searches
The review used the evidence gap map of state‐society relations as a
primary source of potential studies (Phillips et al., 2017). In addition,
authors screened the bibliography of existing systematic reviews and
literature reviews, including Molina et al., (2016), Lynch et al. (2013)
and Hanna et al. (2011). Authors also screened the reference lists of
included studies and undertook forward citation‐tracking for those
studies using Google Scholar. Authors contacted the review’s
advisory group and the funder of the systematic review, USAID, to
identify additional studies.
12.9 | Targeted searches for studies to address
Review Question 4
In order to answer question 4 relating to programme design,
implementation, mechanisms and context, authors attempted to
identify programme and project documents associated with the
programmes in the impact studies identified in the first stage of the
search. This was done through a targeted search for programme
names and study authors using Google and Google Scholar. The
reference lists of included studies were also screened for programme
and project documents. Evidence on context and mechanisms were
collected from any studies eligible for Review Questions 1‐4.
Programme mechanisms may have been suggested by study authors
or identified by the review team. Authors collected additional
contextual information not provided in included studies using
international data, for example the World Development Indicators
(World Bank) or the “Polity IV” governance index (Marshall, Jaggers,
& Gurr, 2011; as also used in Lawry et al., 2014).
12.10 | Studies to address Review Question 5
The review aimed to incorporate and synthesise economic evalua-
tions and cost data that were presented in the included studies. Only
four studies presented any cost data. These are presented in the
results section.
12.11 | Selection of studies
All search results were imported into EPPI‐Reviewer 4 and duplicates
removed. At the title and abstract stage, authors used innovative text
mining technologies to reduce the initial screening workload
(O’Mara‐Eves, Thomas, McNaught, Miwa, & Ananiadou, 2015).
Authors used two functions in EPPI Reviewer 4 to do this: the
priority‐screening function and inclusion/ exclusion classifier (Tho-
mas, McNaught, & Ananiadou, 2011; O’Mara‐Eves et al., ibid). The
priority screening function can be used at the title and abstract
screening stage to prioritise the items most likely to be “includes”
based on previously included documents. This involved independent
double screening a random test set of citations to train the priority
screening function, which learned to identify relevant records based
on key‐words in the title and abstract of the included and excluded
studies. All team members were involved at this stage of screening.
The function continues to learn as screening progresses. Using
priority screening in this way allows for the identification of
includable records at an earlier stage in the review process so that
work can begin earlier on full‐text screening and data extraction. This
review also used the priority screening function to classify studies
into groups based on their probability of inclusion in the review.
Authors conducted piloting and verification of the screening function,
and excluded studies with a low probability of inclusion (<20%
probability of inclusion) automatically from the review. Authors
screened a random 10 per cent sample of the automatically excluded
studies as a check on accuracy of the function. The results of this
process are presented in the search results section. The review team
independently double screened all studies with 20‐99 per cent
certainty of inclusion. If a title and abstract did not present enough
information to definitively include or exclude a study, it was included
for full‐text screening. Disagreements on inclusion or exclusion were
resolved by discussion and the input of a third author if necessary.
Studies included for full‐text screening were double screened by
two independent authors. Disagreements on inclusion or exclusion
were resolved by discussion and the input of a third author if
necessary.
Screening of studies intended to address Review Question 4 took
place in a second stage of screening. Studies were assessed for
relevance by one author to determine whether they covered one of
the programmes included to answer Review Questions 1‐3. Each of
these studies were then assessed for relevance by at least one other
author.
12.12 | Data extraction and management
Authors extracted the following descriptive, methodological, quali-
tative and quantitative data from each included study using a
standardised data extraction form (data extraction form provided in
Appendix 3):
• Descriptive data including authors, publication date and status as
well as other information to characterise the study including
24 of 90 | WADDINGTON ET AL.
country, type of intervention and outcome, population, context,
type of intervention.
• Methodological information on study design, analysis method, type
of comparison (if relevant) and external validity.
• Quantitative data for outcome measures, including outcome
descriptive information, sample size in each intervention group,
outcomes means and standard deviations, test statistics (e.g. t‐test,
F‐test, p‐values, 95% confidence intervals), cost data, and so on.
• Information on intervention design, including how the intervention
incorporates participation, inclusion, transparency and account-
ability characteristics, participant adherence, contextual factors
and programme mechanisms.
Authors extracted quantitative data for outcomes analysis using
Excel. Two authors independently calculated effect sizes for a random
sample of 20 per cent of the included studies, reaching agreement in all
except two cases, which the lead author resolved. Disagreements on
inclusion or exclusion were resolved by discussion and the input of a
third author if necessary. The rest of the quantitative data was
extracted by one author only. Authors extracted descriptive, methodo-
logical and qualitative data using KoBo Toolbox. Descriptive and
qualitative data were single coded by one author and checked by a
second author. One author also checked the coding of intervention
characteristics and mechanisms coded by others.
12.13 | Assessment of risk of bias in included
studies
The critical appraisal results for each included study are reported
(Critical appraisal of included studies).
Assessment of risk of bias in experimental and quasi‐experimental
studies (Review Questions 1‐3)
Authors assessed the risk of bias in the included quantitative
counterfactual studies (impact evaluations) drawing on the signalling
questions in the 3ie risk of bias tool, which covers both internal
validity and statistical conclusion validity of experimental and quasi‐
experimental designs (Hombrados and Waddington, 2012) and the
bias domains and extensions to Cochrane’s ROBINS‐I tool and
RoB2.0 (Sterne et al., 2016; Higgins et al., 2016).The risk of bias tool
developed for this review can be found in Appendix 3. This review
noted any potential differences in methods and risk of bias for
different outcomes reported in each paper.
The review assessed risk of bias of included studies based on the
following criteria, coding each paper as “Yes,” “Probably Yes,”
“Probably No,” “No” and “No Information” according to sub‐questions
relating to the following bias domains:
• Causal inference: Factors relating to baseline confounding and
biases arising from differential selection into and out of the study
(attrition);
• Deviation from intended intervention: Factors relating to biases
due to performance bias (e.g. cross‐overs, contaimination and
survey effects) and motivation bias (Hawthorne effects);
• Outcomes data collection: Factors relating to biases in outcomes
data collection (e.g. social desirability or courtesy bias, recall bias);
• Analysis reporting: Factors relating to biases in methods of
analysis and reporting.
We used the following decision rule to assign a risk of bias rating
for each domain:
• “High risk of bias”: if any of the criterion within that domain were
assessed as “No” or “Probably No”.
• “Some concerns”: if one or several criterion within that domain
were “Unclear” and none were “No” or “Probably No”.
• “Low risk of bias”: if all of the criterion within that domain were
“Yes” or “Probably Yes”.
Finally, we used the decision rule of RoB2.0 (Higgins et al., 2016)
to reach an overall risk of bias judgment:
• “High risk of bias”: if any of the bias domains were assessed as
being “high risk”.
• “Some concerns”: if any of the bias domains were “some concerns”
and none were “high risk”.
• “Low risk of bias”: if all of the bias domains were assessed as “low
risk”.
Two authors independently assessed risk of bias from a random
sample of 20 per cent of the included studies. For the experimental
studies, the two authors agreed on 64 per cent of the decisions for
each criterion for each study. However, 33 per cent of the
disagreements were cases where the two authors answered yes
versus probably yes or unclear, or no versus probably no or
unclear.In only three per cent of cases did the authors fully disagree
on whether a study had addressed a risk of bias domain, that is, one
author had answered yes and one author had answered no. For the
quasi‐experimental studies, the two authors agreed on 76 per cent of
the decisions for each criterion for each study. For the remaining 24
per cent, the two authors had answered either yes and unclear or no
and unclear. Disagreements on bias assessments were resolved by
discussion and the input of a third author if necessary. The
disagreements and their resolutions are reported alongside the
detailed results of the Critical Appraisal in Appendix 5. One author
undertook remaining risk of bias assessments and discussed
uncertain cases with a second or third author as necessary. Following
the independent double assessments, one author re‐assessed all
remaining studies on the criteria that had been clarified as part of the
process.
12.13.1 | Critical appraisal of project design and
implementation (Review Question 4)
It was not necessary to critically appraise the information extracted
on programme design, implementation and context from the project
documents as this information was descriptive.
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12.13.2 | Critical appraisal of cost evidence (Review
Question 5)
The review identified cost data in four studies, most of which only
presented intervention cost per beneficiary, and as some authors of
included studies acknowledged, unit cost estimates were “back of the
envelope” calculations. Authors assessed the quality of the cost
evidence, using the tool provided by Evers, Goossens, de Vet, van
Tulder, and Ament (2005) as recommended in the Campbell
Collaboration Economic Methods Policy Brief (Shemilt, 2008).
12.14 | Measures of treatment effect
An effect size expresses the magnitude or strength of the
relationship of interest (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein,
2009). To address questions 1, 2 and 3, authors extracted data
from each individual study to calculate standardised effect sizes
for cross‐study comparison. To ensure comparability across
outcomes, authors transformed each measure so that an increase
indicates an improvement (hence the sign was reversed for any
variables measuring negative outcomes like mortality and
absenteeism).
For continuous outcomes comparing group means in a treatment
and control group, authors calculated the standardised mean
difference (SMDs), measuring the mean difference in standardised
units of the variance of the outcome. This review calculated SMD as
Cohen’s d along with standard error using formulae provided in
Borenstein et al. (2009), which was adjusted to account for small
sample bias using Hedges’ g method (Ellis, 2010):
( )≅ − ( + ) −g d n n1 34 91 2
Formulas for effect size calculations were used depending on
data provided in included studies. For example, for studies reporting
means (X) and pooled standard deviation (SD) for treatment (T) and
control or comparison (C) at follow up (p+1) only:
= −+ +d x x
SD
Tp Cp1 1
If the study did not report the pooled standard deviation, but
reported the standard deviations of outcome in each group, SD was
calculated as follows:
= ( − ) +( − )+ −+
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For studies reporting means ( ¯ )X and standard deviations (SD) for
treatment and control or comparison groups at baseline (p) and
follow up (p+1):
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+
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For studies reporting mean differences (∆¯ )X between treatment
and control and standard deviation (SD) at follow up (p+1):
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For studies reporting mean differences between treatment and
control, standard error (SE) and sample size (n):
= ∆¯ +d X
SE n
p 1
For studies reporting regression results, authors intended to
follow the approach suggested by Keef & Roberts (2004) and used
the regression coefficient and the pooled standard deviation of the
outcome. However, in most cases, the pooled standard deviation of
the outcome was unavailable, and so regression coefficients and
standard errors or t‐statistics were used to do the following, where
sample size information was available in each group:
= +d t
n n
1 1
T C
where n denotes the sample size of treatment group and control. The
following was used where total sample size information (N) was
available only (as suggested in Polanin, 2016):
= = +d t
N
Var
N
d
N
2 4
4
d
2
The t‐statistic (t) was calculated by dividing the regression
coefficient by the standard error. If the study authors only reported
confidence intervals and no standard error, the review team
calculated the standard error from the confidence intervals. If the
study did not report the standard error, but reported t, this was
extracted and used as reported by the authors. In cases in which 1
per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels were reported
rather than t or se(b), then t was imputed approximately, using
information about sample size, as follows:
Prob > 0.1:t=0.5
0.1≥ Prob > 0.05:t = 1.58
0.05≥ Prob > 0.01:t = 1.96
0.01≥ Prob: t = 3.2.
Where studies reported (log‐) odds ratios, we transformed them
into d using the following (Higgins and Green, 2011):
= ( )d ln OR3 .π
12.15 | Criteria for determination of independent
findings and effect sizes
In this review, data are reported according to the intervention that
the evidence was based on. The review avoided double‐counting of
evidence and synthesis of dependent findings from multiple studies
in any single analysis by linking papers prior to analysis. Where
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studies reported multiple outcome sub‐groups for the same outcome
construct (e.g. studies reporting simple, intermediate and complex
knowledge), the review calculated “synthetic effects” (sample
weighted averages) prior to synthesis. Where studies reported
multiple outcomes or evidence according to sub‐groups of partici-
pants, data on relevant sub‐groups are reported separately.
Estimation of a standard meta‐analytic effect size relies on the
statistical assumption of independence of each included estimation of
effect (Gleser & Olkin, 2007). Dependent effect sizes arise when one
study provides multiple results for the same outcome of interest, or
multiple outcomes for the same outcome construct, when a study has
multiple treatment arms compared to the same control group, or
multiple studies use the same dataset and report on the same
outcome. This review therefore used rules to ensure that only
statistically independent effect sizes were included in any one meta‐
analysis. In general, this review only included one effect estimate per
sample in a single meta‐analysis. Where the review team identified
several papers that reported on the same study, effect size data from
the most recent publication was extracted. Where studies collected
multiple outcomes measuring the same underlying constructs, rather
than choosing a particular outcome, a more objective a priori decision
rule seemed to be to calculate an average (synthetic effect). Similarly,
where the authors had calculated an index comprising outcomes
measuring the same construct (e.g. use of health services in Giné,
Khalid, & Mansuri, 2018; knowledge of employment services in
Ravallion, van de Walle, Dutta, & Murgai, 2013), the review used that
estimate. Where different studies reported on the same programme,
but used different samples (for example from different regions, or
different treatment arms) this review included both estimates,
treating them as independent samples, provided effect sizes were
measured relative to separate control or comparison groups. This
was the case, for example, of the two study arms mandating inclusion
of women in a CDC village development council treatment group and
a jirga (local government) treatment group in Afghanistan (Beath,
Christia, & Enikolopov, 2013), where effects were measured against
standard practice alternatives (respectively, a control group and a
business‐as‐usual jirga where women’s participation was not man-
dated).3
Where a study reported multiple effect size estimates using
different specifications for the same outcome, the review team chose
the one with the lower likelihood of bias, for example the most
appropriately specified outcomes equation (e.g. covariate adjusted
specifications over unadjusted specifications in non‐randomised
studies). Where information was collected on the same programme
for different periods of time, information on the full range of
outcomes over time was extracted. However, the review team
calculated an average synthetic effect size for use in any overarching
analysis. There was also one case where the findings of an included
study (Björkman & Jakob, 2009) were replicated by authors using the
same data (Donato & Garcia Mosqueira, 2016). In this case, the
review team used critical appraisal to determine which outcomes to
include from which study.
12.16 | Unit of analysis issues
Authors assessed studies for unit of analysis errors (The Campbell
Collaboration, 2014), arising when the unit of allocation of a study or
treatment unit is different to the unit of analysis of outcomes data
collection. If unit of analysis errors exist, this was corrected for by
calculating the effective sample size (Ne) using the following
adjustment (Higgins and Green, 2011):
= + ( − )Ne
N
m c1 1
where N is the total sample size, m is the average number of
observations per cluster and c is the intra‐cluster correlation
coefficient, assumed equal to 0.05. Where included studies used
robust Huber‐White standard errors to correct for clustering, the
review team calculated the standard error of d by dividing d by the t‐
statistic on the coefficient of interest.
Authors suspected several studies to have unit of analysis errors,
which were corrected in effect size calculation. These studies were
Capuno & Garcia (2010), and certain outcomes within Alhassan,
Nketiah‐Amponsah, Spieker, Arhinful, and de Witand Rinke (2016),
Bandyopadhyay, Shyamsundar, and Xie (2010), Bradley & Igras
(2005), Kasim (2016), Molina (2014), Palladium (2015), Pandey,
Sehgal Ashwini, Riboud, Levine, and Goyal (2007), Persha & Meshack
(2016), Rasolofosen et al. (2015), Ravaillon (2013) and Touchton &
Wampler, (2014).
12.17 | Dealing with missing data
In cases of missing or incomplete data, this review reported the
characteristics of the study but stated that it could not be included in
the analysis due to missing data. Data were missing or incomplete for
some of the outcomes in one study (Palladium, 2015). Hence the
review was unable to calculate effect sizes for perception related
outcomes (feelings of safety, feelings about police responsiveness,
feelings about collaboration of public bodies with the community),
although effect sizes for reported crime were calculable for that
study. The review team did not contact the authors to obtain the
missing statistical information because the missing outcomes were
not considered sufficiently important in the causal chain (e.g. because
they did not relate to wellbeing) and, given the critical appraisal
assessment, would not affect the overall conclusions of the review. In
other cases, for immediate outcomes on service use, authors did not
present counterfactual information hence effect size calculation was
not possible (Grossman, Jonathan, Tausanovich, & Han, 2017).
3Several of the RCTs that we included had multiple trial arms using the same comparison
group, but tested interventions that fell into different categories in our intervention
framework (e.g. Olken, 2007). In these cases, the trial arms were included in different meta‐
analyses by intervention type.
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12.18 | Assessment of heterogeneity
This review assessed heterogeneity by calculating the Q‐statistic, I‐
squared, and Tau‐squared to provide an estimate of the amount of
variability in the distribution of the true effect sizes (Borenstein et al.,
2009). This was complemented with assessment of heterogeneity of
effect sizes graphically using forest plots. The review explored
heterogeneity using moderator analysis to correlate intervention
characteristics with outcomes using bivariate meta‐analysis rather
than meta‐regression.
12.19 | Assessment of reporting biases
This review attempted to reduce publication bias by searching for
and including unpublished studies in the review. Tests for the
presence of publication bias are presented through the use of
contour‐enhanced funnel graphs (Peters, Sutton, Jones, Abrams, &
Rushton, 2008) and statistical tests (Egger, Davey Smith, Schneider,
& Minder, 1997). As these tests may be sensitive to effect size
dependency, the review used study‐level synthetic effects in these
analyses, to ensure only independent observations were included.
13 | DATA SYNTHESIS
13.1 | Methods of synthesis: review questions 1‐3
Once all included studies were identified, the review team conducted
a mapping exercise, which grouped studies under intervention, main
PITA mechanism, sector and outcome measure. The inclusion criteria
for the review were broad, and so the mapping was used to
determine appropriate categories across which to synthesise. The
minimum criteria for meta‐analysis is usually to combine studies
using meta‐analysis when two or more effect sizes using a similar
outcome construct are identified and where the comparison group
state is judged to be similar across the two, similar to the approach
taken by Wilson et al. (2011).
The review conducted separate analyses by primary outcome
(Review Question 1):
• service delivery and access (quantity and quality)
• service use
• attitudes to services
• wellbeing outcomes
• state‐society relations.
The review also analysed the intervention mechanisms by
analysing secondary outcomes by intervention type (Review Question
2):
• service user and citizen engagement (demand‐side behaviours)
• service provider and public servant response (supply‐side beha-
viours).
Finally, the review explored heterogeneity in effects by inter-
vention type, as well as global region and effects for particular sub‐
groups of participants (Review Question 3).
As heterogeneity exists in theory due to the variety of
interventions and contexts included, this review used inverse‐
variance weighted, random effects meta‐analytic models (Higgins &
Green, 2011). The review team used Stata’s metan command (Sterne
et al., 2008) to generate the meta‐analyses and forest plots.
Sensitivity analysis was undertaken by reporting findings by study
design and risk of bias assessment.
13.2 | Methods of synthesis: review question 4
In the context of “real world” programmes, project design and
implementation fidelity are often the principal reasons why findings
from programme evaluations differ between contexts. This is partly
why advocates of mixed‐methods evaluation approaches recommend
collecting implementation process data (e.g. White, 2009; Bamberger
et al., 2010). This review used a realist‐informed framework synthesis
approach to extract information from project design and implemen-
tation documents and included impact studies on context, imple-
mentation and mechanisms.
Framework synthesis starts with the identification or develop-
ment of a framework to guide the analysis that highlights key factors
that help understand or predict heterogeneity across results, which is
built out through in‐depth reading of included studies to include
additional relevant themes against which studies are coded and
reviewed to identify patterns (Oliver et al., 2008). Framework
synthesis is well‐placed to handle complexity across interventions
and contexts and is amenable to the use of a wide range of potential
sources of data, including evidence based on surveys and quantita-
tive data, and more detailed evidence collected using qualitative
methods, policies and implementation documents (such as proposals
or monitoring reports) (Snilstveit, 2012).
Realist synthesis highlights variation in programme design in
explaining differences in outcomes across contexts (Pawson, 2006).
Realists argue that the effectiveness of a programme depends on the
combined action of the behavioural mechanisms underlying it and the
context in which it takes place. Behavioural mechanisms operate
through the values, beliefs and past experiences of individuals in the
social system. Thus, factors such as interpersonal networks and
individual agency are important in the adoption and rejection of an
intervention. The action of mechanisms depends in part on the
context in which they are used. Behaviour change is achieved via the
entire system of social relationships (the context) and, therefore, an
intervention geared towards the achievement of behaviour change
must be aligned with the context in which it is used. The approach
that draws these concepts together is called context‐mechanism‐
outcome (CMO) synthesis. There are different ways of conducting
the synthesis including iterations of a causal model such as a theory
of change diagram (e.g. Waddington et al., 2014; Carr‐Hill et al.,
2016), tables presenting context mechanisms and outcomes for each
intervention included in a review (e.g. Petrosino, Morgan, Fronius,
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Tanner‐Smith, & Boruch, 2012), and qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA) (e.g. Ton et al., 2017).
Van der Knapp et al. (2006) is possibly the first example of a
systematic review that explicitly incorporates context‐mechanism‐
outcome synthesis. These authors undertook the CMO synthesis
after the systematic review and meta‐analysis. The broad approach
was to collect information on possible programme mechanisms and
contextual factors from studies during the coding phase. They stated
that “The focus in such a classification can be on behavioral and social
“cogs and wheels” of the intervention… but could also include
administrative or legal mechanisms.” (p.6).
In the present study, the review team searched included studies
for information about how or why the intervention is supposed to
work from descriptive information provided in the studies, author
analysis (e.g. tests for “mechanisms” using statistical mediator
analysis) and authors’ own hypotheses about why the intervention
was effective (or not). The information collected on contextual
factors was partly contained in the detailed information about the
comparison condition, co‐interventions and background information
about participants collected from included studies and project and
programme design and implementation documents, and key con-
textual information collected from international datasets. As noted in
more detail below, this review then identified and coded mechanisms
associated with particular intervention sub‐groups and PITA ele-
ments.
CMO is largely an iterative process, and thus the full list of CMO
codes for analysis was developed as part of the synthesis. Initially,
the review team drew on potential codes identified in the protocol,
including contextual conditions and enabling conditions, including:
systemic and social levels targeted by the intervention; whether the
intervention is designed to build off of and work within local systems
of power relations and social norms that uphold the social contract
between the State and society (as in Halloran’s “accountability
ecosystem” (2015); the political salience of the public service
targeted (Mcloughlin and Batley, 2012); or the relative power of
proponents versus opponents in the adoption phase of the policy
cycle (Resnick, Babu, Haggblade, Hendriks, & Mather, 2015).
Where key enabling conditions are already in place, an interven-
tion effectively designed may be successfully implemented in
isolation; where key conditions are missing, the intervention design
may need to be adjusted or expanded to include complementary
interventions that seek to strengthen the enabling environment. For
example, an intervention seeking to build transparency and account-
ability through open data interventions may need to build a coalition
of support that engages people at the point in the system targeted
for data release, upstream, downstream, and externally to create an
environment in which data are provided, demanded, and used
(Hogge, 2010). These enabling conditions may change depending on
context factors such as the target level of the intervention – whether
it targets service delivery at community, sub‐national, or national
level (E‐Pact Consortium, 2016) or whether the external stake-
holders it seeks to engage are organised civil society or interest
groups, marginalised or vulnerable groups, or citizens and service
users more broadly (McGee and Gaventa, 2010). The review team
further conducted more detailed analysis of whether the bottleneck
for good governance was likely to be properly identified as resting
with citizens (e.g. lack of organization, lack of knowledge/ capacity),
with the system (e.g. lack of opportunities for citizens to engage), or
with individual service providers (e.g. power relations, corruption).
The combination of realist‐informed framework synthesis that
moved towards “best fit” framework synthesis was selected as the
most appropriate method to link the meta‐analysis with context and
mechanism information given the complexity and heterogeneity of
included interventions.
In the analysis, the theory of change developed during the
protocol as the overarching framework was built out into a
template to include the series of additional potential explanatory
factors identified in the protocol regarding the enabling conditions
that allow for project success, and systemic and social levels
targeted by the intervention. Data from the studies was then
extracted along the framework, including coding that identified
the source of the data to maintain clarity between first, second
and third order constructs. Each extracted data was coded as
being sourced from: observations from implementers; insight
reported by participants (i.e. quotes, first order constructs); survey
by researcher; commentary by researcher (i.e. researcher inter-
pretation of results, second order constructs); or commentary by
authorauthor (i.e. interpretation based on insights from synthesis,
third order constructs). The goal of framework synthesis is to draw
conclusions that explain relationships between study findings, with
a focus on explaining heterogeneity of results due to variations in
context, intervention design and implementation quality (Snilst-
veit, 2012). The review focused on extracting data that enabled
the identification of mechanisms, moderators, and other explana-
tory factors along the causal chain.
Following the extraction and analysis of data across the frame-
work, interventions were organised according to broad intervention
group and key PITA mechanism. Critical case comparisons were
identified to evidence the role of moderators in triggering different
mechanisms under different contexts. Moving towards “best fit”
framework synthesis, which is more iterative and focused on building
programme theories (Carroll et al., 2013), we analysed the emerging
patterns of moderators and mechanisms within each set of
interventions to identify those that most frequently or persuasively
facilitated sense‐making of the results of each study. These insights
were used to create composite frameworks for each group of
interventions that refine the initial framework based on the findings
from the qualitative synthesis. Thus, this review more precisely
highlights intervention‐specific mechanisms and moderators influen-
cing movement along the causal chain.
13.2.1 | Moderator analysis
The following moderator variables were collected, as indicated in the
protocol:
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• Methodology: study design, risk of bias status, timing of evaluation
(follow‐up length).
• Intervention characteristics: intervention, PITA characteristic,
sector.
• Context variables: region, country income level, democracy policy
index score.
• Participant characteristics: e.g. sex, socio‐economic status.
13.3 | Methods of synthesis: review question 5
This review aimed to draw on standard approaches to synthesise
economic appraisal evidence (Shemilt et al., 2008; Shemilt et al.,
2011). However, only four of the included studies reported cost data,
and therefore this review simply reports the cost data that was
identified in a table in the results section, making adjustments for
estimated number of participants and real prices (2016 US$) using
data provided on numbers of participants and the CCEMG‐EPPI
Centre Cost Converter (v. 1.5 last update: 29 April 2016).
13.4 | Results of search and critical appraisal
This section summarises the results of the search, presents
descriptive information about the included studies, and discusses
findings from the critical appraisal.
14 | RESULTS OF THE SEARCH
The results of the search and screening process are shown in the
study flow search diagram in Figure 3. The initial academic search
resulted in 10,457 hits while the searches of grey literature resulted
in 408 relevant hits (see Appendix 2 for the search record). In
addition, the review took the relevant included studies from the
state‐society relations evidence gap map (Phillips et al., 2017), which
added an additional 348 studies, leaving a total of 10,865.
Following the removal of duplicates, 10,054 studies were left to
screen at title and abstract. As described in the methods section in
more detail, this review used text mining in EPPI‐Reviewer 4 to
reduce the initial screening workload. Authors first independently
double screened approximately 10 per cent of the search results,
then used the priority screening function to develop a classifier that
classified studies into groups based on their probability of inclusion in
the review, using data from the 10 per cent of screened studies. The
review team decided to automatically exclude studies with less than
a 20 per cent probability of inclusion, corresponding to 7,241 of the
search hits. Authors screened a random 10 per cent of the 0‐9 per
cent and 10‐19 per cent group to check the quality of the classifier
but identified no studies that had been wrongly excluded. Authors
double screened all studies classified as 20‐99 per cent probability of
inclusion. In total, 9,835 were excluded at title and abstract.
F IGURE 3 Study search flow diagram
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This left 219 papers to screen at full‐text. After independent
double screening, sometimes involving a third reader, 57 impact
evaluations were included in the first stage. Authors undertook
forward and backward citation tracking on this initial set of studies to
identify studies missed by the initial search, identifying an additional
10 papers. After detailed reading of the complete set, 17 further
studies were excluded on intervention or outcome. In the end, 50
eligible papers corresponding to 35 unique studies were identified.
These 35 studies assess the effect of 41 unique policies or trial arms.
The systematic search also identified 11 ongoing studies, a list of
which is presented in references to ongoing studies. Reasons for
exclusion are discussed in more detail below. Overall, of the 35
unique studies included in this review, 16 had been included in the
state‐society relations EGM, three of which as ongoing studies with
registered trials (Phillips et al., 2017).
Following the search for impact evaluations, authors undertook a
targeted search for qualitative and project documents associated
with the programmes evaluated in the included impact evaluations. In
total, 76 additional documents were identified, of which 36
contributed to the qualitative synthesis. These are discussed in more
depth in the section on framework synthesis.
14.1 | Excluded studies
Studies were often excludable for more than one reason, but we did
not search for all possible reasons for exclusion once a study met one
exclusion criteria. We excluded 98 papers at full‐text for not meeting
our criteria on intervention. With regards to those excluded on
intervention, we excluded five as they were classified as informal
sector, that is, the programme was implemented independently of
government. We excluded six as they only addressed service access
for marginalised populations through the delivery of a new service.
We excluded 24 as they were unable to isolate the PITA element of
the intervention, that is, the evaluation measured the effect of a PITA
mechanism packaged with other interventions. We excluded a
further 63 papers for evaluating other irrelevant interventions.
One of these studies excluded on intervention was of an ineligible
“recentralisation” intervention which acted to reduce the level of
citizen participation (Malesky et al., 2014).
We excluded an additional six because they evaluated a study of
education or a participatory planning intervention alongside a block
grant (CDD), 12 because they were not a primary study, 13 because
the study did not address questions of effects, five because they
were qualitative, five because they did not account for confounding
in design or analysis, and 17 for not using a contemporaneous
comparison group (e.g. before versus after design). In addition, we
were unable to access one paper.
A further seven studies were eligible for being included based on
population, intervention and comparison but only examined the
effects of a PITA mechanism on one or more secondary outcomes of
interest, that is, citizen engagement and/or provider response,
without extending the analysis to primary outcomes of interest.
These studies were Casey et al. (2018), Finkel (2012), Gottlieb
(2016), Grossman et al. (2014), Grossman et al. (2016), Sexton
(2017), Sheely (2015) and Yanez‐Pagans and Machicado‐Salas
(2014).
After the full‐text screening stage, we excluded a further two
papers that appeared to be evaluations of eligible interventions, but
that we discovered to be PITA mechanisms implemented alongside
co‐interventions that were not reported clearly in the original
evaluation (Alderwish & Dottridge, 2013; Andres et al., 2017). We
discovered the presence of the additional co‐interventions in the
additional documentation we identified through our targeted
searches. Both papers evaluated community driven water provision.
For Andres et al. (2017), we identified a 2009 World Bank
Implementation Completion and Results Report associated with the
project evaluated in the paper, the Jalanidhi project. The report
described co‐interventions that would likely have impacted the
outcomes covered by the evaluation, including significant technical
engineering assistance, infrastructure, and capacity building. The
impact evaluation does not acknowledge these co‐interventions, but
rather presents the study as isolating the impact of the institutional
form the water management system takes on the outcomes. Thus,
due to the co‐interventions, the study did not isolate the effect of the
PITA mechanism and was excluded from the review. Alderwish &
Dottridge (2013) was a similar case in that a project document
identified significant infrastructure interventions combined with the
community water provision intervention.
14.2 | Studies awaiting classification
We identified one eligible study towards the end of the review
process that we were unable to include due to time constraints,
Tohari, Parsons, and Rammohan (2017). It is unlikely that the
inclusion of this study would substantively change the results of our
synthesis, partly as the study evaluates an intervention already
included in the review (Banerjee et al., 2018). The results of that
study should be included in updates of this review.
14.3 | Description of included studies
Here we describe the characteristics of the 35 included studies. Key
characteristics of each included study are presented in Appendix 4.
14.4 | Setting
Figure 4 shows the geographical spread of the included studies. The
most studied area for included interventions is Sub‐Saharan Africa (n
= 13), representing almost 40 per cent of the included studies. We
included five studies of interventions that took place in Uganda
(Björkman & Jakob, 2009; Björkman Nyqvist, de Walque, & Svensson,
2017; incorporating Donato & Garcia Mosqueira, 2016; Fiala &
Premand, 2017; Grossman & Michelitch, 2018; Grossman et al.,
2017; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2012), two from the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra, & van
der Windt, 2014; Palladium, 2015), one each respectively from
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Ghana (Alhassan, Nketiah‐Amponsah, Spieker, Arhinful, & Rinke de
wit, 2016), Tanzania (Persha & Meshack, 2016), Madagascar
(Rasolofoson et al., 2015), Malawi (Gullo et al., 2017), Namibia
(Bandyopadhyay, Humavindu, Shyamsundar, & Wang, 2004) and a
study that took place in both Kenya and Guinea (Bradley & Igras,
2005).
We identified nine studies from South Asia, four of which took
place in India (Ananthpur, Malik, & Rao, 2014 in Karnataka; Banerjee
et al., 2014 in Rajasthan; Pandey et al., 2007 in Uttar Pradesh;
Ravallion et al., 2013 in Bihar). The remaining studies took place in
Afghanistan (Beath et al., 2013; Berman et al., 2017), Pakistan (Giné
et al. 2018; Kasim, 2016) and Nepal (Tachibana & Adhikari, 2009). In
addition, we identified five studies from East Asia and Pacific,
including two from Indonesia (Banerjee et al., 2018; Olken, 2007),
two from the Philippines (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010; Capuno &
Garcia, 2010) and one from China (Huang, 2014).
We included six studies from Latin America, of which four were
from Brazil (Gonclaves, 2013; Barde, 2017; Timmons & Garfias,
2015; Touchton & Wampler, 2014), and one each from Colombia
(Molina, 2014) and Mexico (Diaz‐Cayeros, Magaloni, & Ruiz‐Euler,
2014).
Finally, we identified one study in Russia, a study of support for
participatory budgeting (Beuermann & Amelina, 2014).
14.5 | Interventions and PITA mechanisms
We grouped the identified studies by five main intervention areas,
presented in Table 4. Eleven studies provided information to citizens,
either about citizen rights to access services or to participate in
participatory processes (n = 5), or information about performance of
politicians or public service providers, including report cards (n=7).
We consider the main design mechanism for these categories to be
transparency, either for increasing citizen participation or transpar-
ency to improve accountability. The majority of the studies providing
performance information provided information about politicians or
local governments, for example Humphreys & Weinstein’s (2012)
evaluation of the dissemination of a scorecard with detailed
information on the performance of Ugandan Members of Parliament
(MPs). We included these studies in the review as in all cases we
would expect these interventions to have an impact on service
delivery in politician’s local areas as well as potentially having an
impact on voting intentions of citizens. We also included Banerjee
et al.’s (2014) RCT in this category, that placed two volunteers from
the local community in police stations, as the objective of the study
was for the volunteers to feed back their observations to the
community rather than for them to give feedback to the police.
The intervention area with the greatest number of included
studies is citizen feedback and monitoring mechanisms, where we
identified 10 studies or treatment arms. This set includes evaluations
of interventions to allow citizens to feedback concerns or priorities
around service delivery to providers, and/or to introduce or facilitate
monitoring of public service delivery. We consider the main design
mechanism here to be accountability as it encourages or actively hold
individuals, public service providers and institutions responsible for
executing their powers and mandates according to a certain
standard. Within this category, interventions largely fell into two
groups, those with facilitated citizen feedback and those with
unfacilitated citizen feedback. Facilitated citizen feedback covers
interventions that solicited concerns from citizens through commu-
nity meetings or focus groups in order to feed back to service
F IGURE 4 Geographical distribution of included impact evaluations
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providers, often using a local facilitator or civil society organisation,
for example (Björkman & Jakob, 2009; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017)
and Ananthpur et al. (2016). Unfacilitated feedback interventions
gave citizens the tools or opportunities to give feedback or monitor
but the collection of these concerns is not through a facilitated group
meeting, for example Fiala & Premand (2017) which trains commu-
nities to monitor community CDD projects, as well as identify and
make complaints about corruption and mismanagement, but does not
set up forums to do so. We only identified one study that used
technology to solicit feedback on service provision, namely Grossman
et al.’s (2017) study of the U‐Bridge programme in Uganda that
introduced a SMS‐based service for citizens and local government
officials to submit, monitor and respond to requests around public
service delivery.
Seven studies evaluated a participatory planning mechanism to
introduce or facilitate public participation in public institutions'
decision‐making processes, such as participatory budgeting. Two of
these studies were different in that they introduced support for
existing participatory planning mechanisms, namely Beuermann &
Amelina (2014) that introduced training and technical assistance for
an existing participatory budgeting system in Russia, and Ananthpur
et al. (2014) which evaluated a citizenship engagement programme to
encourage participation, and support, the existing ward sabha system
in India. The other five studies compared the participatory planning
mechanism to an area where the mechanism did not exist.
We identified a further two studies that evaluated mandating the
participation of women into decision‐making processes around service
delivery, both in the context of community driven development (CDD)
programmes. These are Humphreys et al. (2014) evaluation of
Tuungane in the DRC and Beath et al.’s (2013) evaluation of the NSP
in Afghanistan. It should be noted that we did not include the findings
from these studies that evaluate the impact of the CDD programmes
themselves which was outside the scope of this review, only the
comparison between those groups that mandated participation of
women and those that did not. We consider these sub‐sets of the
participatory planning intervention category.
Finally, we identified seven studies evaluating community
management of natural resources, whereby there is some devolution
of the management of a natural resource to a community group, but
where the government retains some powers. These fell into two
groups; those that involved management of water (Bandyopadhyay
et al., 2010; Barde, 2017; Huang, 2014) and of forests or
conservancies (Persha & Meshack, 2016; Rasaalofosen et al., 2015;
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2004; Tachibana & Adhikari, 2009). This
intervention category differs substantively from the others in that
communities are equipped with considerable more power to make
decisions and implement public services than the other intervention
areas.
14.6 | Intervention funders
We attempted to capture information on the funders of the
programmes or policies evaluated in the included impact evaluation,
shown in Figure 5. Almost 45 per cent of the programmes received
funding from a public institution such as a national government,
university or bilateral donor such as the Department for Interna-
tional Development or USAID. Twenty‐five per cent received funding
from a multilateral institution, all of which received funding from a
department from within the World Bank, in some cases combined
with funding from another multilateral institution. Three of the
interventions were at least partly funded by an NGO and two by a
foundation. In almost 25 per cent of the studies, the intervention
funders were not reported.
14.7 | Equity
For each study, we captured information about if, and how, it
addresses equity concerns, either through the design of the
intervention or through the evaluation design and analysis methods.
We considered an intervention to address equity if it targeted a
marginalised or vulnerable group or was designed in a way to
overcome local barriers to incorporate these groups into the
programme. We considered an evaluation design and analysis
method to incorporate equity if it undertook sub‐group analysis for
the marginalised group or reported on how those groups were able
to participate in the programme.
Eighteen of the included studies did not explicitly address equity
concerns.4 Nine of the included studies evaluated an intervention
that addressed equity concerns by design. Two of these studies
focused exclusively on how the mandated incorporation of women
into community groups affected service delivery outcomes. These
were Humphreys et al.’s (2014) evaluation of how removing the
gender parity component of the CDD programme, Tuungane, in the
DRC affected outcomes, and Beath et al.’s (2013) evaluation of how
the requiring female participation in the distribution of food aid in
the context of a CDD programme in Afghanistan, the NSP, and
through the traditional jirga system, affected delivery and corruption.
Two of the citizen feedback studies, (Björkman & Jakob, 2009;
Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017) in Uganda and Gullo et al. (2017) in
Malawi, divided citizens into key social groups such as women, men,
youths in order to get their perspectives over issues concerning
service delivery and determine their preferences for change. The
Diaz‐Cayeros et al. (2014) evaluation in Oaxaca, Mexico assessed the
Usos y Costumbres system, which formalises participation of tradi-
tional forms of governance, typically of indigenous groups, in
municipality level government decision‐making. The participatory
budgeting system in Brazil, evaluated in Touchton & Wampler (2014)
and Gonclaves (2013), frequently adopts a “quality of life index”,
which allocates greater resources on a per capita basis to poorer
neighbourhoods. Banerjee et al. (2018) evaluates an information
campaign on the Raskin rice for poor households programme in
Indonesia, which is targeted at poor households who are entitled to
4We state they did not explicitly address equity concerns, as it is possible the intervention
design considered marginalised and vulnerable groups, but it was not reported in the
intervention description in the impact evaluation or additional documents.
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the rice but do not receive it. Finally, Giné et al.’s (2018) evaluation of
the initial community mobilisation stages of a CDD programme in
Pakistan actively targets the inclusion of women and poor house-
holds in the mobilisation and community organisation formation
process.
Only eight of the included studies addressed equity issues by
evaluation design.Just six of the included studies undertook sub‐
group analysis by a marginalised or vulnerable group. Palladium’s
(2015) evaluation of the community engagement component of the
Security Sector Accountability and Police Reform (SSAPR) Pro-
gramme in the DRC undertook sub‐group analysis by men and
women for outcomes around crime and feelings of security in the
community.Ananthpur et al. (2014) undertook a sub‐group analysis
for the effect of the “People’s Campaign” in Karnataka, India, on
female and male agricultural wages.Ravallion et al.’s (2013) evalua-
tion of an information campaign around NREGA (National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act) assessed outcomes on service use and
knowledge of rights for men and women separately. Bandyopadhyay
et al. (2010) assessed the effects of the Irrigation management
transfer (IMT) to Irrigation Associations in the Philippines on
production of rice for both the asset rich and the asset poor. Persha
& Meshack (2016) assessed how the Joint Forest Management policy
in Tanzania affected women headed households. Finally, Pandey
et al.’s (2007) evaluation of a rights campaign in India undertook sub‐
group analysis by people belonging to lower and mid‐ to high‐level
castes.
In addition to sub‐group analysis, Ananthpur et al. (2014) also
included a substantial ethnographic component, which considered
the participation of particularly marginalised groups in the gram
sabha system in India following the information campaign and
considered how women had been mobilised by the intervention.
Alhassan et al.’s (2016) evaluation of a citizen feedback mechanism in
Ghana considered the gender dynamics of focus groups that were
part of the intervention to identify gaps in service delivery in
healthcare facilities. Finally, Diaz‐Cayeros et al. (2014) considered
how women’s participation related to the Usos y Costumbres system
in Mexico, including the share of the municipal council made up by
women, and whether the current mayor is a woman.
14.8 | Types of studies
Figure 6 shows the types of publications we included in the review.
Just under 50 per cent were peer‐reviewed journal articles. Almost
30 per cent were articles published in working paper series such as
the World Bank Policy Research working paper series or Inter‐
American Development Bank Paper Series. We identified five
organisational reports, for example reports published in the 3ie
impact evaluation series or USAID. Finally, we included two
conference papers and one PhD thesis (Kasim, 2016).
Nineteen, or just over half, of the included studies were cluster
RCTs, that randomised the allocation to the intervention or
comparison group at the level of the public service, village, wider
community or similar. Most of these studies used covariate‐adjusted
regression (n = 15), including fixed effects regression, methods of
analysis.Six of these studies used difference‐in‐differences (DID)
analysis with baseline data from the RCT. Alhassan et al. (2016) also
used Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to analyse some outcomes for
their RCT, presumably as there are imbalances between the
treatment and control groups.
Timmons & Garfias’ (2015) study from Brazil was the only
included natural experiment. It evaluated a policy in Brazil that
randomly audited sub‐national government expenditure, the results
of which were then published for citizens.
The remaining 14 studies used non‐randomised, quasi‐experi-
mental designs. Ten of the studies used a comparison group with
both pre‐intervention and post‐intervention data. Three of these
used pseudo‐panel with repeated measurement for groups but
different individuals (Capuno & Garcia, 2010; Palladium, 2015;
Persha & Meshack 2016). The remaining seven used panel data on
the same individuals, households or communities (Diaz‐Cayeroset al.,
2014; Touchton & Wampler, 2014; Gonclaves, 2013; Barde, 2017;
Bradley & Igras, 2005; Huang, 2014; Tachibana & Adhikari, 2009, ).
Six of these studies combined statistical matching with DID analysis,
typically through covariate adjusted regression. The remaining
studies only used covariate matching followed by a comparison of
means or only covariate adjusted regression.
Finally, four of the included studies used a comparison group but
only had one data point after the intervention had started. Three of
F IGURE 5 intervention funding sources
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these studies used statistical matching methods (Bandyopadhyay
et al. 2010; Molina, 2014; Rasalofoson et al. 2015) combined with
another analysis method such as covariate adjusted regression or
simple comparison of means, while Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004) used
instrumental variables regression only without statistical matching.
Table 5 presents the follow up period for the assessment of
outcomes after the start of the citizen engagement intervention.
Most of the included impact evaluations assessed outcomes between
one year and five years after the start of the intervention (n= 22). In
six studies, the follow period was 12 months or less. The shortest
follow up period was in Kasim (2016) which looked at outcomes after
six months. Two studies assessed outcomes between five and 10
years after the start of the intervention. Six of the evaluations
assessed outcomes 10 years or more after the initiation of the
intervention. All these evaluations assessed long‐standing national
programmes: participatory budgeting in Brazil (Gonclaves, 2013;
Touchton & Wampler, 2014), the Usos y Costumbres system in Mexico
(Diaz‐Cayeros et al., 2014), rural water user associations in Brazil
(Barde, 2017) and community‐based forest management in Tanzania
(Persha & Meshack, 2016) and Nepal (Tachibana & Adhikari, 2009).
14.9 | Critical appraisal of included studies
We assessed the risk of bias for all studies included in this review.
Figure 7 presents the results for each criteria across all randomised
studies and Figure 8 presents the results for non‐randomised studies.
The criteria related to the assignment mechanism, analysis reporting
and blinding are assessed at the study level whereas all the other
criteria are assessed at the outcome level. While selection bias and
risks of confounding are usually assessed at the study level, it can be
the case that some outcomes are more exposed to bias than others,
depending on the data source or the analysis method (e.g. where
outcomes data are collected based on participant self‐reports rather
than direct observation in non‐blinded studies).
We found that out of the 166 outcomes assessed separately from
non‐randomised studies, 146 had high risk of bias, 19 had some
concerns, and one had low risk of bias. Out of 386 outcomes assessed
separately for randomised studies, 161 had high risk of bias, 83 had
some concerns and 142 had low risk of bias. A detailed and overall
assessment by study and group of outcomes is presented in Appendix
5.
14.10 | Findings by risk of bias domain
14.10.1 | Assignment mechanism in randomised
studies
As Figure 7 illustrates, for a large majority of the studies (73%), the
assignment of clusters into the different study arms was random or
probably random. For only one study (Kasim, 2016), although the
assignment mechanism was reported as random and the sample was
F IGURE 6 Type of publications
TABLE 5 Follow up periods of included studies
Follow up period Study
12 months or less Björkman and Svensson (2010), Olken (2007), Fiala & Premand (2017) scorecard intervention only, Kasim (2016), Pandey
et al. (2007) Ravallion et al. (2013).
1 ‐ 5 years Alhassan et al. (2016), Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017), Grossman et al. (2017), Gullo et al. (2017), Palladium (2015), Berman
et al. (2017 ‐ two follow ups), Fiala & Premand (2017 ‐ two follow ups), Ananthpur et al. (2014), Beuermann & Amelina
(2014), Giné et al. (2018), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2010), Bradley & Igras (2005), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004), Capuno &
Garcia (2010), Humphreys & Weinstein (2012), Grossman & Michelitch (2018), Timmons & Garfias (2015), Banerjee et al.
(2014), Banerjee et al. (2018), Humphreys et al. (2014), Beath et al. (2013).
5 ‐ 10 years Huang (2014), Tachibana & Adhikari (2009 ‐ environmental outcomes).
10 + years Diaz‐Cayeros et al. (2014 ‐ several follow up periods), Touchton & Wampler (2014), Gonclaves (2013), Barde (2017), Persha
& Meshack (2016), Tachibana & Adhikari (2009 ‐ forest condition).
Unclear Molina (2014), Rasalofosen et al. (2015).
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relatively large, significant imbalances at baseline suggests that there
might have been a problem in the random allocation. While
assignment seems to have indeed been random for 73 per cent of
randomised studies (and is reported as such), 47 per cent lacked
detailed information about the exact randomisation method, such as
whether the sequence was generated by a computer or whether a
paper‐based lottery was organised. In one study, important informa-
tion on the number of units of programme implementation within
each cluster was missing (Berman et al., 2017).
Reporting of a baseline balance table on cluster characteristics and
household characteristics is not done systematically. Five randomised
studies did not report any balance table and one reported it only for
balance on cluster characteristics, even though the outcomes were
measured at the household level. Eight out of 14 non‐randomised
studies reported a balance table at baseline and when relevant after
statistical matching. In some instances, it was not possible to assess
baseline balance. For instance, in Ananthpur et al. (2017), the baseline
data were collected after the start of the intervention in some villages,
yet the analysis method used the difference‐in‐difference technique.
The extent to which this undermines the results will depend on the
proportion of observations affected, but the authors did not report the
information required to assess the scale of the issue.
14.10.2 | Selection bias
The randomisation ensures that the risk of selection bias into the
study is relatively small. A majority of outcomes measured in
randomised studies were considered free or probably free from
selection bias (70%). However the sampling method used to collect
survey data or differential attrition at the end of the study represent
threats for RCTs and non‐randomised studies. Given that tracking
survey respondents over long time periods or preventing dropouts
can be challenging, attrition is common across almost all studies to a
certain extent. It is only a threat to validity if it represents a large
proportion of the sample and is systematically larger for some study
groups than others (and correlated with outcomes). This might be the
case for eight per cent of outcomes and is unclear for 21 per cent of
outcomes. Unfortunately, the lack of information reported on the
reasons for attrition makes it hard to identify risks of selection bias
out of the study. Authors do not tend to make attrition information
very accessible. In three studies where attritions rates were
particularly high (greater than 20 per cent of the baseline sample),
authors do not report attrition rates across different treatment and
control groups, or test of the relationship between covariates and
treatment status, four neglect to comment on varying sample sizes
between the initial sample and the results tables, and two do not
provide enough information to calculate attrition.
An example of an unclear case is Giné et al. (2018), in which
stunting could not be measured in one of the five districts included in
the study, and no information was provided on the proportion of
treatment and control communities per district. Excluding an entire
geographical area because of the difficulty to collect data, could be
selecting out of the study populations sharing similar characteristics,
but it is not clear whether there was an equal proportion of treated
and control communities which would prevent any bias from
undermining the results. There could also be selection bias into the
study if the sampling of survey respondents was not representative
of the study sample, or too small. There is a risk that this bias exists
for Kasim (2016), as the in‐person survey was conducted only in one
out of eight districts where the study was implemented.
F IGURE 7 Summary of risk of bias appraisal for randomised studies Note: figures are rounded percentages hence may not add to 100 per
cent
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Thirteen of the non‐randomised studies are quasi‐experimental
studies using various econometric techniques to control for selection
bias. One of the studies (Timmons and Garfias, 2015) is a natural
experiment, which evaluates the impact of a programme happening
outside the researcher’s control, but the selection process resembles
random assignment. More than 70 per cent of non‐randomised
studies did not provide enough information on the selection process
into the programme to reject the risk of selection bias, or failed to
overcome the selection bias that was identified. Non‐randomised
studies included in this review typically evaluate programme like
community‐based natural resource management reforms, because
they imply a long‐term change in the management system which
cannot be measured via a trial. The selection process for this type of
programme is likely to be either the government’s decision based on
unknown criteria or through self‐selection of the communities
themselves. For outcomes in four studies (24%), where the design
was likely to introduce selection bias, authors conducted an in depth
analysis of the selection criteria and convincingly argue that all
characteristics that might affect outcomes were controlled for in the
analysis. For these outcomes, the presence of unobservable
characteristics that might affect the outcomes is unlikely, therefore
these outcomes were rated as probably free from selection bias.
14.10.3 | Deviations from intended interventions
Any spill overs from one study group to the other, contamination of
the study by another program, or non‐compliance to the assigned
intervention status, has been assessed under deviations from
intended interventions. Only two randomised studies have outcomes
that had high risks of deviations. One of the outcome in Giné et al.
(2018) was assessed at the level above the unit of randomization, the
Basic Health Unit, which was served by control and treatment
communities. Berman et al. (2017) mentions issues in the implemen-
tation of the random assignment leading initially assigned control
community to receive the treatment. For 21 per cent of outcomes in
randomised and 48 per cent of outcomes in non‐randomised studies,
authors did not report on the geographical distance between
intervention and comparison groups, or failed to justify the absence
of spill overs when there was a potential risk.
14.10.4 | Performance bias
Another potential bias occurring during the data collection process is
performance bias: the fact that monitoring participants influences
their behaviours because they are aware of being watched
(Hawthorne effect). A majority of randomised studies are protected
from this bias (56%). When a process evaluation of the intervention
was conducted (Fiala & Premand, 2017) it was done on a subsample
of the treatment group. Banerjee et al. (2014), which was also at risk
of motivation bias due to the decoy visits used as a monitoring
technique, overcame this risk by adding a pure control study arm
(placebo group), free from monitoring visits.
14.10.5 | Outcome measurement bias
With regards to outcome measurement bias, which refers to cases
where the way the outcome is being measured differs between
treatment and control participants as a result of the intervention, it is
F IGURE 8 Summary risk of bias appraisal of non‐randomised studies Note: figures are rounded percentages hence may not add to 100 per
cent
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worth noting that around 65 per cent of the primary outcomes in
these studies are self‐reported, increasing their exposure to bias.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate this with 20 per cent of the study
outcomes being unclear, probably not free or not free from outcome
measurement bias for randomised studies and 34 per cent for non‐
randomised studies. An illustration of why this bias is greater when it
is self‐reported is a situation where the participants receive
information about what the expected behaviours or beliefs are, and
then are asked about their own behaviours and beliefs. This issue
exists with Kasim (2016), where people receive text messages about
their rights with regards to certain institutions and are then asked to
rate their trust toward these institutions. Measuring participants’
trust in religious institutions was used as a “placebo outcome”, which
attempts to measure the effect of possible social desirability bias in
survey responses by collecting self‐reported outcomes on which no
information was provided as part of the intervention.
Five studies included in this review evaluate community‐based
monitoring of health services (Alhassan et al. 2015 Alhassan et al.
2016, Björkman & Svensson, 2010, Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017,
Fiala & Premand 2017, Gullo et al. 2017). Because the main
intervention aims to engage citizen in monitoring health worker’s
performance, the service users in the intervention groups in these
studies are more likely to remember the services they received over
the past year because they paid attention to it (recall bias). Similarly,
the service providers in this setting have incentives to over‐report on
their performance.
In situations where there are risks of measurement bias known
from the start, four studies collect data from different sources so that
they do not rely only on a biased estimate. This is what researchers
have done in Berman et al. (2017) to measure road quality. Given
that there is a high risk of outcome measurement bias in asking
villagers who have been taught how to assess quality as part of the
intervention, they have measured this outcome using both villagers
report and a technical assessment.
The bias could also come from the outcome assessors, if they
know the respondent’s treatment status. This could still be a risk for
all studies because none of them blinded outcome assessors except
one (Pandey et al., 2007).
14.10.6 | Analysis and reporting bias
The randomised study designs ensured comparability of groups for
the analysis of almost all outcomes. As a result, 70 per cent of all
outcomes in randomised studies were free or probably free from
confounding. However, depending on the sample size and the
randomisation procedures, some imbalances can occur by chance.
The majority of authors identified these imbalances and controlled
for relevant variables in the analysis method, whereas in 26 per cent
of the cases, it was not clear whether imbalanced variables were
controlled in adjusted analysis.
Although 12 out of the 14 non‐randomised studies used the
appropriate method to control for group differences given the data
available, the existing selection bias into the programme and the lack
of baseline data explains why more than 60 per cent of studies did
not ensure group equivalence on all relevant variables. Despite the
use of combinations of matching techniques with difference‐in‐
difference estimations, it was sometimes unclear whether unobser-
vable characteristics could be accounted for (19 per cent of the
outcomes).
Out of all studies, only one blinded data analysts to the treatment
(Humphreys et al., 2012).
Overall, for randomised and non‐randomised studies alike, there
is a lack of transparency and reporting. Non‐randomised studies do
not systematically report results using different analysis methods
and specifications, which is often key to assessing the robustness of
their model. Three studies out of eight using statistical matching
reported estimation from different matching techniques. The
existence of a pre‐analysis plan, published before the start of the
analysis, or a trial registration is rare across all types of studies. None
of the non‐randomised studies and only three randomised studies
reported having registered the trial or a list of outcomes (Banerjee
et al., 2018, Pandey et al., 2007 and Fiala & Premand, 2017). Only
three study reported having published a pre‐analysis plan (Beath
et al., 2013, Grossman et al., 2017 and Humphreys et al., 2012). The
42 per cent of randomised studies being probably free from analysis
reporting are studies which have been reported transparently but
have not registered either trial, outcomes or pre‐analysis plan,
therefore we cannot be certain that all relevant analyses are
reported. Finally, two randomised studies failed to report analysis
differentiating treatment arms (Alhassan et al., 2015; and Kasim,
2016).
More generally, as Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate, there is, for all
criteria, a share of studies and outcomes which could not be assessed
because of a lack of information (grey areas). Overall, it is sometimes
the case that there is some doubt about a risk of bias, which could
have been eliminated if more information on the issue was provided.
These issues were particularly problematic for method of assignment
(randomisation procedures), reporting of baseline data and attrition.
14.11 | Research ethics
We also captured information on whether the paper explicitly stated
that the authors had ethical clearance to undertake the study. Of the
35 included studies, the majority (28) collected primary data for
analysis. However, just three of the included studies reported that
they had sought and received ethical clearance for their studies. The
rest did not report whether ethical clearance to undertake the
research was sought or granted; they may well have done, but they
simply do not indicate whether this was the case in the country
where the data were being collected and (if different) where the
research team was based. In addition, we looked for declarations of
interest in the included studies, to capture for example if any of the
authors related in any way to the funding or implementing
institution. We found that only two studies included conflict of
interest statements. In 18 of the studies, the authors did not include
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a statement or did not present a statement that clearly reported on
possible conflicts (known or unknown) for all authors.
14.12 | External validity
Several factors need to be taken into account when assessing the
external validity of studies such as the approach used by researchers
to select the study population, whether the programme implemented
was a small scale pilot or a large scale established program, and the
characteristics of the population and setting of the study. We
captured information on the sampling strategies, as well as authors’
discussions of generalisability of their findings.
14.12.1 | Selection of the study population
We identified nine studies in which random sampling was used to
either select the study’s geographical areas such as regions and
districts, or select the clusters or units of treatment such as
communities, facilities and villages. Twenty one used purposive
sampling and four did not provide enough information on their
method or the origin of the data set used. Table 6 shows which
studies have used each of the sampling strategies, and separate the
results by treatment assignment mechanism and whether survey
respondents were randomly sampled.
Knowledge of the sampling method is not sufficient on its own
and, more attention to each study is needed to be able to conclude on
the representativeness of the populations selected. Of the studies
which used random sampling, three did not include randomly
selected regions but researchers selected the communities within
the regions randomly. One decided to include a representative
population of the country by randomly selecting regions or districts
but then purposely selected villages.
Of the studies which used only purposive sampling, two reported
specific exclusion criteria which might limit the generalisability of
their results. For instance, Alhassan et al. (2016) mentions that health
facilities were selected because they were less complex and easy to
monitor. Gullo et al. (2017) selected areas where not many NGOs
were already present to avoid contamination. Two studies had to
drop communities or facilities from their sample because of
constraints related to their randomization method (Berman et al.,
2017; Gullo et al., 2017). Two studies selected areas specifically for
their representativeness of the state or country population (Banerjee
et al., 2014; Berman et al., 2017). Ananthpur et al. (2014) specifically
targeted the poorest area in the state. Another selection criteria was
availability of data, especially for non‐randomised retrospective
studies using existing data sets. A few authors mention that villages
where survey or administrative data was already available from
previous studies were selected to be part of the evaluation (Banerjee
et al., 2018; Pandey et al., 2007; Gonclaves, 2013). Finally, three
studies evaluating the impact of an established programme were
restricted to the area or communities where the NGO or the
government was implementing or had had the program (Beath et al.,
2013; Giné et al., 2018; Molina, 2014).
14.12.2 | Author discussion of external validity
We found 11 studies where authors specifically discussed external
validity. Among those studies, five acknowledged the limits to the
generalisability of their findings, due to the small scale of the study or
the sampling strategy. Four studies claimed generalisability of their
findings, either to the level of an Indian state (Banerjee et al., 2014;
Ravaillon et al., 2013), or to other areas of the country under similar
conditions, such as density of population or distance to a health
facility (Toutchon, 2015; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017). Finally, two
studies claimed generalisability of their findings to other contexts,
TABLE 6 Sampling strategy used to select communities and villages
Population selection
Random sampling of
survey respondents Random allocation to treatment Non‐random selection into treatment
Randomly sampled regions (or
any geographical unit above
cluster)
Yes Beuermann & Amelina (2014), Björkman and
Svensson (2010), Humphreys & Weinstein
(2012)
Capuno & Garcia (2010)
No Timmons & Garfias (2015)
Randomly sampled clusters
within purposely selected
regions
Yes Ravallion (2013), Grossman et al. (2017) Bandyoadhyay (2010)
No Huang (2014)
Purposive sampling of clusters Yes Giné et al (2018), Ananthpur et al. (2014),
Beath et al. (2013), Banerjee et al. (2018),
Banerjee et al. (2014), Grossman & Michelitch
(2018), Humphreys et al (2014)
Tachibana & Adhikari (2009),
Palladium (2015), Persha & Meshack
(2016), Rasamoelina et al. (2015)
No Alhassan et al. (2016), Gullo et al. (2017),
Pandey et al. (2007), Olken (2007), Berman,
2017
Touchton & Wampler (2014), Molina
(2014), Goncalves (2013), Bradley &
Igras (2005), Barde (2017),
Unclear Kasim (2016), Fiala & Premand (2017) Bandyoadhyay (2004), Diaz‐cayeros
et al. (2014)
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and potentially other countries (Fiala & Premand, 2017; Timmons &
Garfias, 2015).
14.13 | Summary of findings from critical appraisal
The quality of evidence from randomised studies is relatively high
compared to non‐randomised studies, and easier to assess due to
standards of reporting for those studies. Prospective randomised
study design helped ensured comparability of intervention and
control groups according to observable characteristics, and protected
threats from selection bias into the study in 70 per cent of the cases.
For these studies, threats to internal validity are therefore more
relevant at the outcome level, where concerns related to the way
some outcomes are measured in the majority of studies. This is
largely due to the use of self‐report measures that are more likely to
be biased in open studies where blinding (of outcome data collectors
or participants) is not attempted or impossible. A majority of the non‐
randomised studies did not provide enough information on the
selection process into the programme to reject the risk of selection
bias, or failed to overcome the selection bias and confounding that
was identified. Transparency in reporting is an issue for randomised
and non‐randomised studies alike given the limited pre‐registrations
of trial, outcomes or analysis plans. The use of methods such as
placebo outcomes or groups, and blinding for outcome assessors or
data analysts, is not common, though it seems relatively easy to
implement and could reduce risks of biases. With regards to external
validity, four studies still do not report their sampling strategies
clearly, and a surprisingly small share of all studies specifically discuss
the extent or limits to generalisability of their findings.
14.14 | Results of meta‐analysis (review questions
1‐3)
In this section, we describe the quantitative dataset and outcome
variables classification. We present the results of meta‐analysis
across all included studies, by primary outcomes along the causal
chain (review question 1). We then examine findings for secondary
outcomes (review question 2). In both instances, we assess the extent
to which findings are homogeneous for groups of interventions that
aim to address different participation, inclusion, transparency and
accountability mechanisms. Finally, we further examine heterogene-
ity according to context and implementation factors, as well as
differential effects for sub‐groups of participants such as poor people
(review question 3).
As discussed, we collected all effect estimates from each included
study, on any eligible outcome, population sub‐group or specification.
Hence for some studies we collected large numbers of effects. Figure
9 presents the number of effect estimates collected from each study
that we were able to incorporate in meta‐analysis.
In total the 35 studies yielded 618 estimates of programme
impacts that we incorporated in meta‐analysis. All studies provided
usable data for effect size calculations. In cases where pooled
standard deviations were not available, we had to rely on t‐statistic
transformations to calculate g and its standard error. The effect sizes
are unevenly distributed between studies. The largest numbers of
effect sizes were from Ravallion et al. (2013) in Rajasthan, India, with
87 effect estimates used in the analysis, followed by Bradley & Igras
(2005) in Guinea and Kenya with 78 effect estimates, (Björkman &
Jakob, 2009; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; also incorporating
Donato & Garcia Mosqueira, 2016) in Uganda with 56 effect
estimates extracted, and Grossman et al. (2017) in Uganda with 48.
However, the majority of studies presented far fewer effect
estimates, usually less than 20.
We assigned specific sub‐categories of outcomes (e.g. participation
in meetings) to causal chain outcome groupings: intermediate outcomes
(service access, service use and attitudes to services), final outcomes
(wellbeing and state‐society relations) (review question 1), and
immediate outcomes (user engagement and provider response) (review
question 2). Figure 10 presents the number of effect sizes collected for
each outcome, together with the distribution of effect size estimates,
showing the mean, minimum and maximum values of g.
We drew on a recent review of community‐driven development
(White et al., 2018) in informing the outcome groupings along the
causal chain, as presented here. Table 7 presents the detailed
description of variables included under each outcome area. As these
may differ by projects, these are presented by main sector (health,
social protection, justice and security, local infrastructure and
economy, and natural resources). The full list of variables collected
under each outcome category is presented in Appendix 6.
14.15 | Meta‐analysis of intermediate and final
outcomes (review question 1)
We present findings by primary outcome group and subgroups along
the results chain (intermediate and final outcomes). In each sub‐
section, we first present an overview of the different outcome
metrics used in each study included in meta‐analysis (for the full list,
see Appendix 6) and then present the subsequent meta‐analysis
results including forest plots. When presenting the meta‐analysis, we
present sensitivity analyses to disaggregate findings by study design
(whether randomised or non‐randomised) and risk of bias status.
Owing to the large number of outcomes collected, we present all
effect sizes as standardised mean differences for ease of pre-
sentation.5 The total number of study participants across all studies
included in the analysis is 62,500.
In general, the findings suggest that the interventions can be
effective ways of boosting citizen engagement in service delivery
governance and access to public services. But the evidence does not
suggest that outcomes further along the results chain typically
improve as a result of interventions to promote citizen engagement.
In a few cases, particularly in health and infrastructure, there may be
increases in service use and some wellbeing outcomes. For state‐
society relations, payment of taxes may increase.
5As requested by the methods reviewer, we also present odds ratios for dichotomous
outcomes in Appendix 6 Figure A6.13.
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14.15.1 | Service access
A mix of variables was used to measure physical access including new
amenities available in the community, such as water sources
(Ananthpur et al., 2014; Barde et al., 2017; Diaz‐Cayeros et al.,
2014; Grossman, 2017; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2012), roads,
(Ananthpur et al., 2014), health units (Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017),
or new health staff posted in the community like Anganwadi
(community creche) workers (Ananthpur et al., 2014) and lady health
workers (Giné et al., 2018). Access is also measured through costs to
consumers in two studies: subsidies received (Banerjee et al., 2018)
and user fees paid in health (Giné et al., 2018).
Quality of service provision was assessed through measures of
service provision performance such as whether there are employees
in the Anganwadi or agricultural extension visits occur (Ananthpur
et al., 2014), condition of health facilities (Alhassan et al., 2015;
Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Giné et al., 2018; Grossman, 2017;
Gullo et al., 2017) or quality of health care received (Bradley, 2005),
quality of roads (Berman et al., 2017) and irrigation provision
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010), or environmental services like forestry
cover (Persha & Meshack, 2016; Rasolofosen et al., 2015; Tachibana
et al., 2004). Quality was also assessed by absenteeism in several
studies in Uganda (Björkman & Jakob, 2009; Humphreys &
Weinstein, 2012; Grossman, 2017; Grossman & Michelitch, 2018),
which we report separately. The final measure of quality in service
delivery was measured by leakages of public goods from road
construction (Olken, 2007) and food aid (Beath et al., 2013).
The overall findings suggest some improvement in access for some
measures of service delivery (Figure 11). This is demonstrated by an
increase in average effects of physical access (SMD=0.08, 95%
confidence interval (CI)=0.00, 0.15; 12 studies), and service quality
(SMD=0.10, 95%CI=0.03, 018; 16 studies). However, improvements in
other outcomes were not apparent, including for reducing absenteeism
(SMD=0.02, 95% confidence interval (CI)=‐0.19, 0.24; four studies),
leakages from embezzlement (SMD=0.02, 95% confidence interval (CI)
=‐0.18, 0.21; four studies) and costs paid for access (SMD=0.07, 95%
confidence interval (CI)=−0.11, 0.24; 2 studies).
F IGURE 10 Number of effect sizes by outcome along causal chain
F IGURE 9 Number of effect sizes collected from included studies
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There was significant heterogeneity which we explored in
sensitivity analysis (Table 8; forest plots presented in Appendix 6).
The results indicate that the findings for non‐randomised studies
tend to be bigger than those for RCTs, while results for risk of bias
categories vary, although there are positive significant effects for low
risk of bias studies measuring physical access (SMD=0.12, 95%
confidence interval (CI)=0.06, 0.17; four studies) and quality of
service (SMD=0.12, 95% confidence interval (CI)=0.01, 0.24; three
studies)
14.15.2 | Service use and attitudes to services
Service use was measured in health and social protection sectors.
Various measures of health care for children were collected such as
immunisation (e.g. Donato & Garcia Mosqueira, 2016; Giné et al.,
2018) and nutrition supplements (Grossman, 2017), and mothers
such as use of antenatal and postnatal care (Grossman, 2017; Gullo
et al., 2017). In one social protection study, the authors measured
participation in employment services (Ravallion et al., 2013).
User satisfaction was measured through satisfaction surveys in
health (Duku et al., 2018; Giné et al., 2018), policing (Banerjee et al.,
2014), general satisfaction with local amenities provided by govern-
ment including infrastructure (Beuerman et al., 2014; Molina, 2014)
and employment services (Ravallion et al., 2013), and complaints
reported (Banerjee et al., 2018). User satisfaction with service
delivery staff was also assessed in policing (Banerjee et al., 2014),
health (Bradley et al., 2005; Giné et al., 2018) and family planning
(Gullo et al., 2017) and in local leadership (Fiala & Premand, 2017;
Molina, 2014). One study also measured perceived user rights to
employment services for women (Ravallion et al., 2013).
The results of the meta‐analysis (Figure 12) indicate that we do
not observe any changes in use on average for health services
(SMD=0.25, 95% confidence interval (CI)=−0.04, 0.54; six studies),
user satisfaction (SMD=0.05, 95% confidence interval (CI)=−0.02,
0.13; 15 studies) or perceived quality of service provision
(SMD=0.02, 95% confidence interval (CI)=−0.07, 0.11; seven studies).
There also appeared to be significant heterogeneity in the findings
although this was not related to study design or risk of bias (Table 9).
14.15.3 | Wellbeing
A variety of wellbeing outcomes among study participants were
measured. Health outcomes included mortality (Touchton & Wam-
pler, 2015; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Giné et al., 2018), illness
(Duku et al. 2018; Giné et al., 2018), fertility (Björkman Nyqvist et al.
2017; Donato & Garcia Mosqueira, 2016) and anthropometry
(Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Giné et al., 2018). Several studies
reported agriculture yields (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010; Huang et al.,
2014) and livestock (Fiala & Premand, 2017). Other studies
measured feelings of empowerment in and of the community (Fiala
& Premand, 2017; Humphreys et al., 2014) and social cohesion via
presence and membership of civil society organisations (AnanthpurT
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et al., 2014; Capuno & Garcia, 2010; Touchton & Wampler, 2015) or
trust (Kasim, 2016). Kasim (2016) also measured life satisfaction.
Figure 13 presents forest plots for wellbeing outcomes
(summarised in Table 10). These suggest outcomes may increase
marginally, although usually not statistically significantly with the
exceptions of reductions in illness (SMD=0.09, 95%CI=0.02, 0.16;
2 studies) in health. In the case of economic outcomes, there are
improvements in yields (SMD=0.24, 95%CI=0.12, 0.36; 2 studies)
and income/expenditure (SMD=0.08, 95%CI=0.01, 0.14; 3 studies).
We do not see statistically significant findings for pooled effects in
social wellbeing. It is also difficult to explore heterogeneity by
study design in the cases of health and economic outcomes as
health outcomes are mainly from RCTs while those in agriculture
are all non‐randomised. For social outcomes, the heterogeneity
observed appears to be due to study design, although all studies
(randomised and non‐randomised) were assessed as being of high
risk of bias. In general, there are too few outcomes of any type to
draw conclusions.
14.15.4 | State‐society relations
A few studies also measured the category of variable we have
referred to (following Phillips et al., 2017) as state‐society relations,
which are principally measures of the relationship between citizens
and government. We categorised these into variables measuring
taxes paid (Ananthpur et al., 2014; Beuermann & Amelina, 2014;
Timmons et al., 2015) or in the case of natural resource management
contribution to local service fees (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010; Huang
et al., 2014); feelings of trust in leadership and institutions (Fiala &
Premand, 2017; Kasim, 2016); and, relatedly, public perception of
corruption among public servants (Fiala & Premand, 2017) including
the police (Banerjee et al., 2014).
Service access
F IGURE 11 Forest plots showing service access outcomes Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for comparability
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The results suggest that there have been improvements in taxes
paid in individual studies and overall (SMD=0.58, 95%CI=0.08, 1.086;
5 studies) (Figure 14). There were no improvements for the other
outcomes – corruption perceptions (SMD=−0.02, 95%CI=−0.18, 0.14;
2 studies) or confidence in institutions (SMD=0.04, 95%CI=−0.02,
0.11; 2 studies). Sensitivity analysis indicates that the estimated
increase in tax paid is mainly due to the RCT of participatory
budgeting training and technical assistance in Russia (Beuermann &
Amelina, 2014) (Table 11).
14.16 | Meta‐analysis of immediate outcomes
(review question 2)
We grouped immediate outcomes into user engagement and provider
response, in order to break down the mechanisms through which
interventions operate. In general, the findings suggest that citizen
engagement interventions can be effective ways of boosting user
engagement in service delivery governance, but not typically
provider responsiveness. We conclude that we are able to go some
way to explaining intervention mechanisms on demand and supply
sides, articulating that the interventions are mainly successful in
improve demand (user engagement) and not supply (provider
engagement). However, heterogeneity in findings needs further
explanation, which we return to below in moderator meta‐analysis
and framework synthesis.
14.16.1 | User engagement
User engagement outcomes include knowledge about the processes
of engagement with the intervention (Ananthpur et al., 2014;
TABLE 8 Service access by study design and intervention
Outcome Moderator g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Physical access Total 0.075 −0.001 0.152 63.9% 0.0084 30.49 0.001 12
RCT 0.051 −0.027 0.128 65.4% 0.0071 23.10 0.003 9
NRS 0.297 −0.014 0.609 52.6% 0.0396 4.22 0.121 3
Low RoB 0.118 0.064 0.172 0.0% 0.0000 0.73 0.867 4
Some concerns 0.057 −0.184 0.299 70.7% 0.0308 6.84 0.033 3
High RoB 0.081 −0.069 0.230 74.7% 0.0157 15.82 0.003 5
Service quality Total 0.105 0.026 0.184 62.4% 0.0103 39.94 0.000 16
RCT 0.045 −0.005 0.096 0.0% 0.0000 6.66 0.672 10
NRS 0.287 0.031 0.544 84.7% 0.0716 32.78 0.000 6
Low RoB 0.127 0.011 0.243 0.0% 0.0000 0.01 0.996 3
Some concerns 0.018 −0.153 0.190 0.0% 0.0000 0.69 0.405 2
High RoB 0.127 0.023 0.232 72.5% 0.0141 36.42 0.000 11
Reduced absenteeism Total 0.022 −0.193 0.236 45.8% 0.0216 5.54 0.136 4
RCT 0.022 −0.193 0.236 45.8% 0.0216 5.54 0.136 4
NRS ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Low RoB −0.028 −0.341 0.284 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns −0.294 −0.863 0.274 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB 0.240 −0.372 0.852 77.9% 0.1591 4.52 0.034 2
Reduced leakage Total 0.019 −0.177 0.215 42.6% 0.0167 5.23 0.156 4
RCT 0.019 −0.177 0.215 42.6% 0.0167 5.23 0.156 4
NRS ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Low RoB 0.131 −0.056 0.319 0.0% 0.0000 0.00 0.987 2
Some concerns −0.132 −0.424 0.159 27.4% 0.0149 1.38 0.241 2
High RoB ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Reduced cost of service Total 0.067 −0.105 0.239 80.5% 0.0127 5.13 0.024 2
RCT 0.067 −0.105 0.239 80.5% 0.0127 5.13 0.024 2
NRS ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Low RoB 0.145 0.080 0.209 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
High RoB −0.033 −0.172 0.107 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Note: ‐ not applicable.
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Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017) or the services themselves that are
available (Ananthpur et al., 2014; Ravallin et al., 2013; Banerjee et al.,
2018). They also include measures of participation in the governance
intervention, including meeting attendance (Ananthpur et al., 2014;
Capuno and Garcia, 2010; Olken, 2007; Ravallion et al., 2013) and
more active participation in processes such as public speaking
(Björkman & Jakob, 2009; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Olken,
2007), and maintenance planning and expenditure (Huang et al.,
2007; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010). A few studies also measured
knowledge about intervention processes (Ananthpur et al., 2014;
Banerjee et al., 2018; Ravallion et al., 2013) or public services
(Ananthpur et al., 2014; Björkman et al., 2018).
It is worth noting that because these are secondary outcomes,
which are reported in studies that also measure primary outcomes,
the findings for immediate outcomes are only generalisable to the
population of studies that also report immediate and final outcomes.
We first present overall findings for user engagement (Figure 15).
The evidence suggests that interventions appear to be particularly
effective on average in getting citizens to attend meetings
(SMD=0.69, 95%CI=0.22, 1.15; 5 studies), and to a lesser extent
participate actively in intervention processes like speaking at
meetings (SMD=0.20, 95%CI=0.07, 0.33; nine studies), and improving
knowledge about services (SMD=0.09, 95%CI=0.01, 0.17; 3 studies).
The two studies measuring knowledge about intervention processes
did not find significant effects (SMD=0.01, 95%CI=−0.11, 0.11; 2
studies).
There was some heterogeneity in the findings which we explored
in sensitivity analysis (Table 12). Most of the studies are RCTs so
exploring differences by design were not especially useful. The
findings suggested low risk of bias studies tended to have bigger
effects than higher risk of bias studies.
14.16.2 | Provider response
We categorised provider response variables into groups of related
outcomes. A number of studies measured changes in public spending
Service use and user attitudes
F IGURE 12 Forest plots showing service use outcomes Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for comparability
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in health (Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Grossman, 2017; Touchton
& Wampler, 2015) or more generally (Beuermann & Amelina, 2014;
Goncalves, 2013; Grossman & Michelitch, 2018). We also defined
other provider actions relating to the citizen engagement interven-
tion such as holding meetings (Pandey et al., 2007) or adopting
processes like participatory budgeting (Timmons et al., 2015); or
resulting from the engagement, such as activities carried out by staff
(Ananthpur et al., 2014; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Diaz‐Cayeros,
2014) and projects selected (Humphreys et al., 2014). Two studies
further measured variables relating to self‐motivation of staff
governing the intervention (Alhassan et al., 2016; Bradley et al.,
2005) or perceptions about politician performance (Diaz‐Cayeros
et al., 2014; Grossman & Michelitch, 2018; Humphreys & Weinstein,
2012). Finally, a number of studies measured responsiveness of
providers to the governance intervention as perceived by users
(Ananthpur et al., 2014; Beath et al., 2013; Beuermann & Amelina,
2014; Capuno & Garcia, 2009; Fiala & Premand, 2017).
On average, across those studies primarily concerned with
intermediate and final outcomes, the findings do not suggest that
the interventions improved provider response (Figure 16; Table 13).
Thus, we were unable to find increases in public spending (SMD=
−0.02, 95%CI=−0.08, 0.05; six studies), perceived response by users
(SMD=0.03, 95%CI=−0.05, 0.11; 7 studies), staff motivation
(SMD=0.23, 95%CI=−0.08, 0.54; four studies), and politician perfor-
mance (SMD=−0.06, 95%CI=−0.17, 0.05; 3 studies).
In the case of provider actions, there is significant heterogeneity
in the effect (SMD=0.13, 95%CI=−0.04, 0.30; 12 studies). We also
analysed the significant heterogeneity across studies by design and
risk of bias. In general, the findings support the overall results that
provider response outcomes are not significantly affected. There was
some evidence that low risk of bias studies on average provided
significant effects on provider actions (SMD=0.26, 95%CI=0.03, 0.48;
six studies) (forest plot reported in Appendix 6).
14.17 | Moderator analysis: analysis by
intervention group and inclusion dimension
While these findings are instructive about the effects of governance
interventions overall on intermediate and final outcomes, there is
significant residual statistical and substantive heterogeneity. Here,
we attempt to explain this by examining whether findings differ
firstly by intervention group and secondly inclusion dimension. It is
difficult to draw strong conclusions given the small sample sizes
available at the individual intervention level. However, the findings
suggest interventions focusing on rights information and community
feedback appear may be effective in improving user engagement and
service access. Interventions promoting participatory planning can be
effective in improve service access, particularly where implementa-
tion is fully devolved through community‐based natural resource
committees, where wellbeing and state‐society relations may also
increase. On the other hand, interventions promoting performance
information are not generally effective in improving any outcomes.
Furthermore, most interventions have little if any effect on provider
responsiveness and in most cases do not improve outcomes relating
to use, wellbeing or state‐society relations.
TABLE 9 Service use and satisfaction by study design and intervention
Outcome Moderator g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Service use Total 0.254 −0.035 0.544 87.5% 0.1011 40.00 0.000 6
RCT 0.065 −0.012 0.141 0.0% 0.0000 2.35 0.672 5
NRS 1.086 0.769 1.403 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB 0.417 −0.146 0.981 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns 0.078 −0.011 0.167 0.0% 0.0000 0.03 0.874 2
High RoB 0.349 −0.269 0.967 94.5% 0.2809 36.43 0.000 3
User satisfaction Total 0.035 −0.042 0.112 66.9% 0.0097 33.18 0.000 12
RCT −0.011 −0.052 0.030 8.1% 0.0003 8.70 0.368 9
NRS 0.336 −0.034 0.707 80.9% 0.0867 10.49 0.005 3
Low RoB −0.024 −0.070 0.021 0.0% 0.0000 1.06 0.589 3
Some concerns −0.053 −0.309 0.204 81.3% 0.0282 5.34 0.021 2
High RoB 0.147 −0.032 0.325 69.8% 0.0382 19.90 0.003 7
Perceived quality Total 0.027 −0.082 0.136 66.9% 0.0091 15.11 0.010 6
RCT 0.004 −0.043 0.051 0.0% 0.0000 0.94 0.815 4
NRS 0.202 −0.511 0.916 91.8% 0.2434 12.23 0.000 2
Low RoB 0.008 −0.040 0.056 0.0% 0.0000 0.50 0.480 2
Some concerns −0.061 −0.512 0.391 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB 0.108 −0.292 0.507 85.9% 0.1064 14.22 0.001 3
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14.18 | Rights information
The evidence suggests rights information interventions improve
active participation (SMD=0.25, 95%CI=0.18, 0.31; 2 studies), as well
as knowledge about services (SMD=0.13, 95%CI=0.07, 0.18; 2
studies) and meeting attendance (individual effect estates are
positive and significant for Ravallion et al., 2013, and Olken, 2007)
(Figure 17). Overall, the interventions do not necessarily improve
provider responsiveness, although there is a significant improvement
Health outcomes Economic outcomes
Social outcomes
F IGURE 13 Forest plots showing wellbeing outcomes Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for comparability
TABLE 10 Wellbeing outcomes by study design and intervention
Outcome Sub‐category g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Health Survival 0.073 −0.139 0.284 80.4% 0.0233 10.21 0.006 3
Reduced illness 0.092 0.024 0.159 0.0% 0.0000 0.81 0.368 2
Reduced fertility 0.074 −0.061 0.210 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Improved nutrition 0.029 −0.078 0.136 0.0% 0.0000 0.50 0.482 2
Economic Income/expenditure 0.076 0.011 0.141 0.0% 0.0000 1.32 0.517 3
Agricultural yields 0.241 0.120 0.362 0.0% 0.0000 0.01 0.927 2
Assets 1.588 −1.429 4.606 100.0% 4.7391 3668.48 0.000 2
Social Social capital 0.361 −0.039 0.761 87.2% 0.1447 23.38 0.000 4
Empowerment 0.089 −0.041 0.218 28.7% 0.0045 1.40 0.236 2
Satisfaction with life 0.020 −0.303 0.343 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Reduced crime 0.239 −0.358 0.836 89.6% 0.1675 9.64 0.002 2
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in the case of food subsidies in Indonesia (Banerjee et al., 2018).
Service access also improves (SMD=0.11, 95%CI=0.05, 0.17; 2
studies) and costs fall (SMD=0.14, 95%CI=0.08, 0.21; one study,
Banerjee et al., 2018) across the few studies available measuring
those outcomes. However, the evidence does not suggest service use
typically improves, with partial exception of user satisfaction that
increases slightly but not significant across 2 studies (SMD=0.16,
95%CI=−0.03, 0.15; 2 studies). Only a single study (Kasim, 2016)
measured any wellbeing or state‐society relations outcomes, and was
not able to report any significant changes (Figure 18).
14.19 | Performance information
As regards performance information, the six studies that evaluated
this intervention type measured a wide range of outcomes, making it
difficult to do much pooling in meta‐analysis. However, the evidence
does not suggest intermediate, immediate outcomes or final out-
comes in individual studies improve due to greater performance
intervention (Figure 19, Figure 20). There is a partial exception in the
case of one study (Capuno and Garcia, 2010).
14.20 | Participatory planning
For participatory planning interventions, where seven studies
measured a range of interventions, the story is mixed but largely
not a positive one. Physical access to services improves on average
(SMD=0.10, 95%CI=0.03, 0.18; 3 studies) (Figure 21). A few other
outcomes are positive but not statistically significant, for example
quality of service delivery (SMD=0.08, 95%CI=−0.02, 0.18; 2 studies)
and use of health services and morbidity in Giné et al. (2018). In
State society relations
F IGURE 14 Forest plot showing state‐society relations outcomes Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for comparability
TABLE 11 Wellbeing outcomes by study design and intervention
Outcome Moderator g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Tax paid Total 0.584 0.083 1.086 92.5% 0.2755 53.56 0.000 5
RCT 1.048 −0.975 3.071 98.0% 2.0887 50.00 0.000 2
NRS 0.246 −0.085 0.576 43.6% 0.0395 3.55 0.170 3
Low RoB 2.099 1.541 2.657 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns 0.061 −0.152 0.273 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB 0.238 −0.119 0.595 55.4% 0.0568 4.48 0.106 3
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general, however, the evidence does not support increases in
outcomes for other intermediate and final outcomes, for any low
risk of bias study groups.
Only one study was able to measure user engagement outcomes
(Ananthpur et al., 2014). However, it is noteworthy that a relatively
large number of studies that measured service access and wellbeing
outcomes also measured provider response outcomes (Figure 22).
The evidence does not suggest provider response improves on
average or in individual studies, whether measured by provider
actions (SMD=0.04, 95%CI=−0.05, 0.14; 5 studies), public spending
(SMD=−0.01, 95%CI=−0.08, 0.06; 3 studies), perceived response by
users (SMD=0.04, 95%CI=−0.06, 0.14; 5 studies) or staff motivation
(SMD=0.13, 95%CI=−0.09, 0.13; 2 studies).
14.21 | Citizen feedback mechanisms
The story for citizen feedback mechanisms is more positive, although
there is significant heterogeneity in the findings. For evaluations that
also measure primary outcomes, citizen engagement improves for
active participation (SMD=0.14, 95%CI=0.05, 0.24; four studies) and
in one study that measured meeting attendance (Olken, 2007). The
meta‐analyses also did not suggest positive improvements in
provider responsiveness on average, although some individual
studies reported positive effects for provider actions (Olken, 2007)
and staff motivation (Bradley et al., 2005) (Figure 23). Several service
access and use outcomes were assessed as having increased on
average but not statistically significantly, including service quality
(SMD=0.19, 95%CI=−0.01, 0.39; 7 studies) and user satisfaction
(SMD=0.13, 95%CI=−0.04, 0.30; six studies). Finally, a few single
studies reported positive wellbeing outcomes for reducing illness
(Duku et al., 2018) and crime (Palladium, 2015), and improving
empowerment and assets (Fiala & Premand, 2017) (Figure 24). Only
one study (Fiala & Premand, 2017) measured state‐society relations
outcomes and was not able to detect significant changes due to
citizen feedback mechanisms.
14.22 | Community based natural resources
management
To some extent the findings for CBNRM are less convincing than
other interventions, because in the main the included studies were
assessed as being of risk of bias largely on design grounds (the
User engagement
F IGURE 15 Forest plot showing service user engagement outcomes
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exception is for the RCT by Barde et al., 2017). The findings from
meta‐analysis (Figure 25, Figure 26) suggested that final outcomes
may improve for income/expenditure (SMD=0.08, 95%CI=0.01, 0.14;
3 studies), yield (SMD=0.24, 95%CI=0.12, 0.36; 2 studies) and tax
payments (contribution to natural resource management)
(SMD=0.46, 95%CI=0.06, 0.86; 2 studies).
14.23 | Inclusion dimension
The analysis (reported in Appendix 6) suggests that where interven-
tions had an inclusion dimension, the interventions tended to be at
least as effective in improving outcomes, if not more effective
(Figures A6.6 and A6.7).
14.24 | Impacts by population group (review
question 3)
This section presents results of sub‐group analysis for studies that
report outcomes measured among different groups, including men,
women and poor households. In addition, it presents further
moderator analysis for whether interventions had an inclusiveness
component by design and reporting outcomes by global region.
Three studies collected outcomes data measured separately
among women and men (Ananthpur et al., 2014; Palladium, 2015;
Ravallion et al., 2013) and a further five studies reported sub‐group
outcomes solely for women (Beath et al., 2013; Diaz‐Cayeros et al.,
2014; Fiala & Premand, 2017; Humphreys et al., 2014). The results,
presented in Table 14 (see Appendix 6 for forest plots), do not
suggest there are differences in outcomes by sex, where outcomes
for both men and women are reported in the same studies. There are
differences in magnitude in a few cases, such as the two studies of
employment (Ravallion et al, 2013) and local governance (Ananthpur
et al., 2014) in India. Indeed, Ananthpur et al. (2014) suggests that
the positive wellbeing outcomes measured among men are not seen
among women. However, there are very few observations where
studies report sex disaggregated effects, and when they do the
confidence intervals overlap, so any differences can be interpreted as
statistically insignificant.
Three studies reported outcomes for poor households (Banerjee
et al., 2018; Pandey et al., 2007; Persha & Meshack, 2016). In the
case of Banerjee et al. (2018), the intervention targeted the poorest
decile. In the case of Pandey et al. (2007) and Persha and Meshack
(2017), outcomes are presented separately for lower‐caste commu-
nities and poor households. The findings suggest that outcomes for
TABLE 12 User engagement outcomes by study design and intervention
Outcome Moderator g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Meeting attendance Total 0.686 0.224 1.148 97.1% 0.2643 139.59 0.000 5
RCT 0.666 0.141 1.191 97.7% 0.2752 128.09 0.000 4
NRS 0.771 0.472 1.070 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB 1.289 0.945 1.632 67.1% 0.0412 3.04 0.081 2
Some concerns 0.120 0.029 0.212 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB 0.390 −0.330 1.111 94.9% 0.2566 19.70 0.000 2
Active participation Total 0.203 0.072 0.334 83.6% 0.0248 48.64 0.000 9
RCT 0.167 0.047 0.287 82.7% 0.0178 34.64 0.000 7
NRS 0.766 −0.668 2.200 90.6% 0.9705 10.60 0.001 2
Low RoB 0.172 0.021 0.323 88.4% 0.0229 34.46 0.000 5
Some concerns 0.186 −0.188 0.560 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB 0.492 −0.157 1.141 85.0% 0.2687 13.31 0.001 3
Knowledge about services Total 0.090 0.012 0.169 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
RCT 0.090 0.012 0.169 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
NRS ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Low RoB 0.144 0.081 0.206 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns 0.090 −0.001 0.180 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
High RoB −0.008 −0.135 0.119 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Knowledge about processes Total 0.008 −0.098 0.113 0.0% 0.0000 0.28 0.598 2
RCT 0.008 −0.098 0.113 0.0% 0.0000 0.28 0.598 2
NRS ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Low RoB 0.050 −0.139 0.239 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Some concerns ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
High RoB −0.011 −0.138 0.116 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
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poor households are often positive and statistically significant
(Table 15).
However, there are too few observations to draw conclusions,
other than that studies must more consistently present results of
sub‐group analysis. Even where significant effects are not reported
due to underpowered analyses, statistical synthesis (meta‐analysis)
can be undertaken to detect possible effects across studies.
Finally, we conducted analysis by global region (Appendix 6).
Bearing in mind that the analyses are likely to be confounded by
other characteristics such as intervention type, we note simply that
the analysis suggests intervention conducted in East Asia and Pacific
and South Asia are more likely to have significant effects than studies
conducted elsewhere.
14.25 | Publication bias analysis
This section presents results of the analysis of small study effects.
Figure 27 presents contour enhanced funnel graphs for all study
designs (part a) and for RCTs only (part b). There does appear to be
asymmetry in the plot, which is markedly less for RCTs than all study
designs. This may support Peters et al. (20o8) contention that bias
may confound attribution of small study effects to publication bias.
Eggers et al. (1997) test also did not find significant evidence for
publication bias (Table 16).
14.26 | Results of framework synthesis (review
question 4)
The following section presents the analysis of context and mechan-
isms that may contribute to findings along the causal chain (review
question 4). We present the findings of a qualitative, realist‐informed
framework synthesis that moves toward “best fit” framework
synthesis, focusing on the key mechanisms and moderators along
the casual chain for each broad intervention group. These findings
are drawn from a mixture of first, second and third order constructs.
The analysis is broken down across the five broad intervention
group: rights information provision; performance information provi-
sion; citizen feedback and monitoring; participatory planning; and
community‐based natural resource management (CBNRM). For each
intervention group, the analysis identifies the key moderators
Provider response
F IGURE 16 Forest plot showing provider responsive outcomes
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(barriers and enablers) that explain the mechanisms triggered by the
interventions along their causal chains. Each sub‐section first
presents an overview of the included primary studies and corre-
sponding additional literature that were used for the analysis, then
iterates a series of case comparisons that highlight the key
explanatory factors identified through the synthesis process. Finally,
the revised framework for each broad intervention group is
presented as a refined theory of change articulating the primary
mechanisms connecting the intervention to outcomes along the
causal chain. Note that certain factors are important to all included
intervention types; to avoid repetition, each factor is only discussed
in‐depth through case comparisons once, though included in all
refined frameworks as relevant. The extent to which certain factors
are generalizable across all intervention types and those unique to
specific contexts are discussed in section 5. This section concludes
with a section that integrates the framework synthesis with the
meta‐analysis, empirically testing the strongest moderating variables
that emerged from the qualitative synthesis.
14.27 | Rights information provision
Five studies comprised or included study arms of interventions that
aimed to improve citizens’ access to information about their rights to
services (Table 17).
These studies look at the provision of information on rights to
services that cover both merit goods (such as rice subsidies) and
public goods (such as construction monitoring). Through providing
citizens with information on their rights to services, including both
entitlements to both quality and quantity, these interventions aim to
increase their realisation of their rights. The data extracted in the
TABLE 13 Provider response outcomes by study design and intervention
Outcome Moderator g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Public spending Total −0.019 −0.084 0.046 0.0% 0.0000 1.10 0.954 6
RCT −0.053 −0.196 0.090 0.0% 0.0000 0.83 0.934 5
NRS −0.010 −0.084 0.063 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB −0.004 −0.321 0.312 0.0% 0.0000 0.68 0.711 3
Some concerns −0.065 −0.226 0.095 0.0% 0.0000 0.04 0.851 2
High RoB −0.010 −0.084 0.063 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Provider actions Total 0.131 −0.040 0.302 87.3% 0.0696 86.37 0.000 12
RCT 0.156 −0.040 0.352 86.5% 0.0743 66.61 0.000 10
NRS 0.034 −0.095 0.163 0.0% 0.0000 0.37 0.544 2
Low RoB 0.286 0.047 0.525 82.8% 0.0549 23.26 0.000 5
Some concerns 0.027 −0.074 0.127 12.8% 0.0021 5.73 0.333 6
High RoB 0.017 −0.275 0.308 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Perceived response by user Total 0.033 −0.046 0.112 0.0% 0.0000 3.38 0.760 7
RCT 0.032 −0.051 0.115 0.0% 0.0000 3.37 0.643 6
NRS 0.042 −0.219 0.303 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB 0.039 −0.195 0.274 0.0% 0.0000 2.95 0.229 3
Some concerns ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
High RoB 0.038 −0.058 0.134 0.0% 0.0000 0.39 0.942 4
Staff motivation Total 0.234 −0.077 0.544 72.7% 0.0712 11.00 0.012 4
RCT 0.084 −0.085 0.254 0.0% 0.0000 0.62 0.733 3
NRS 0.773 0.389 1.156 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Some concerns 0.127 −0.089 0.343 0.0% 0.0000 0.23 0.633 2
High RoB 0.382 −0.359 1.123 89.9% 0.2575 9.95 0.002 2
Politician performance Total −0.058 −0.168 0.053 0.0% 0.0000 1.58 0.454 3
RCT −0.005 −0.156 0.147 0.0% 0.0000 0.57 0.449 2
NRS −0.118 −0.280 0.044 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Low RoB ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Some concerns −0.092 −0.217 0.033 0.0% 0.0000 0.25 0.615 2
High RoB 0.066 −0.172 0.304 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
WADDINGTON ET AL. | 53 of 90
qualitative synthesis for these studies were reviewed to identify
patterns of movements along the causal chain. Within this interven-
tion group, three key factors emerged that helped explain the
heterogeneity of results: whether the bottleneck to service access
was correctly identified as demand‐driven lack of information;
whether the intervention targeted a collective or individual good;
and whether the bottleneck was due to demand‐driven lack of
information about existing services or supply‐driven rationing of
service allocation or corruption. Case comparisons using the included
studies are provided to illustrate the importance of these factors.
F IGURE 17 Forest plots showing immediate and intermediate outcomes for rights information Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes
are inverted for comparability
F IGURE 18 Forest plots showing final outcomes for rights information
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The first stage in the causal chain thus assumes that the
underlying bottleneck to citizens’ access to services is a lack of
information about their rights. However, few studies provided ex‐
ante evidence that the key barrier to service access was lack of
information. Olken (2007) is an exception; in explaining the design of
the intervention, the researchers provided qualitative evidence that
suggested that the barrier to citizen participation in construction
monitoring meetings was due to the lack of written invitations. In the
F IGURE 19 Forest plots showing immediate and intermediate outcomes for performance information Note: * effect sizes for negative
outcomes are inverted for comparability
F IGURE 20 Forest plots showing final outcomes for performance information Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for
comparability
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Indonesian cultural context, it was viewed as inappropriate to attend
an event to which one had not been invited, and thus the public
meetings were primarily attended by a few elite villagers. During the
evaluation, this assumption was tested, and the researchers found
some evidence that supported their identification of the barrier:
following the intervention disseminating invitation cards, the number
of non‐elite villagers present at the meetings increased by 75 per
cent (Olken, 2007).
In comparison, in Ravallion et al. (2013), though the researchers
conducted qualitative research during the design phase to ensure
their video would be salient to the rural, poor population targeted,
and identified low levels of knowledge of their rights to the labour
subsidy service, the intervention ultimately had limited impacts on
use of the rural guaranteed labour scheme amongst the targeted
population. Subsequent research of the jobs programme suggests
that the key barrier to citizens’ access to the labour programme was
actually rationing of access to jobs by administrators, triggering
discouragement amongst potential workers (Narayanan, Das, Liu, &
Barrett, 2017).
A key theme throughout the transparency and accountability‐
related studies is the difference in mechanisms triggered by
interventions depending on the nature of the service they were
targeting, which related to how citizens accessed the service.
Broadly, the services could be split into two groups: “direct delivery”
services and “indirect delivery” services. The first, “direct delivery,”
refers to those services that citizens access from individual service
providers, such as the healthcare one receives from a clinician or the
food subsidies one collects from the distributor. In these cases,
citizens engage with the service provider staff on a regular basis as
part of their normal service use. The second, “indirect delivery,”
refers to services that citizens access independently of the providers,
such as public infrastructure that one uses without engaging with the
contractors who built it. In this latter group, citizen engagement in
service delivery tends to be limited to transparency/accountability
interactions; in the absence of such processes, citizens may not
otherwise interact with the providers at all.
Where the intervention targets a directly delivered service, such
as the provision of rice subsidies, and the bottleneck is correctly
F IGURE 21 Forest plots showing immediate and intermediate outcomes for participatory planning Note: * effect sizes for negative
outcomes are inverted for comparability
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identified as pertaining to lack of information on the demand‐side,
then the provision of information may suffice to improve the delivery
of services to citizens. In Indonesia, Banerjee et al. present evidence
suggesting that disseminating cards with information on citizens’
rights to rice subsidies and standard costs was sufficient to change
citizens’ bargaining power with the service provider to increase the
amount of subsidised rice they received (2018). The authors highlight
facilitating factors that triggered a significant change in response to a
relatively small intervention, including:
• The salience of the information provided: rice is a staple of the
Indonesian government, and the subsidised rice is significantly
cheaper than the market rate yet doesn’t cover their full monthly
consumption; thus, citizens are highly motivated to attempt to
access as much as possible;
• The creation of perceptions of common knowledge of eligibility to and
costs of the subsidised rice, through the public campaigns in a sub‐
set of the treatment;
• The appropriateness of the strength of the social sanctions risk: The
provision of information regarding rights to services is a relatively
weak instrument for changing the balance of power between
service providers and service users. However, Banerjee et al. argue
that it was effective in the case of the rice subsidies because it
created a small shift in citizens’ bargaining power without
eradicating the service providers’ control completely over alloca-
tion of resources. In their context, this was important because the
central government relied on the cooperation of the local village
officials for the dissemination of the service; without their
cooperation, it would be difficult to implement the project in their
villages, and the authors present qualitative evidence suggesting
that government officials were cautious of sanctioning incomplete
compliance too forcefully (Banerjee et al., 2018).
Conversely, in the case of indirectly delivered services, the ability
of citizens to influence service providers appears much weaker. In
Olken (2007), though the bottleneck was likely correctly identified as
described above, and an increase in participation suggested that
communities were motivated to monitor the projects and did not
suffer from the free rider problem, the analysis found statistically
insignificant results of the intervention on decreasing corruption
within the community construction projects. However, he provides
evidence that supports the identification of the direct versus indirect
delivery mechanism: in the treatment villages, the invitations to
participate in monitoring did have an effect on lowering corruption as
regards labour costs in construction projects, but not for materials
costs. As materials costs comprise the majority of construction
F IGURE 22 Forest plots showing final outcomes for participatory planning Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for
comparability
WADDINGTON ET AL. | 57 of 90
budgets, the overall results were insignificant. Yet the community
construction projects required voluntary, unpaid labour contribu-
tions by community members in addition to providing paid labour
opportunities; individual villagers were thus interacting with the
contractors to access labour and wages, in addition to participating in
the accountability meetings. They were thus highly aware of the real
wages and amount of paid labour provided. Conversely, materials
were sourced directly amongst contractors with community engage-
ment only through accountability processes, and Olken notes that
villagers likely had incomplete information about real costs.
A common element of rights‐information provision interventions
is a focus on engaging primarily or solely with demand‐side actors.
This thus triggers demand‐driven responses, and may explain the lack
of evidence regarding service provider response that led to breaks in
the causal chain. However, in cases where service use has a direct
effect on wellbeing outcomes, the provision of rights‐information
may be able to achieve results further along the causal chain directly
through inspiring changes in citizen use of services, despite failing to
influence the quality of service provision. For example, in India,
Pandey et al. (2007) find that an information campaign on access to
health services was successful in increasing citizens’ knowledge of
existing services that they could choose to access; unlike the video
campaign for the guaranteed labour scheme, service allocation
rationing was not an issue. However, though the campaign informed
citizens on their rights and how to complain when service delivery
didn’t meet quality standards, the authors present qualitative
evidence that suggested that the lack of engagement with the
supply‐side actors throughout the intervention may have triggered a
break in the causal chain for service provider response and service
quality improvements (Pandey et al., 2007).
Following the synthesis process, the original framework was
adapted to create a “best fit” framework that highlights the
abovementioned key mechanisms and moderating factors (Figure
28). Though the included studies within this intervention group did
not include any instances in which an intervention targeting an
indirectly delivered service was able to have an effect on service
quality through the dissemination of information, the synthesis
across the entire sample of included studies in this review identified
F IGURE 23 Forest plots showing immediate and intermediate outcomes for citizen feedback mechanisms Note: * effect sizes for negative
outcomes are inverted for comparability
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the strong facilitating capabilities of building social capital and
capacity for collective action amongst citizens, such as through
working with organised community groups (e.g. local civil society
organisations (CSOs) or interest groups) in addressing this bot-
tleneck.Indeed, a subsequent intervention document related to the
Olken (2007) experiment noted that a key project lesson had been
the success of shifting from implementer‐facilitated monitoring to
forming and training groups of community monitors for the
construction projects (World Bank, 2011). In the refined theory of
change for this intervention group, we thus include the potential of
CSO engagement to overcome the indirect delivery bottleneck.
In the diagram, the dotted lines denote the lack of evidence in the
included studies. Grey boxes denote key moderators that trigger
different mechanisms, leading to slightly different causal change
pathways.
14.28 | Performance information provision
Six studies comprised or included study arms of interventions that
improved citizens’ access to information about the performance of
public service providers (Table 18).
These studies include interventions that provided performance
information about both individual service providers in the form of
elected politicians (Capuno & Garcia, 2010; Grossman & Michelitch,
2018; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012) and service provider
institutions (Timmons & Garfias, 2015; Banerjee et al., 2014; Fiala
and Premand, 2017). Through providing citizens with performance
information, these interventions aim to trigger mechanisms in which
service providers respond to a change in motivated citizens’ efforts
to hold them accountable to performance improvements.
The data extracted in the qualitative synthesis for these studies
were reviewed to identify patterns of movements along the causal
chain. Within this intervention group, four key factors emerged that
helped explain the heterogeneity of results: for interventions
targeting elected politicians, the relative competitiveness of their
constituency and the timing of the intervention in relation to the next
election; for all types, the extent to which targeted supply‐side actors
accept the intervention (buy‐in); and whether the information
provided changes citizens’ priors. Case comparisons using the
included studies are provided to illustrate the influences of these
factors.
As noted above, this sub‐sample of studies includes interven-
tions that disseminate performance information about individual
F IGURE 24 Forest plots showing final outcomes for citizen feedback mechanisms Note: * effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted
for comparability
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elected politicians and about service provider institutions. Within
the first group, Humphreys & Weinstein (2012) and Grossman &
Michelitch (2018) measure the impact of intensive dissemination
of performance information against a comparatively weak dis-
semination, whereas Capuno & Garcia (2010) measure the impact
of providing performance information versus its absence. In the
second group, Timmons & Garfias (2015) measures the impact of
providing performance information in the form of audits related to
municipal governments, and thus is still impacted by the electoral
factors. Fiala and Premand (2017) include a study arm that
provides scorecards to communities with the overall and relative
performance of their local community‐driven development (CDD)
council regarding the community’s chosen project. Banerjee et al.
(2014) is the only included study which attempts to evaluate
performance information regarding non‐elected service provider
performance, specifically the police.
F IGURE 25 Forest plots showing immediate and intermediate outcomes for CBNRM
F IGURE 26 Forest plots showing final outcomes for CBNRM
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The studies that evaluate the provision of performance informa-
tion of elected politicians are included in this review because they
attempt to make an explicit link between politician performance and
service delivery and report the results on service delivery quality
accordingly. As noted in the background section, the different
spheres of governance interact, and in the case of these studies,
the underlying theory is that changes to politician performance can
be realised via informal processes of vertical accountability through a
“shortened long route” of direct citizen pressures on politicians
outside of the electoral cycle, which relies on the threat of immediate
social sanctions and future sanctions at the ballot box. While there
are many reasons for desiring strong politician performance and
accountability to constituents, in this review we focus on the effects
of these interventions on service delivery.
The first key moderator identified through the synthesis along
the causal chain for politician performance interventions is the
influence of competition within an electoral constituency on
politicians’ behaviours. This mechanism is specifically tested in
Grossman & Michelitch (2018), wherein they find that the intense
dissemination of scorecards for politician performance only triggered
an improvement in politician performance in electorally competitive
constituencies. Grossman & Michelitch (2018) provide contextual
information suggesting that in Uganda, while the national‐level
politics are dominated by a single party, locally there is variation in
relative competition for elected seats, which enabled them to test
this mechanism. The findings in Humphreys & Weinstein (2012)
support this theory; they find that while voters were strongly
receptive to the disseminated performance information, it did not
TABLE 14 Outcomes by sex sub‐group
Outcome (study) Sub‐group g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Knowledge about services (Ravallion, 2013) Male 0.090 −0.019 0.198 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.094 −0.010 0.198 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Meeting attendance (Ravallion, 2013) Male 0.110 0.000 0.220 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.128 0.030 0.227 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Provider actions (Beath, 2013 CDC, jirga) Male ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Female 0.106 −0.070 0.281 0.0% 0.0000 0.04 0.836 2
Politician performance (Diaz‐Cayeros, 2014) Male ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Female −0.198 −0.360 −0.036 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Use employment service (Ravallion, 2013) Male −0.017 −0.156 0.122 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female −0.042 −0.192 0.108 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
User satisfaction (Ravallion, 2013) Male 0.070 −0.043 0.183 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.039 −0.070 0.148 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Perceived right to access service (Ravallion, 2013) Male −0.013 −0.133 0.107 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.005 −0.105 0.114 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Assets (household) (Fiala, 2017) Male ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Female 0.009 −0.052 0.071 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Income/expenditure (Ananthpur, 2014) Male 0.285 −0.008 0.577 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.095 −0.196 0.387 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Crime rates (Palladium, 2015) Male 0.374 0.012 0.735 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Female 0.350 −0.012 0.712 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Empowerment (Palladium, 2015) Male ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0
Female −0.146 −0.434 0.142 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Note: effect sizes for negative outcomes are inverted for comparability.
TABLE 15 Outcomes for poor sub‐group
Outcome (study) g 95%CI I‐sq Tau‐sq Q P‐value N obs
Physical access (Banerjee, 2018; Persha, 2017) 0.066 −0.006 0.137 0.0% 0.0000 0.18 0.672 2
Measured quality of service (Pandey, 2007) 0.221 −0.005 0.446 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Cost of service (Banerjee, 2018) 0.084 0.009 0.159 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
User satisfaction (Persha, 2017) 0.449 0.073 0.826 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
Income/expenditure (Persha, 2017) 0.054 −0.319 0.428 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1
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trigger improved performance amongst national‐level MPs, who face
minimal electoral competition.
This leads to the next key assumption: that the information
provided is salient to citizens’ decision‐making. As noted, Humphreys
& Weinstein (2012) found that while the information was salient to
citizens’ interests, it did not translate into changes in politicians’
chances for re‐election, thus suggesting that citizens’ electoral
decisions were based on factors other than politician performance.
Grossman and Michelitch (2018) suggest that the salience of
performance information to voters’ decision‐making depends on
the political culture; in a context where voting is primarily along
party, ethnic or religious lines, politician performance is unlikely to
have a large impact on voters’ actions. Given the Ugandan context of
limited national‐level electoral competition, this factor could also
help explain the null results.
In determining whether the performance information provided is
likely to be salient to constituents, the extent to which it changes
their priors appears to be influential. This mechanism is tested by
Timmons & Garfias (2015), who find that the publication of the
results of a municipal government audit influenced the willingness to
pay taxes for those constituents whose priors were changed by the
audit results. This mechanism may also help explain the dissipation in
results over time that Capuno & Garcia observe; in their intervention,
performance information was regularly disseminated to constituents
over two years, and while the intervention started off by often
triggering strong results, by the end of the project the results had
weakened or even disappeared in some cases (2010). Drawing on the
insights from Timmons & Garfias (2015), this dissipation could
potentially be explained as the result of a decrease in the strength of
the “shock” provided by the transparency initiative, as citizens and
government developed expectations of the results.
Another potential explanatory factor between these two studies
is the relative power difference between targeted supply‐side actors
(i.e. the politicians) and demand‐side (constituents). It is reasonable
to expect that there is a larger power difference between national‐
level MPs and their primarily rural constituents, compared to rural
constituents and district‐level councillors. Thus, in the absence of the
potential for electoral sanctions, politicians who enjoy a greater level
of power difference compared to their constituents are more able to
ignore increased transparency without fear of credible social
sanctions.
(a) (b)
F IGURE 27 Funnel graphs a) All study designs b) RCTs only
TABLE 16 Results of Eggers tests
Sample Coeff 95%CI p‐value N obs
All study designs 0.397 −0.417 1.212 0.336 113
RCTs −0.644 −1.653 0.365 0.208 82
TABLE 17 Included studies of rights information provision
First author Year Country Sector and specific intervention Additional literature included
Banerjee 2018 Indonesia Information cards with rice subsidy rights and prices 2 (previous evaluation versions)
Kassim 2016 Pakistan Information on government reforms N/A
Olken 2007 Indonesia Invitations to public construction monitoring meetings (“invitations”
study arm)
1 (implementation report)
Pandey 2007 India Health services presentation N/A
Ravallion 2013 India Video campaign of rights to guaranteed labour scheme 2 (qualitative and quantitative studies)
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Timmons & Garfias (2015) present some evidence that suggests
that while elections are not the only mechanism at play in
determining whether performance information dissemination trig-
gers improvements in performance, the timing of information
dissemination relative to elections does have some effect. The
authors of all included studies evaluating elected politician perfor-
mance note that the reactions to the dissemination of performance
information for elected politicians are likely to be affected by
whether they are up for re‐election and the time until the next
election. Grossman & Michelitch (2018) argue that performance
information should be disseminated at such a time that the politicians
have the scope to improve their performance before the next
election, yet not so close to the election that a negative response (e.g.
vote buying or intimidation) is potentially triggered.
Even where the information provided is salient to constituents’
decision‐making, the politicians may still manage to subvert the
efforts to hold them accountable, either through preventing the
dissemination of information or discrediting the messenger and/or
the message. Across the included studies, whether this disruption
occurred tended to depend on the extent to which the targeted
supply‐side actors were engaged in the intervention design; their
support or “buy in” for the intervention; and the relative local
credibility of the messenger of the performance information
compared to the targeted actor or institution.
In Banerjee et al. (2014), the only included study which looked at
non‐elected service providers, the break in the causal chain occurred
extremely early on, as the actors charged with implementing the
intervention were the very ones whose performance was being
measured, and they were able to successfully prevent effective
implementation. The purpose of the community observer interven-
tion was to increase citizens’ understanding of the police perfor-
mance and improve their perceptions, and it had been designed at
F IGURE 28 Theory of change for interventions providing information on rights to public service quantity and quality
TABLE 18 Included studies of performance information provision
First author Year Country Sector and specific intervention Additional literature included
Banerjee 2014 India Police community observers N/A
Capuno 2010 Philippines Dissemination of municipal scorecards N/A
Fiala 2017 Uganda Dissemination of scorecards of CDD projects (“scorecard” study arm) 2 (implementation reports)
Grossman 2018 Uganda Intensive dissemination of district councillor scorecards 2 (implementation reports)
Humphreys 2012 Uganda Intensive dissemination of scorecards of Members of Parliament (MP)
performance
1 (previous evaluation version)
Timmons 2015 Brazil Publication of municipal audit reports N/A
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national level, with the engagement of the national police leadership,
yet it sought to change behaviours amongst local police chiefs.
Without their buy‐in, the implementation of the intervention was
extremely poor, as they falsified records or simply ignored the
directives (Banerjee et al., 2014). Humphreys & Weinstein (2012)
noted cases in which the MPs forcefully blocked the dissemination of
performance information within their constituencies. These cases
evidence the importance of ensuring buy‐in amongst the supply‐side
actors whose behaviours are targeted by the intervention.
In contrast, the intervention evaluated by Capuno & Garcia
(2010) actively engaged the local government units (LGUs) in the
implementation process, including at times selecting the LGU as the
presenter of the performance information to the communities.
Similarly, Grossman and Michelitch (2018) present qualitative
evidence suggesting that many district councillors supported the
scorecard initiative, as it increased competition.
The importance of the local credibility of the messenger can be
understood by comparing the results of Capuno & Garcia (2010)
with Humphreys & Weinstein (2012). In the latter, the information
was developed and disseminated by a national‐level NGO that did
not necessarily have strong ties across all of the treatment
constituencies. The authors present qualitative evidence from
town hall meetings where the MP was effectively able to discredit
the information presented by the NGO staff and undermine the
message to such an extent that participants in the meetings had a
worse estimation of their MP’s performance compared to compar-
ison groups (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012). Conversely, in
Capuno & Garcia (2010), the information was disseminated
through local partners in each municipality, who were engaged in
the process of gathering and analysing the performance data as
well. In some cases, the researchers actually worked through the
LGUs to present the data, yet even in those where the local
partner presented the results, the local partners’ strong ties to the
community reduced the politicians’ ability to “shoot the messen-
ger” (Capuno & Garcia, 2010).
Incorporating these insights into the framework, the following
refined theory of change presents an improved “fit” framework
for performance information interventions (Figure 29). While the
only included study to investigate performance information
dissemination on service delivery through non‐elected actors
failed at the first stage of the causal chain, as described above, we
nonetheless suspect that should the support of targeted service
providers be secured for an intervention, the causal chain for
these interventions would likely mimic that of rights information
provision. Note that the results chain from interventions
targeting elected politicians through to service delivery is quite
long. The final barrier to move from changes in politician
performance to improvements in service delivery was not
reached in any of the included studies. Grossman and Michelitch
(2018) suggest that this may be because improvements in service
delivery cannot be the result of changes to a single actor (the
politician); rather, they rely on multiple actors who may have
limited to no direct accountability to the targeted politician
(2018). This suggests the relative weakness of interventions that
F IGURE 29 Theory of change for interventions providing information on individual and institutional service provider performance
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aim to affect service delivery through changes to politician
performance.
14.29 | Citizen feedback and monitoring
Ten studies covered interventions that created or strengthened
citizens’ access to feedback and monitoring processes for public
services (Table 19).
This intervention group included the largest sample of included
studies, though there were key differences in the intervention
components that influenced the causal chains, particularly related to
the nature of the public service that was targeted. Of the included
interventions, four targeted healthcare, a directly delivered service,
three targeted infrastructure, an indirectly delivered service, one
targeted the security services, and two targeted a mixture of
services. Regarding the nature of the intervention approach, two
studies offered only community feedback opportunities: Grossman
et al. (2017) and Bradley and Igras (2005).
The rest comprised a version of community‐based monitoring, yet
differed as to whether the monitoring comprised a collaborative
process engaging both citizens and service providers or provided
support only to citizens; whether the accountability or “interface”
meetings between providers and citizens were facilitated; whether
performance information was provided, and if so, if it was generated
by the community or provided by external researchers; and whether
technical training on monitoring for the particular service was
provided to communities. The ramifications of these differences are
discussed in depth below.
The framework synthesis identified two key moderating factors
that influenced the causal chain and five common facilitators.
Moderating factors included: 1) the type of service targeted, as
above, and whether for indirectly delivered services, some additional
support was provided to shift the power difference between service
providers and citizens, either through well‐respected civil society or
government engagement; and 2) collaborative versus confrontational
approaches. The common facilitators included the provision of
technical monitoring skills; access to contracts and other key
information; the inclusion of provider performance information; the
incorporation of a dedicated community monitoring group; and the
creation of common knowledge of provider performance.
As with the other accountability and transparency‐for‐account-
ability interventions, the nature of the service being targeted
appeared to be a key moderating factor within the causal chains.
Alongside the indirectly delivered services, the intervention evalu-
ated by Grossman et al. (2017) followed a similar causal chain, as the
SMS‐based anonymous feedback intervention aimed to encourage
citizens to complain to government officials regarding public services,
and thus, the indirect accountability relationship between citizen and
frontline service provider was mirrored. Conversely, the other study
comprising a mixture of service types, Fiala and Premand (2017), was
implemented in the context of a national CDD programme; in each
community, only a single project prioritised and implemented
through the CDD programme was targeted, such that while the
nature of the services varied across communities, it was constant
within each community.
The studies of indirectly delivered infrastructure projects
demonstrate the key role external support to the community can
play in overcoming the comparatively weaker social sanctions that
are posed by communities monitoring indirectly delivered services.
Similarly to Olken (2007), the interventions evaluated in Molina
(2014) and Grossman (2017), both of which rely on engagement with
unorganised citizens, were unable to realise significant improvements
in public service delivery, despite achievements in triggering citizen
engagement with the respective platforms. Conversely, even in a
TABLE 19 Studies included in analysis of citizen feedback and monitoring
First author Year Country Sector and specific intervention Additional literature included
Alhassan 2016 Ghana Collaborative community‐based monitoring (CBM) + community
assessment of health service performance
2 (qualitative studies)
Berman 2017 Afghanistan Technical training for community monitors + facilitated
accountability meetings for infrastructure projects (roads)
1 (qualitative case studies)
Björkman 2017 Uganda Collaborative CBM of health services (two arms:(1) CBM only; (2)
CBM + externally‐generated performance information)
N/A
Bradley 2005 Kenya and Guinea Healthcare services feedback loops 1 (working paper)
Fiala 2017 Uganda Technical training for community monitors (two arms: (1) CBM
only; (2) CBM + externally‐generated performance information)
2 (implementation and completion
reports)
Grossman 2017 Uganda SMS‐based anonymous feedback on public services N/A
Gullo 2017 Malawi Collaborative CBM of health services + participatory performance
measurement
2 (implementation report +
synthesis document)
Molina 2014 Colombia Public construction monitoring meetings (“citizen audits”) N/A
Olken 2007 Indonesia Anonymous feedback and invitations to public construction
monitoring meetings (invites + feedback group)
1 (implementation report)
Palladium 2015 DRC Community forums, scorecards and other engagement with
security services
1 (implementation report)
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challenging context such as the DRC, in Palladium (2015), the
implementer’s work with local civil society led to greater‐than‐
expected project success in organising and hosting well‐attended
community fora to encourage citizen engagement with the security
sector. The evaluation presented qualitative evidence that suggested
that participation in these fora had positively impacted people’s
perceptions of security and the security sector (Palladium, 2015). The
role of civil society support to communities may be critical not only
for encouraging engagement in monitoring and accountability
processes, but also for shifting the balance of power between
citizens and public service providers of indirectly delivered services.
In Berman et al. (2017), the authors present evidence from
qualitative research to test the underlying mechanisms, which found
that the active engagement of the large, well‐respected national‐level
NGO Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) in the construction
monitoring intervention was critical to the project’s success. The
social capital provided by IWA enabled the community monitors to
access the critical information they needed to monitor the road
construction, such as contracts; brought key stakeholders to the
table to discuss issues in Provincial Monitoring Board meetings,
including local leaders, government officials, contractors and com-
munity monitors; and thus increased the bargaining power of
community monitors, enabling them to often enforce improvements
before escalating the situation by complaining to the government.
This theory is supported by the quantitative evidence, which showed
the dissipation of the positive effects of the project after IWA ended
its direct engagement in the intervention.
The creation of common knowledge amongst the community of the
monitoring results further emerged as a strong facilitating factor. Two
interventions incorporated the provision of anonymous feedback: Olken
(2007), which consisted of invitations to monitoring meetings +
anonymous feedback cards; and Grossman et al. (2017), the uBridge
SMS programme to increase engagement between constituents and
local government. In the former, consolidated anonymous feedback
forms were read out at the open meetings, which the author argues
created a common knowledge amongst participants as to the common
nature of people’s complaints, which had a small positive impact on their
ability to trigger sanction measures (Olken, 2007). Conversely, in
Grossman et al., 2017, though many messages were sent by
constituents commenting on the quality of service delivery, common
knowledge was not created, as the content of the messages was not
public. This prevented the citizens from using the intervention to
identify like‐minded compatriots, build social capital and undertake
collective action that might have increased the relative strength of their
pressure on service delivery. This suggests a potential explanation for
the break in the causal chain for this intervention.
Similarly, in analysing citizen audits of construction projects in
Colombia, Molina presents evidence that suggests that low participa-
tion in monitoring opportunities prevented the creation of common
knowledge about the projects, which in turn discouraged politicians
and service providers from adhering to quality standards, which he
refers to as the “self‐fulfilling prophecy” phenomenon (2014).
However, in Fiala and Premand (2017), the authors report no
significant change in numbers of community members engaged in
monitoring following the intervention, despite seeing positive results;
what changed was the capacity of the group monitoring the projects
to carry out their mandate, and the creation of common knowledge
of the monitoring results through intervention‐led activities such as
the scorecard presentation. Berman et al. (2017) present similar
findings, including qualitative evidence of “social shaming” initiatives
undertaken by the monitors, such as partnering with the local mullah
to announce the monitoring findings (good and bad) during sermons.
The qualitative evidence further stresses the importance of the
technical training to enable the monitors to effectively identify
whether the construction was of sufficient quality or not (Berman
et al., 2017); such technical training was absent from the intervention
studied in Molina (2014). Thus, it may be that a dedicated monitoring
group, with a mandate from the community and technical training in
monitoring the service targeted, could have a greater impact than an
open‐forum type of intervention as in Molina (2014) and Olken
(2007), and as noted above, the intervention studied in Olken (2007)
ultimately adopted the approach of establishing and training a
dedicated group of community monitors (World Bank, 2011).
Amongst the sample of community feedback and monitoring
interventions, a unique feature of those targeting healthcare services
was a focus on a collaborative process that engaged both supply and
demand‐side actors, i.e. both community members and frontline
health centre staff. This set the group apart from the other
interventions, which focused on training and/or creating opportu-
nities for citizens to hold providers accountable through dedicated
accountability meetings. This included both public Town‐Hall style
meetings, as in Molina (2014), Olken (2007) and Palladium (2015),
and higher‐level fora such as the Provincial Monitoring Board
meetings in Berman et al. (2017).These meetings are often more
confrontational than in the phased, collaborative approach, wherein
the implementers guide communities and service providers through a
series of three types of meetings: citizen meetings, to build capacity
for monitoring and ensure understanding of rights; service provider
meetings, to present the emerging findings of the citizen meeting and
begin planning for ways to address the highlighted issues; and an
interface meeting, during which the community’s priorities and ideas
for improvements are incorporated into the relevant service delivery
plan, with a focus on assigning responsibilities amongst both
community members and service provider staff to address areas in
need of improvement. These interventions can be adjusted to include
an explicit inclusivity component to improve the engagement of
vulnerable groups along the causal chain. In the evaluation of CARE’s
Community Scorecards by Gullo et al. (2017) and in Björkman
Nyqvist et al. (2017), a series of community meetings were held with
different interest groups, including women, youth, the disabled, and
the elderly. This ensured that views from across the community are
fully captured. However, the approach relies in significant extent on
the capacity of implementer staff and their facilitation skills.
To attempt to explain the black box of intervention and outcome,
Alhassan et al. tested the underlying mechanisms for service provider
motivation, and found that the service providers working in rural health
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clinics were highly intrinsically motivated, and through the collaborative
engagement with the community, increased their intrinsic motivation
(2016). This suggests that monitoring interventions that rely on the
“soft” power of social sanctions may be more effective when they focus
on identifying mutually empowering “win‐win” opportunities and ways
for citizens and service providers to work together. This theory is also
supported by qualitative evidence presented in Bradley and Igras
(2005), wherein healthcare staff reported that the empowering process
of local problem identification and solving had a strong impact on their
attitudes, and led to changes in the way they engaged with each other
and with community members. The increased sense of self‐efficacy built
through this type of approach may extend to the community members,
who see the responses to their efforts enacted by service providers, as
suggested by Gullo et al. (2017).
The relationship between service providers and users may also be
strengthened through the facilitated, collaborative approach because
while learning about their service entitlements and identifying
opportunities for improvement, citizens also learn more of the
intricacies and challenges in service delivery, which may enable them
to mitigate their expectations and be more understanding of the
frontline staff. Gullo et al. (2017) suggest that the more realistic
expectations held by households in treatment communities may
account for their increased satisfaction with the health services,
despite the context in which there were serious issues in health
service supply chains due to a national‐level scandal, which led to
decreasing satisfaction with health services in control communities.
A final key facilitator in community monitoring interventions is
the benefits wrought by including performance measurement
information into the intervention. In Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017)
this was done by external researchers and research assistants, who
gathered the data and presented it to communities in a digestible and
locally appropriate way. This was a very thorough approach, but it
has made replication challenging, an issue the authors identify
(Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017). In Alhassan et al. (2016), the
implementers worked with the community groups to support them to
undertake the performance assessment, which they then used to
identify the key opportunities for improvement. CARE’s Community
Scorecard methodology takes this further, working with communities
to create a localised scorecard in which communities develop their
own list of priorities and indicators (Gullo et al., 2017). In comparing
their two treatment arms, wherein the difference was access to
performance information, Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017) present
evidence suggesting that having information on performance and
benchmarks was critical for enabling communities to identify realistic
opportunities for service improvements. Conversely, in Palladium
(2015), which didn’t include any performance information, though
perceptions of security rose amongst participants, the study did not
find evidence of improved service delivery outcomes, and conclude
that changes in perceptions may occur more quickly than changes in
service delivery (2015). Fiala and Premand, in a study arm comprising
only interventions in livestock provision, also find that the inclusion
of both community monitoring support and performance information
is critical to achieving positive impacts on household assets (2017).
Through the framework synthesis, the key mechanisms, barriers and
facilitators were collected and used to refine the theory of change for
this group of interventions (Figure 30).
F IGURE 30 Theory of change for citizen monitoring and feedback interventions
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14.30 | Participatory planning
Eight studies evaluated seven interventions or policies that created
or strengthened citizens’ access to participatory planning processes
(Table 20) – note that while Touchton & Wampler, 2014 and
Gonçalves, 2013 are separate studies, they are of the same
countrywide policy.
Within this sample, three studies measure the effect of
participatory processes against the status quo (Touchton & Wampler,
2014; Gonçalves, 2013; and Diaz‐Cayeros et al., 2014); two studies
measure the effect of external support to participatory planning
processes (Ananthpur et al., 2014; Beuermann & Amelina, 2014); two
studies measure the effect of mandating women’s inclusion in
participatory planning (Beath et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2014);
and one study measures the effect of participatory planning training
on citizens’ empowerment to demand services (Giné et al., 2018).
Grouped differently, five of the studies look at interventions wherein
citizens engage in government planning processes (Touchton &
Wampler, 2014; Gonçalves, 2013; Ananthpur et al., 2014; Beuer-
mann & Amelina, 2014; and Diaz‐Cayeros et al., 2014), and three of
them pertain to interventions wherein citizens are engaged in
community‐driven development (CDD) types of deliberations (Beath
et al., 2013; Humphreys et al., 2014; and Giné et al., 2018). Through
engaging citizens in the identification of priorities and allocation of
resources, these interventions aim to improve the responsiveness of
service delivery to citizens’ prioritised needs, particularly for
vulnerable groups.
The data extracted in the qualitative synthesis for these studies
were reviewed to identify patterns of movements along the causal
chain. Within this intervention group, four key factors emerged that
helped explain the heterogeneity of results: the extent to which the
intervention correctly identified and adequately addressed barriers
to participation for vulnerable groups; the extent to which the
intervention process was designed to encouraged the growth of local
social capital and capacity for collective action; the extent to which
the local government or decision‐making body supported the process
and had the capacity to implement it; and the incorporation of
explicit measures to facilitate the inclusion of vulnerable groups.
Case comparisons using the included studies are provided to
illustrate the importance of these factors.
As noted above, a key goal of participatory planning processes is
frequently to ensure the priorities of vulnerable and marginalised
members of society are incorporated into decision‐making. As
described above in the equity discussion, however, only a minority
of the included interventions were described as incorporating
specific components to improve the inclusion of vulnerable groups
in the activities. The majority of these were incorporated into
participatory planning interventions; of the seven interventions in
this set, five incorporated specific inclusion components. Barriers and
facilitators to inclusive planning is thus a key focus of the framework
synthesis. Again, as noted previously, however, studies that incorpo-
rated inclusion components generally only focused either on
inclusion for the poorest or women’s inclusion. Thus, the dataset is
limited in its capacity to provide insights into the barriers for
vulnerable groups in general, and particularly weak to the barriers
and facilitators of including other types of vulnerable groups, such as
people with disabilities, refugees or internally displaced persons.
In order to support vulnerable groups to participate, the barriers
they face at baseline must be adequately assessed (bottleneck
identification) and the intervention designed to address the specific
barriers in a culturally appropriate and locally relevant way. The
different mechanisms triggered in four of our included studies can
help illustrate the trickiness of doing so.
Two of the included studies, Beath et al. (2013) and Humphreys
et al. (2014), demonstrate these challenges regarding including
women in decision‐making. Humphreys et al. (2012) evaluated the
effects of mandating women’s participation in the village develop-
ment councils in DRC, and found no effects; where women’s
participation was not mandatory, they nonetheless participated in
roughly equal numbers. This suggests that the barrier to women’s
voices being heard in the local context was not the result of them
being denied a seat at the table, an example of bottleneck
misidentification. Meanwhile, Beath et al. (2013) studied the effect
of mandating women’s inclusion in food distribution planning. While
in the Afghan context, women are frequently denied a seat at the
table, the intervention design comprised an externally‐imposed
TABLE 20 Studies included in analysis of citizen engagement in planning
First author Year Country Sector and specific intervention (* if inclusive planning) Additional literature included
Ananthpur 2014 India Support to engage in participatory development planning N/A
Beath 2013 Afghanistan Mandated women's inclusion in participatory development
planning*
2 (qualitative studies)
Beuermann 2014 Russia Increased facilitation of participatory budgeting N/A
Diaz‐Cayeros 2014 Mexico Municipal indigenous participatory governance* 1 (qualitative study)
Giné 2018 Pakistan Community mobilisation for participatory development
planning*
N/A
Gonçalves 2013 Brazil Municipal participatory budgeting* 5 (qualitative and quantitative studies)
Touchton 2014
Humphreys 2014 DRC Mandated women's inclusion in participatory development
planning*
4 (implementation reports and qualitative
study)
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participation requirement that was not adapted to the local context,
leading to unintended effects. The authors found that mandating
women’s participation alongside traditional jirga leaders led to an
increase in leakages of food aid (Beath et al., 2013). Qualitative
evidence in the evaluation suggested that the jirga elders were
retaining some of the food aid for themselves as compensation for
their services in the distribution, and that when women were
required to participate, they were generally the wives or relatives of
the jirga members (ibid.). This suggests the possibility that mandating
women’s participation may have triggered elite families to “double
dip” into the food aid as compensation for the services of both their
male and female representatives. This demonstrates how nuanced an
understanding of local practices is required in selecting an appro-
priate intervention to address an identified barrier.
Understanding and adequately addressing the power gap
between “status quo” participants in decision‐making processes and
those excluded may be key to addressing participation barriers. In
Giné et al. (2018), communities that received community‐driven
development training were evaluated to ascertain the effects of this
sector‐non‐specific training on citizens’ capacity to demand public
service provision. The training covered elements of participatory
development planning, and communities were organised and mobi-
lised to prepare for project implementation. They found that the
intervention had a significant effect on the provision of health
services by the local “Lady Health Workers” (LHWs), which they
attribute to the growth in collective action capabilities amongst
women participants, who had indicated at baseline that healthcare
was a priority concern (Giné et al., 2018). However, LHWs are local
women from the village in a conservative area wherein women are
frequently disempowered; the relative difference in power, there-
fore, between the LHWs and the other villagers is extremely small.
Thus, in this context, an intervention that was designed to be
empowering but did not specifically address people’s capacity to
demand health services nonetheless had an effect, given that the
women had indicated that health was their priority area of focus and
the relative power difference between village women and LHWs was
minimal. It is telling that the study found limited to no effects on
health services at the health centre level (ibid.). This is in stark
contrast to the experiences documented through qualitative research
in Ananthpur et al. (2014), in which the members of the local elite at
times actively attempted to dissuade or prevent villagers from
participating in the decision‐making processes. The ethnographic
component of the study identified remnants of a feudal relationship
between villagers and local elites; elites thus capitalised on this larger
and entrenched power difference to stifle participation.
Incorporating into intervention design flexibility to enable
communities to adapt the activities to their local context may be
key to avoiding such shortcomings. In Brazil, participatory budgeting
was designed as a pro‐poor intervention at the national level, yet the
specifics for how municipalities went about ensuring participation
was left to them to decide. Thus, the extent to which measures were
put in place to actively include vulnerable populations varied by
municipality. While all incorporated pro‐poor measures, in at least
one case, specific mechanisms were created to facilitate the
participation of historically marginalised groups such as LGBT
citizens (Hernandez‐Medina, 2010). Though the included impact
evaluations of this policy do not present outcomes data disaggre-
gated by vulnerable groups, evidence from participant interviews in a
qualitative study of the policy suggested that the explicit measures
adopted by some municipalities were critical to opening up the
process to diverse disadvantaged groups (ibid.).
In Diaz‐Cayeros et al. (2014), the authors note mixed effects of
the intervention on women’s participation in local governance. On
the one hand, quantitative evidence suggested that the switch from
political‐party based to traditional governance systems led to a
decrease in the number of women in senior municipal government
positions, yet the authors also found qualitative evidence that
women’s participation in traditional governance processes was slowly
increasing (Diaz‐Cayeros et al., 2014). In this last case, the
intervention (the shift to traditional governance) was not imposed
by an external party but rather chosen by the community. While the
externally‐imposed processes evaluated in Humphreys et al. (2014)
and Beath et al. (2013) misidentified the local barrier and appropriate
response, respectively, to ensuring women’s inclusion, and thus do
not enable a comparison of the value of incorporating explicit
measures to address inclusion barriers, the qualitative evidence
noted above from Brazil suggests that explicit measures may be
required to support the engagement of vulnerable groups in
processes in which they have been historically excluded. Though
the intervention in Mexico increased participation across the
community as a whole (by making it mandatory), the lack of
complementary measures to support women’s and other groups’
empowered participation may have led to the initial declines in
women’s leadership evidenced in the evaluation.
The framework synthesis of the data suggests that the capacity of
these interventions to empower communities to participate in local
planning processes (i.e. to reach the first block of the causal chain)
could be strongly facilitated through designs that encouraged the
growth of local social capital and capacity for collective action. This
theme emerges as a key mechanism for changing the balance of
power between targeted actors on the supply and demand sides. In
Brazil, the design of the participatory planning policy explicitly
sought to incentivise collective action through engagement with the
planning process, by encouraging citizens to create coalitions in
support of their favoured priorities, which stimulated the growth of
local civil society (Touchton & Wampler, 2014). This success is also
due to the Brazilian context, characterised by lower initial barriers to
participation for marginalised citizens and historically strong civil
society, and the long timeframe of the intervention and evaluation
follow‐up, uniquely long amongst this group of interventions.
In comparison, the experience in India studied by Ananthpur et al.
(2014) was very different: in this intervention, pairs of facilitators
were trained and dispatched to the intervention areas to attempt to
support the implementation of the community meetings and
engagement with the Gram Panchayat (local village council). By
relying on the individual capacity of two consultants in each area, this
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intervention failed to generate social capital and capacity for
collective action amongst the targeted communities, and the balance
of power between villagers and local elites was not challenged.
Ensuring buy‐in from the government or community decision‐
making body for implementing participatory planning processes may
be critical to their success, and opt‐in style policies may strongly
facilitate such buy‐in. In Brazil, municipal governments choose
whether or not to adopt participatory budgeting, ensuring strong
government support for the process. Conversely, in Russia, the
reforms were passed at national level and implemented across the
country, without the flexibility for “settlements” to choose whether
or not to adopt the policy (Beuermann & Amelina, 2014). Similarly, in
India, Ananthpur et al. find qualitative evidence that suggests that
local elites worked hard to inhibit the participatory nature of the
intervention, as it jeopardised their control over development
resources (2014).
The final critical barrier to successful implementation of
participatory planning processes identified through the synthesis
was the importance of ensuring that the government or community
decision‐making body had the capacity to implement the participa-
tory planning process. In the case of Mexico, Diaz‐Cayeros et al.
documented the return to “traditional” governance for indigenous
communities in an impoverished state (2014). Thus, the intervention
was implemented in a context in which there were strong local
capacities and traditions of engaging in such processes. In contrast,
Beuermann & Amelina found that newly established “settlement”‐
level governments tasked with implementing participatory budgeting
were saturated with attempting to establish and learn how to run
their governments in general (2014); alongside everything else they
were trying to learn, participatory budgeting fell by the wayside. This
bottleneck further highlights the importance of timing in an
intervention.
Incorporating these insights into the framework, the following
refined theory of change presents an improved “fit” framework for
performance information interventions (Figure 31).
14.31 | Community‐based natural resource
management
Seven studies covered interventions that created or strengthened
citizens’ capacity to manage full or close‐to‐full decentralisation of
service delivery (Table 21).
The included studies in this intervention are quite different from
those in the previous groups, as the service provision has been
decentralised to such an extent that communities themselves are
both the user and the provider. This fundamentally shifts the power
dynamics at play, complicating the delineation between supply‐side
and demand‐side actors. Community‐based natural resource manage-
ment (CBNRM) interventions aim to improve communities’ sustain-
able access to resources through increasing their control over
resource management and maintenance. The complexities and
tensions involved in marrying the dual goals of resource use and
preservation are evident throughout the interventions, which cover
wildlife conservancy (Bandyopadhyay et al. 2004); participatory
forestry management (Persha & Meshack 2016; Rasolofoson et al.
2015; and Tachibana & Adhikari 2009); and irrigation or water use
F IGURE 31 Theory of change for participatory planning and priority setting interventions
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(Bandyopadhyay et al. 2010; Barde 2017; and Huang 2014). Each of
these studies evaluates the implementation of a national‐level policy,
which tend to have smaller results than pilots or experiments
wherein the quality and uniformity of implementation is more easily
managed.
A key moderator identified early in the causal chain for these
interventions is the extent to which the policy constitutes a
relinquishment of government control over the productive resource.
For example, in Nepal, the community forestry project studied by
Tachibana & Adhikari primarily represents a formalisation and
standardisation of existing practices; the government remained only
lightly involved in forestry management (2009). Conversely, in
Tanzania, the Joint Forestry Management (JFM) intervention
requires a more engaged and active partnership between govern-
ment forestry officials and communities, which has proven more
challenging to implement (Persha & Meshack, 2016).
Building on this moderator, where the government is required to
give up some of its control over the benefits from the productive
resource through the CBNRM intervention, there is often a barrier
wherein local officials choose not to fully implement the require-
ments of the policy or seek to undermine its promise of transferring
resource benefits to communities. This tends to happen after the
devolution of resource management responsibilities to the commu-
nity, but before communities’ rights to benefits are formalised, as in
Persha & Meshack’s study, wherein they note that only seven per
cent of targeted communities had signed joint forestry agreements
with the government, and present evidence to suggest that this
barrier led to a break in the causal chain that inhibited communities’
ability to realise the economic benefits of JFM (2016). In a second
example, evaluating the implementation of irrigation management
transfer (IMT) in the Philippines, Bandyopadhyay et al. present
qualitative evidence that suggested the government water agency
was withholding fees from the community associations; this risk was
further evidenced in a qualitative study whose findings suggested
that the government water agency only agreed to IMT in order to
reduce its operating costs (Bedore 2011). This is a serious risk of
CBNRM projects, as it may leave communities shouldering more of
the burden of resource management without enjoying the benefits; in
contexts where most communities are resource‐ and time‐poor, this
cost can be substantial.
The likelihood of incomplete implementation for national‐level
policies is compounded when the policies are not clearly specified,
aligned with other key laws and regulations, or especially when
contradictory to them. This was found to be the case in Rasolofoson
et al. (2015), wherein the researchers conducted in‐depth analysis of
the myriad national policies, laws and regulations pertaining to
natural resource management, and identified a number of incon-
sistencies and contradictions that helped explain the lack of impact
on outcomes found in the statistical analysis. These inconsistencies
and contradictions are vulnerable to exploitation by supply‐side
actors intent on retaining access to their benefits; Rasolofoson et al.
present qualitative data suggesting that local officials selected a
mixture of the policies that best suited their interests, rather than
the interests of communities (2015). This sensitivity to capture by
government officials substantially decreases the potential benefits
communities may realise through CBNRM.
The success of CBNRM further depends on the type of
resource use in which communities engage, and their capacity to
enforce the rules. In a qualitative study of the community
conservancies evaluated by Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004), partici-
pants highlighted the challenge of preventing poaching in areas
frequented by migrants (Jones, 1999). Such high‐stakes monitoring
may be beyond the capacity of communities to enforce, particu-
larly without resorting to violence. Conversely, Tachibana &
Adhikari suggest that the primarily light resource use in the
Middle Hills of Nepal (collecting leaves and sticks for kindling) was
more conducive to CBNRM; the authors interpret their findings to
suggest that forests where logging is common may be more of a
challenge for the CBNRM model (2015).
The provision of alternative livelihoods support is vital in areas
where communities’ traditional access to the resource is restricted as
a result of the implementation of the conservation component of
CBNRM. While this speaks to the tension between human quality of
life outcomes versus environmental outcomes, various studies
identified the potential to overcome this barrier through support
for alternative livelihood means and practices. Further, analysis by
Barde of community‐based water management in Brazil suggested
that CBNRM groups were effective at improving outcomes for
communities because they had a higher level of downwards
accountability to their communities (2017).
TABLE 21 Studies examining CBNRM
First author Year Country Sector and specific intervention Additional literature included
Bandyopadhyay 2004 Namibia Community wildlife conservancies 3 (qualitative studies and policy paper)
Bandyopadhyay 2010 Philippines Irrigation management transfer to Irrigation
Associations
1 (qualitative study)
Barde 2017 Brazil Water User Associations N/A
Huang 2014 China Water User Associations 2 (qualitative studies)
Persha 2016 Tanzania Joint forestry management 2 (policy document and implementation report)
Rasolofoson 2015 Madagascar Community‐based forestry management 2 (previous evaluation versions)
Tachibana 2009 Nepal Community‐based forestry management 5 (qualitative and quantitative studies)
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The synthesis of included studies and additional texts suggests
that key factors for success in CBNRM interventions may rest on full
legalisation of the communities’ ownership of resource benefits
(Persha & Meshack, 2016); the injection of donor funds to catalyse
the change in resource use (Barnes, MacGregor, & Weaver, 2002);
sustained external support to enable the community groups to
institutionalise slowly over years (Jones, 1999); and the presence of
tourism opportunities for communities to undertake alternative
livelihoods (Barnes et al., 2002; Persha & Meshack, 2016).
As a result of the synthesis process, the theory of change was
refined for CBNRM interventions. While the causal chain appears
relatively linear, the large number of moderators, assumptions and
identified barriers and bottlenecks, combined with the often weak
results from the evaluations, suggests that these interventions are
extremely tricky to carry out at national scale (Figure 32).
14.32 | Common cross‐cutting factors and
integrated synthesis
Many interventions experienced challenges stemming from a lack of
positive engagement with supply‐side actors at the intervention
target level, whose relative power the interventions often sought to
diminish. Interventions implemented within the good governance
domain of external engagement generally operate within a context of
an imbalance of power in favour of the service provider, who controls
the quality of and access to resources and services. Interventions
that seek to change this balance of power without engagement with
and buy‐in from these actors may trigger response mechanisms in
which the service providers attempt to block, discredit or co‐opt the
intervention to maintain their relative power. For example, Hum-
phreys and Weinstein report evidence that some politicians whose
performance scorecards were due to be disseminated successfully
blocked implementation of the intervention in their constituencies,
threatening violence (2012). Banerjee et al. (2014) identify this
triggering of a negative response by the service providers at the
targeted level (police station chiefs, in this case, who successfully
prevented the implementation of community observers in most
areas) as the key mechanism leading to a break in the causal chain.
Similarly, Persha and Meshack (2016) and Rasolofosin et al. (2015)
present evidence that government forestry staff members are able to
exploit lack of clarity in national‐level policies or top‐down
enforcement of complete implementation such that the officials are
able to maintain their control over the resource benefits despite
having devolved the responsibilities of management to the commu-
nities. Conversely, interventions that were designed and implemen-
ted with the support of key power brokers at the level targeted by
the intervention, as in the case of municipal governments that chose
to implement participatory budgeting in Brazil (Touchton and
Wampler, 2014; Gonçalves, 2013) or structured community engage-
ment in the health sector that aimed to strengthen service providers’
intrinsic motivation (Alhassan et al. 2016), were able to realise
positive impacts across the causal chain.
It is important to note that while in the majority of included broad
intervention groups, a break in the causal chain at this stage may at
best prevent outcomes tied to service provider response or lead to
null effects, in the case of community‐based natural resource
F IGURE 32 Theory of change for community‐based natural resource management interventions
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management there is a risk of causing negative effects on well‐being
outcomes. As noted in the Persha and Meshack (2016) and
Rasolofosin et al. (2015) cases, this may happen where a lack of
full intervention implementation leads to a context in which
resource‐ and time‐poor communities increase their burden of
natural resource management, have less access to the resource due
to sustainability restrictions, and are not afforded adequate
compensation in the form of resource benefits ownership or
alternative livelihoods support. The risk that an intervention may
do harm to a community should be seriously considered during
project design, and locally appropriate mitigation measures should be
developed to lessen the likelihood of negative impacts.
Building on the above, the findings of this review lend some support
to the theory that citizens’ attempts to increase their relative power
through means seen as confrontational by service providers often
disincentivise the service provider from participating (World Bank
2004). The findings of this review suggest that approaches to citizen‐
service provider engagement in the realm of accountability, including
transparency for accountability, appear to work more effectively when
implemented through phased, facilitated processes that are framed as
collaborative, as opposed to one‐off accountability meetings that tend
to be interpreted as confrontational. Interventions that promote
transparency with the aim of triggering mechanisms that motivate
citizens to demand greater accountability often fall closer to the
confrontational spectrum, and their limited success on realizing
outcomes along the causal chain is evident throughout the included
studies. Those that promote an explicitly collaborative process may be
more effective, particularly when they incorporate measures to improve
citizens’ understanding of performance benchmarks, such as in Björk-
man and Svensson (2010) and Alhassan et al. (2016). In these two
programs, though citizens were provided or supported to gather
information on service provider performance quality, respectively, the
process of applying that knowledge to service improvements was done
in a collaborative way that was mutually empowering, in line with the
theory suggested by Fox (2014).
We note, however, a difference between interventions targeting
individuals versus service provider institutions, and caution that it
may be more difficult to engage in collaborative approaches to
performance improvements with individuals, such as politicians, who
are understandably more likely to feel personally targeted. In these
situations, the synthesis suggests that ensuring the engagement of a
locally credible messenger to disseminate performance information
reduces the ability of the targeted individual to undermine, co‐opt or
discredit the information.
One potential limitation of interventions relying on accountability
and transparency‐for‐accountability through community engage-
ment, however, is that while such interventions often met with some
success in realising improvements at a local level regarding service
delivery quality, there are many service delivery bottlenecks that
cannot be dealt with through community engagement. This was a
barrier highlighted in Bradley and Igras (2005) and Gullo et al.
(2017): in both these evaluations, the authors identified improve-
ments only among indicators that could be addressed without
changes in resources or support. This provides some support to an
assumption identified in the initial theory of change, which identified
a risk that improvements would be limited to those that were within
the purview of the service providers targeted for support. Bottle-
necks such as issues in service supply chains or those requiring the
approval and engagement of more senior management, particularly
at provincial level and above, are unlikely to be successfully
addressed through community engagement efforts. This reinforces
the need for proper bottleneck identification during project design,
to ensure the proper tools are applied.
The findings of the framework synthesis suggest a key facilitator
for interventions across the external engagement sphere of good
governance was the incorporation of active engagement with local
organised community groups, such as CSOs or interest groups, or the
inclusion of measures that explicitly sought to build local social
capital and capacity for collective action. This facilitator was present
in each intervention that succeeded in addressing the bottleneck
caused by a lack of service provider response in indirectly delivered
service provision. For example, in their replication of Björkman and
Svensson (2010), Donato and Mosqueira demonstrate the significant
contribution of a strong presence of the local CSO partner in the
targeted community on achieving positive results (2016). Similarly, in
their in‐depth ethnography of a “failed” intervention, Ananthpur et al.
present qualitative evidence that suggests that positive results were
achieved where the facilitators tasked with supporting the imple-
mentation of participatory planning processes were able to build
relationships with local citizen groups, particularly women’s groups,
and work with them to address key issues (2014).
Following the completion of the initial framework synthesis, we
added codes to the meta‐analysis data to test the strength of some of
the mechanisms identified. We first tested the strength of the
influence from the different types of service delivery. Initially, the
distinction was theorised to be between pure public goods ‐ services
provided by the state which are non‐rival and non‐excludable, e.g.
public roads ‐ and merit goods ‐ public services which are rival and
excludable, usually because they are provided by front‐line public
servants, e.g. health services, or are subject to rationing, e.g. food
subsidies. We expected to see stronger results around citizen
engagement in merit goods provision, in which accountability to
service users is more direct, leading to differential effects on access
and possibly use and wellbeing further along the causal chain. Note
that this distinction relates only to the three accountability and
transparency interventions (rights information, performance infor-
mation, and community feedback and monitoring); it did not emerge
as a strong explanatory factor in participation interventions
(participatory planning and CBNRM).
The results of meta‐analysis showing immediate, intermediate
and final outcomes are presented below. As Figure 32 demonstrates,
the expected difference in citizen engagement for merit versus pure
public goods was not identified. This suggests that these interven-
tions do not necessarily suffer from a free‐rider or collective action
bottleneck; the interventions were successful in stimulating citizen
engagement in feedback and monitoring opportunities whether they
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are for pure public goods or merit goods. However, the distinction
between the two groups of services becomes starker when looking at
provider response (Figure 33), where the only outcome that suggests
a significance increase is for provider actions (SMD=0.35, 95%
CI=0.09, 0.60) and subsequently on changes in service access.
Figure 34 shows findings for intermediate outcomes, indicating
consistent differences between merit goods and pure public goods
for service access outcome categories. The findings show positive
effects for all outcome sub‐categories (physical access, service cost,
quality of service, absenteeism) for merit goods, but insignificant
findings for pure public goods outcomes. There are no significant
effects for service use variables; pooled effects for merit goods were
positive in several cases, including health service use (SMD=0.36,
95%CI=−0.15, 0.88), user satisfaction (SMD=0.07, 95%CI=−0.03,
0.18) and perceived quality of staff (SMD=0.06, 95%CI=−0.06, 0.18),
where they were null or negative for health service use, user
satisfaction and quality of staff.
Figure 35 presents findings for wellbeing and state‐society relations
outcomes. No more than a single study measured most outcomes, and
the results no not suggest any differences between wellbeing and state‐
society relations for merit versus pure public goods.
Based on the results of the integration with the meta‐analysis, we
revised the theory, including the theory of change best‐fit frame-
works, to hypothesise that the break in the causal chain at provider
response for services such as infrastructure or municipal government
is more likely to be due to the nature of the interaction between
citizens and those they are attempting to hold accountable. In what
we initially conceptualised as merit good services, such as food
subsidies, citizens collect the subsidies directly from the service
provider staff member; thus, the citizens and providers interact in the
provision of services, and thereby have a relationship that extends
beyond the accountability measures. This is in contrast to a service
such as a road, which is built by service providers but accessed by
citizens independently of the providers; once the road is built, the
providers are no longer engaged in its day to day management and
use. As a result, the relationship between the citizens and service
providers is constrained to the accountability initiatives. Upon
revisiting the framework synthesis, we extracted further evidence
in support of this theory, which is described above.
In addition to the moderating variable regarding the nature of
service provision, we further attempted to test the strength of the
facilitator identified around service provider engagement by coding
F IGURE 33 Immediate outcomes for pure public and merit goods
74 of 90 | WADDINGTON ET AL.
interventions according to whether they engaged with service
providers in the design and/or implementation of the intervention
a) at the point targeted by the intervention; b) with different public
service officials whose behaviour wasn’t targeted; or c) no engage-
ment with the supply side. However, the results were inconclusive,
which was likely due to the small sample of studies within each group
and additional key factors that made it difficult to statistically isolate
the potential impact of service provider engagement.
14.33 | Cost evidence (review question 5)
Cost effectiveness is a key question for decision makers, and one that
is rarely incorporated into systematic reviews.6 Unfortunately, few
included studies included cost information and no studies included
cost information systematically. We present the data here drawn
directly from the study reports. Table 22 presents the types of
programme costs analysed and key findings.
Two studies (Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017; Pandey et al. 2007)
presented some description of cost per outcome.7 The measures
used to define costs and expenditures varied across these studies.
None of the studies presented tables with detailed breakdown of
costs by any kind of category or intervention. This limited the
potential for any kind of comparisons across programme settings and
intervention designs.
Programme costs were reported in four studies (Alhassan et al.
2015; Ananthpur et al. 2014; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017;
F IGURE 34 Intermediate outcomes for pure public and merit goods
6For a good example, see Doocy and Tappis (2017).
7Björkman et al. (2017) only reported results of the combined package of facilitated
meetings to enhance participation with the dissemination of report cards on the facility’s
performance. Hence the comparison of costs with the facilitated meetings without report
cards was not possible based on published data.
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Pandey et al. 2007). Only total costs were presented across these
studies, and the costing methodology used in arriving at these cost
values were described as “back of the envelope” and were not
detailed. No studies included cost information systematically. One
study was assessed as a full economic evaluation (cost‐effective-
ness) (Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017) and the remaining three were
assessed as partial economic evaluations. The methodological
quality of all the economic studies were found to be low (Table 22).
Full critical appraisals using Evers et al.’s (2005) checklist are in
Appendix 7.
Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017) presented approximate total
intervention costs (cost for collecting data for the report cards which
were the main cost item) over a four‐year period for 13 treatment
facilities at USD10,000 per facility.
Ananthpur et al. (2014) reported implementation costs of
citizenship training and facilitation programme in rural India from
100 treatment villages. However, the attrition rate of household
respondents was relatively high (attrition rate=39.91%) as 3,545
households were visited on both rounds of the panel compared to
4,000 households as per sample size calculations at the start of the
study. The total cost reported at US$200,000 (2009 reference year)
might have resulted in censoring8 of cost data calculations as missing
not at random (Glick et al., 2015). Since the implementation involved
citizen training and facilitation programme, the implementation costs
are correlated to the cost of participants who were censored might
differ from the cost of those without censored data.
Pandey et al. (2007) presented intervention costs of US$4,000
across 55 village clusters receiving the information campaign. There
is very low attrition (1.91%), hence limited censoring of cost data.
The authors also report costs of US$0.22 per household, presumably
based on numbers of households with women reached by the
intervention (data not reported). We also used information reported
in the papers to standardise cost estimates wherever possible. For
example, Alhassan (2015) reported costs across 32 health facilities
(private: 21 intervention, 16 controls; public: 11 intervention, 15
controls) which represent about 10 per cent of the total number of
accredited clinics/health centres in each of the two study regions.
F IGURE 35 Final outcomes for pure public and merit goods
8Cost data may be considered as incomplete due to loss of follow‐up. MNAR or non‐
ignorably missing censoring occurs when the mechanism that generates the censored
observations is correlated with the mechanism that generates cost (Glick, Doshi, Sonnad, &
Polsky, 2015).
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The costs reported at US$380 per intervention design would mean
the overall cost of intervention to be US$ 12,160 across the 32
intervention health facilities.
We adjusted the cost estimates across the studies to specific target
currency (US$) and the latest price year at which exchange rate
conversion data are available (2016). The revised costs across the
interventions identified for the calculations are reported in Table 23.
Three studies reported factors influencing implementation costs.
Alhassan et al. (2015) suggested that factors such as champions being
community members and resources being mobilised from within the
community, influenced in keeping the implementation costs low.
Björkman et al. (2017) highlighted the cost of data collection for the
report card to be the main cost item influencing implementation
costs. Pandey et al. (2007) suggested that if the government or local
organisations could disseminate the information campaign, such as
radio or newspapers, it could result in even lower intervention costs.
15 | DISCUSSION
15.1 | Summary of main results
This systematic review synthesises both quantitative and qualitative
evidence from Thirty five studies of 41 unique policies or trial arms in
20 low‐ and middle‐income countries spanning five regions on
programs that incorporate the principles of participation, account-
ability, transparency and inclusion (PITA) to increase citizen engage-
ment in public service delivery. This covered programmes promoting
participation (participatory priority setting); inclusion of marginalised
groups; transparency (information on rights and public service
performance), and/or citizen efforts to ensure public service
accountability (citizen feedback and monitoring). The primary goal
was to determine the programs’ impact on the quality of and access
to public services, including health care, social protection, justice and
physical infrastructure, and social and economic wellbeing of citizens
(review question 1). We also considered the impact on intermediate
outcomes in the causal chain, including citizen engagement and
provider response (review question 2), and how results vary by
participants and location (review question 3). In addition, we aimed
to understand the mechanisms and processes through which change
happens, by identifying programme design, implementation, context,
and mechanism factors associated with programme effectiveness
along the causal chain (review question 4). Due to insufficient cost
data, we were unable to address review question 5 on the cost‐
effectiveness of interventions incorporating PITA characteristics.
We used quantitative meta‐analysis to combine the results of the
impact evaluations, including sub‐group analysis to explore hetero-
geneity by intervention, study location and other moderators. We
conducted a detailed critical appraisal of the included impact
evaluations to assess the credibility of the results. From the included
programmes, we identified 36 associated qualitative and program-
matic documents that we used to address review question 4. We
used framework synthesis to synthesise the data.T
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We reported our quantitative results in this section along the
causal chain to address review questions 1‐3, supported by the
results from the qualitative framework synthesis to address review
question 4. We start by presenting the results of the overall
synthesis, followed by the individual results for the five intervention
areas.
15.2 | Effectiveness of citizen engagement
interventions
The meta‐analysis found that citizen engagement interventions are
usually effective in increasing the engagement of service users, for
example improving meeting attendance, contributing to community
funds, and general knowledge about services. The average pooled
effect on user engagement was an increase of 0.23 standard
deviations (95%CI=0.12, 0.34) in the typical outcome measure across
all interventions. Yet, the effects of interventions promoting citizen
engagement on provider actions were very limited: the pooled effect on
provider responsiveness was not significant across all PITA mechan-
isms and interventions.
15.3 | Heterogeneity of impacts across populations
We considered diversity and equity of impacts across different
population groups in three ways. Overall, few of the studies reported
disaggregated intervention approaches and/or analysis of results for
different population groups. We identified five studies that incorpo-
rated specific measures within the intervention to extend the
engagement to vulnerable groups, which comprised three participa-
tory planning interventions and one each of rights information
provision and citizen feedback or monitoring. These programmes
tended to have smaller effects on citizen engagement and access to
services than other programmes, but it is unclear whether this was
due to many of the programmes being implemented in challenging
contexts (e.g. Afghanistan, Pakistan and DRC) rather than problems
inherent in targeting vulnerable community members. Further, we
identified nine studies that conducted sub‐group analysis to
differentiate impacts for different population groups, most commonly
by socio‐economic status and by gender, yet these were spread
widely across intervention type and geography. Finally, we looked for
studies that conducted equity‐oriented causal chain analysis, and
identified only one study that conducted a detailed qualitative
assessment that incorporated consideration of differentiated impacts
for women. We also examined overall differences by global region,
but were not able to find consistent differences by intervention or
outcomes along the results chain. Ultimately, due to the small sample
of studies across a wide range of interventions and outcomes, it is
difficult to conclude anything systematically for different population
or geographic groups.
15.4 | Performance information provision
We identified six evaluations of public official or service provider
performance information interventions, such as the dissemination of
municipal government performance scorecards in Afghanistan, Brazil,
the Philippines and Uganda, and monitoring information provided in
police stations in India.
The framework synthesis identified that amongst performance
information interventions, a key facilitating factor was the extent to
which implementers secured the support of and buy‐in from the
actors whose performance was being analysed and disseminated.
Without such support, the findings suggest that the targeted actors
may be able to avoid accountability by either preventing full
implementation of the intervention, or by successfully undermining
the credibility of the performance information disseminated. Most of
these interventions targeted political actors’ performance (as
opposed to specific public services), in attempt to “shorten the long
route” of citizen‐state accountability by increasing citizen engage-
ment with politicians outside of elections. While interventions were
at times successful in eliciting some improvements in politician
TABLE 23 Converted cost calculations to target currency (US$) and price year (2016)
Study Assessment Period
Total cost
data Unit cost per year Cost‐effectiveness
Ghana: Alhassan et al.
(2015)
Baseline: June 2013 US$ 12,417 US$ 388 per facility ‐
Follow‐up: March 2014
Karnataka: Ananthpur et al.
(2014)
Baseline: Oct‐Nov 2007 US$ 221,700 US$ 277 per village ‐
Follow‐up: Oct‐Dec
2009
Uganda: Björkman Nyqvist
et al. (2017)
Long‐term evaluation:
2005‐2009
USD$144,105 US$ 2,771 per facility/ community US$ 308 per death averted of a
child aged under five
Short‐run evaluation:
2005, 2007‐09
Uttar Pradesh: Pandey et al.
(2007)
Baseline: 2004 US$ 4,820 US$ 87 per village per year (US$
0.27 per household in a village
cluster)
‐
Follow‐up: 2005 (after
12 months)
* reference price year reported in the study used as base year for the cost calculation.
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performance, the findings suggest that, ultimately, this route remains
too long to identify short‐term effects on service delivery. Politicians
may claim plausible deniability of their individual capacity to
influence service delivery change, and such interventions do not
engage many key actors involved along the public service delivery
supply chain.
15.5 | Citizen feedback mechanisms
We identified 10 evaluations of accountability interventions, which
specifically comprised citizen feedback or monitoring mechanism
interventions, that is, those that solicited feedback regarding and/or
actively engaged citizens in the monitoring of service delivery, to
hold public service providers and institutions responsible for
executing their powers and mandates according to appropriate
standards. These include community report cards in infrastructure
(Afghanistan, Indonesia and Colombia), health (Ghana, Malawi and
Uganda), agriculture (Uganda) and the security sector (DRC), and
individual citizen “feedback loops” in Guinea, Kenya and Uganda.
The framework synthesis suggested that citizen feedback and
monitoring interventions were more successful at achieving results
where some or all of the following factors were present:
• Interventions targeted a service that citizens accessed through
interactions with front‐line providers;
• A phased, facilitated approach jointly engaged citizens and service
providers in monitoring
• Performance benchmarks;
• Creation of common knowledge of feedback or monitoring results;
and
• Working through local community organizations to strengthen
community members’ voices.
15.6 | Rights information provision
We identified five evaluations of rights information interventions,
which enable users to demand minimum standards for access to
services, such as for social protection services in Indonesia (food
subsidies) and India (public works), maternal and child health care in
India and freedom of information in Pakistan.
The results from the framework synthesis suggested that
interventions informing citizens of their rights were more likely to
succeed where they targeted the provision of a service citizens
access directly from front‐line providers; created a sense of common
knowledge about people’s rights to the service among citizens and
providers; and built an appropriate level of social sanction risk for
providers.
15.7 | Participatory planning interventions
We identified nine participatory priority setting, planning or budget-
ing interventions, wherein citizens participated in setting the
priorities for and/or planning of local services. These include support
for participatory budgeting in municipal governments in Brazil,
Mexico and Russia, and support for participatory planning in India,
Pakistan, Guinea and Kenya. It also included requirements for
inclusive participation in two fragile contexts, Afghanistan and DRC.
The framework synthesis suggested three factors improved the
likelihood of achieving results along the causal chain:
• Strong local buy‐in from front‐line service providers for the
intervention;
• Incorporating specific, culturally appropriate measures that
address local barriers to the participation of vulnerable groups; and
• Interventions designed to spur the growth of local civil society and
capacity for collective action.
15.8 | Inclusive participation interventions
Five studies incorporated specific measures to strengthen the
inclusion of marginalised and vulnerable groups such as women,
ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay bisexual, transgender and intersex
(LGBTI) people in citizen engagement interventions. These interven-
tions are first grouped based on their primary aim (participation,
accountability or transparency), but subsequently coded to identify
the value‐add of specific measures to include vulnerable groups.
These include programmes which tested the effectiveness of
mandating women’s participation in food distribution (Afghanistan
and DRC), holding separate meetings for vulnerable groups in health
programmes (India, Pakistan and Uganda).
15.9 | Community‐based natural resource
management
We identified seven community‐based natural resource management
(CBNRM) interventions, wherein citizens form local collectives and
take over the management of a shared resource, for forest manage-
ment in Nepal, Madagascar and Tanzania, and water user associa-
tions in Brazil, China and the Philippines, and Namibia.
We identified four key contextual factors that mediated results
chains amongst community‐based natural resource management
(CBNRM) interventions. Where interventions required large shifts
in control over the resource, representing a relinquishment of power
from local officials to community groups, we identified a lack of
engagement and buy‐in from local officials as a frequent barrier to
the full implementation of the CBNRM policy. Critically, this barrier
often resulted in situations in which community groups took on
additional responsibilities for resource management, but did not gain
access to the corresponding promised benefits. A related factor is the
clarity of the national CBNRM policy context; where there were
multiple vague and overlapping policies governing natural resource
use, officials were more able to adjust or block full implementation of
CBNRM in a way that preserved their power and control over
resource benefit access. We identified external support to change
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resource use as a key facilitating factor: even in the absence of full
policy implementation, access to alternative livelihoods such as
tourism may still enable communities to realise the joint socio‐
economic and environmental objectives of CBNRM. Finally, we
identified the type and intensity of local resource use as a key
moderating factor influencing the effectiveness of CBNRM; commu-
nity management may not be appropriate in contexts prone to illegal
logging or poaching, where attempts to enforce regulations may
endanger community members.
15.10 | Overall completeness and applicability of
evidence
We identified 50 papers associated with 35 studies in low‐and middle‐
income countries. While this is a growing evidence base, with 60 per
cent of the included papers published within the last five years and 11
ongoing studies identified, this still represents a limited evidence base
from which to make conclusions. The largest number of studies or trial
arms testing a particular mechanism was 16, for studies testing policies
to encourage or mandate participation, and these studies reported on a
diverse range of outcomes. Geographically, the evidence base is skewed
towards Sub‐Saharan Africa and India, representing half of the evidence
base. We identified no studies from North Africa or the Middle East and
limited evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia
and the Pacific region.
While we identified seven studies of community‐based natural
resource management committees, these were all rated as having a
high risk of bias or having some concerns, with the exception of
Barde’s (2017) evaluation of water user associations in Brazil.
We also undertook a formal assessment of the external validity of
the included studies. A number of studies still do not report their
sampling strategy clearly, and a surprisingly small share of studies
specifically discuss the generalisability of their findings to other
contexts. Only 11 studies explicitly discussed external validity.
Among those studies, five acknowledged the limits to the generali-
sability of their findings, due to the small scale of the study or the
sampling strategy. Four studies claimed generalisability of their
findings, either to the level of an Indian state (Banerjee et al. 2014;
Ravaillon et al., 2013), or to other areas of the country under similar
conditions, such as density of population or distance to a health
facility (Toutchon 2015; Björkman Nyqvist et al. 2017). Finally, two
studies claimed generalizability of their findings to other contexts,
and potentially other countries (Fiala & Premand, 2017; Timmons &
Garfias, 2015).
15.11 | Quality of the evidence
Overall, the quality of evidence from randomised studies is relatively
high, with studies for the most part ensuring comparability of
intervention and control groups and protecting them from selection
bias. The risk of bias assessment is therefore more relevant at the
outcome level. We identified concerns related to the way some
outcomes are measured in the majority of studies. This is due to the
use of self‐report measures that are often biased by the intervention
itself. A majority of the non‐randomised studies are natural
experiments, which in most cases did not provide enough information
on the selection process into the programme to reject the risk of
selection bias, or failed to overcome the selection bias and
confounding that was identified. Transparency in reporting is an
issue for randomised and non‐randomised studies alike given the few
pre‐registrations of trial, outcomes or analysis plan. The use of
methods such as placebo outcomes or groups, and blinding for
outcome assessors or data analysts, is not common, though it seems
relatively easy to implement and could reduce risks of biases.
15.12 | Limitations and potential biases in the
review process
There are several limitations of this review related to both the
existing evidence base in this area and the synthesis approach.
15.13 | Limitations of the existing evidence base
1. Statistical power for the meta‐analyses and heterogeneity
analysis: Our ability to make strong conclusions on the effective-
ness of the PITA mechanisms and interventions were limited by
the number of studies looking at each intervention and outcome
area. This was despite using a fairly high level of aggregation for
mechanisms, intervention areas and outcomes.In addition, we
were unable to undertake the full moderator analyses that we
specified in the protocol to explore heterogeneity quantitatively
that due to a limited number of included studies in each
mechanism and intervention category.
2. Reporting in primary studies: We were limited in our ability to
test key mechanisms quantitatively that we identified through the
framework synthesis due to limited reporting of design and
contextual characteristics in the impact evaluations. For example,
our framework synthesis and previous reviews have suggested
that the extent to which interventions engaged with or were
strongly supported by national or local governments would be an
important determining factor for effectiveness. However, primary
studies rarely reported on this in detail.
3. Cost‐effectiveness analysis: We aimed to undertake an analysis of
the cost‐effectiveness of the included set of interventions (review
question 5), however we were limited by the available cost data.
15.14 | Limitations of the review scope and
synthesis process
1. The focus of our review questions were on the valued added of
incorporating PITA characteristics into existing service delivery,
and therefore we did not include studies that studied the impact
of combining PITA‐based interventions with co‐interventions to
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improve resources or capacity for service delivery. One of the
hypotheses emerging from our review is that citizen engagement
interventions that do not incorporate complementary interven-
tions along the service provider supply chain may be insufficient
to improve key wellbeing outcomes for target communities.
However, we are unable to say this conclusively without
comparing to the results of interventions that do combine PITA
mechanisms and supply side interventions. We believe that this
would be a valuable subject for future synthesis.
2. We did not include studies of education related to PITA mechanisms
in our review due to overlap with existing systematic reviews and
time and resource limitations. However, the inclusion of this
evidence base may have increased the power of our quantitative
analysis and the generalisability of our results to this sector.
3. Due to time and resource limitations, we did not undertake
independent double coding of effect size information or the
qualitative data extraction. In addition, we only undertook double
coding for the risk of bias assessments for a sample of 20 per cent
of studies rather than the full set. However, the results of the
independent double coding of risk of bias demonstrated a high
level of agreement between the two authoauthors.
15.15 | Deviations from protocol
This review largely followed the approach described in the associated
protocol published in the Campbell Library (Waddington et al., 2018).
However, we note several deviations.
1. Upon identifying the included studies, we mapped the character-
istics of each intervention and produced a framework of five sub‐
interventions that shared similar design characteristics. These
categories were not pre‐specified in the protocol as we defined
our intervention inclusion criteria using PITA design character-
istics and were unsure what the final set of included interventions
would look like. We used these categories to undertake sub‐group
analysis by intervention area.
2. As noted in the previous section, we did not undertake full
independent double coding of effect size information or the
qualitative data extraction although categorisation of all effect
sizes into outcome groups for every study was done by two
authorauthors.
3. We discussed exploring the possibility of applying alternate
methods to link the meta‐analysis with context and mechanism
information, such as QCA (Befani, 2016).QCA articulates the
associations between empirical effects and context and mechan-
ism conditions drawing on “truth‐tables” which articulate all
possible instances of conditions and show which cases share the
same combination of conditions. We noted that the application of
QCA is limited by the number of included studies, their
comparability and the completeness of reporting within them,
hence the application of QCA was not feasible in this review. We
were unable to apply QCA to our review due to number of
included studies, their comparability and the completeness of
reporting within them. Instead we used realist‐informed frame-
work synthesis that moved towards “best fit” framework
synthesis to explore context and mechanism information.
4. In addition, we identified potential programme mechanisms and a
moderator variable (merit versus pure public goods) in the
qualitative framework synthesis that we subsequently tested in
the meta‐analysis through sub‐group analysis. This moderator
analysis was not described in the protocol.
15.16 | Agreements and disagreements with other
studies or reviews
This systematic review is the first that we are aware of to consider
the effects of a range of interventions with PITA characteristics
across a range of sectors. The findings from the review are broadly
consistent with reviews that have examined governance interven-
tions and/or have examined demand and supply in service delivery.
For example, the recent review of community driven development
programmes by White et al. (2018) found that effects tended to
diminish further along the causal chain, such as programmes were
often ineffective in improving wellbeing outcomes, apart from in the
special case of water and sanitation.
Several high quality systematic reviews exist focusing specifically
on the impact of community‐based monitoring and information
interventions (Molina et al. 2016; Snilstveit et al. 2015). In 2016,
Molina et al. published a review of the effects of 15 community
monitoring studies in the health and education sectors. Snilstveit
et al.’s (2015) mixed method systematic review examines the effects
of education interventions including community‐based monitoring of
schools and education systems.
Hanna et al.’s (2011) systematic review of anti‐corruption
interventions found that monitoring interventions have been
effective in cases where they were implemented and monitored by
a party desiring to lower corruption, and where they have been
combined with either nonfinancial or financial incentives. They also
suggested community‐level monitoring works but only “when the
community can punish corruption” (Hanna et al. 2011: 49).
USAID’s (2015) Practitioner's Guide for Anticorruption Program-
ming Guide aggregates lessons from more than 300 USAID programs
between 2007 and 2013 which included anticorruption design
elements.They suggest that public awareness campaigns or citizen
monitoring groups have little impact without willing coordination
with governments.
16 | AUTHORS ’ CONCLUSIONS
16.1 | Implications for policy and programming
This section presents the main conclusions for policy and pro-
grammes from the synthesis of impact evidence on interventions
promoting external participation and accountability in low‐ and
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middle‐income countries. As might be expected for a review of broad
interventions and even broader scope of outcomes, there is
significant heterogeneity in findings. In order to manage the
anticipated heterogeneity, we developed a framework which enabled
sensible grouping of interventions and outcomes. The results from
analysis according to this grouping suggested significant hetero-
geneity in findings across intervention groupings and outcomes.
The first conclusion is that, regardless of intervention type,
interventions are usually effective in improving engagement of
citizens in service delivery and improving access to services and
quality of service provision. However, external participation and
accountability interventions are not often able to elicit strong
responses from public services.
Secondly, evidence suggests some interventions may be more
effective in improving service delivery outcomes, including those
with stronger accountability components, and those providing rights
information. The findings about relative effectiveness across inter-
ventions are tentative in light of the heterogeneity in evidence
included in the review. More promising evidence, however, was
found in the effectiveness of accountability interventions, including
transparency for accountability, that targeted the provision of merit
good‐type public services, as opposed to those that targeted pure
public good‐type services. For merit good services, such as health
care, citizens typically already came into contact with service
delivery agents in order to access the service, and simply built on
those relationships to advocate for improvements in service
provision management; this multidimensional and ongoing personal
engagement between providers and users, comprising both everyday
service delivery and accountability engagement, was better able to
elicit improvements in service provider actions, leading to greater
impacts in quality of and access to services. In contrast, for pure
public good‐type services, such as roads, citizens typically accessed
or used the service independently of front‐line providers, and thus
their relationship with service providers through citizen engagement
efforts was more one‐dimensional, focused solely on the account-
ability efforts. The social sanctions threat of local civic engagement
was not strong enough to overcome the power difference between
providers and users, and thus interventions often failed to elicit
responses in service provider actions, leading to a break in the causal
chain. However, there is some evidence from Afghanistan that
suggests that where interventions targeting pure public goods
incorporate the engagement of strong, locally well‐respected civil
society groups, the additional social capital provided by the CSO
enables citizens to overcome this bottleneck and realise improve-
ments in service delivery quality through citizen engagement – yet
there is a caveat that effects may only hold so long as the active CSO
engagement continues (Berman et al., 2018).
The third main conclusion is that outcomes tend to get smaller
along the causal chain, to the extent that we do not expect
participation and accountability interventions of themselves to
improve wellbeing. This finding should not be surprising, partly
because the deteriorating causal chain is a common occurrence,
called elsewhere the “funnel of attrition” (see White, 2014). The
other reason is that the systematic review inclusion criteria were
limited to studies examining the marginal effect of a participation or
accountability intervention on top of standard public service delivery.
Hence, any study (or trial arm) that incorporated any co‐interven-
tions, including increased resource delivery, was excluded. It is highly
possible that participation and accountability interventions when
provided alongside other services that can relieve important bottle-
necks, can act to improve behavioural responses and wellbeing.
The results suggest particular attention should be paid to the
following areas when designing and implementing interventions:
Ensuring positive engagement with supply‐side actors at the
intervention target level
Many interventions experienced challenges stemming from a lack of
positive engagement with supply‐side actors at the intervention target
level, whose relative power the interventions often sought to diminish.
Interventions seeking to change this balance of power with engagement
and buy‐in from these actors are likely to be more effective in improving
service delivery outcomes and state‐society relations. Interventions
implemented with the strong support of the targeted supply‐side actors,
such as the case of municipal governments that chose to implement
participatory budgeting in Brazil or structured community engagement
in the health sector have been able to realise positive impacts across the
causal chain. In contrast, in Rajasthan, India, only national police
leadership were involved in the design of the intervention; local police
chiefs, whose behaviour was targeted, were not engaged, and were
subsequently able to undermine or effectively block implementation of
the intervention (Banerjee et al., 2014).
Particular consideration for natural resource management
committees
In the majority of included intervention sub‐groups, a limited
response on behalf of the service provider may at worst prevent
outcomes tied to service provider response or lead to null effects. In
the case of CBNRM, however, there is a risk of causing negative
effects on well‐being outcomes, where a lack of full intervention
implementation leads to a context in which resource‐ and time‐poor
communities increase their burden of natural resource management,
have less access to the resource due to sustainability restrictions, and
are not afforded adequate compensation in the form of resource
benefits ownership or alternative livelihoods support. For example, in
Madagascar, Rasolofoson et al. (2015) reviewed the set of policies,
laws and regulations for natural resource management in the
country, and identified numerous inconsistencies and contraditions.
They presented qualitative evidence suggesting that this complicated
and contradictory policy and legal framework was exploited by front‐
line forestry staff, who were able to manipulate implementation of
the CBNRM forestry policy to suit their purposes and retain power
and effective control over the resources, thus causing a break in the
causal chain as implementation of the policy was neither complete
nor consistent.
Collaborative versus confrontational approaches to service
provider engagement
The findings of this review lend some support to the theory that
citizens’ attempts to increase their relative power through means
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seen as confrontational by service providers often disincentivise
service provider participation (World Bank 2004). The findings of this
review suggest that approaches to citizen‐service provider engage-
ment in the realm of accountability, including transparency for
accountability, appear to work more effectively when implemented
through phased, facilitated processes that are framed as collabora-
tive, as opposed to one‐off accountability meetings that tend to be
interpreted as confrontational. Interventions that promote transpar-
ency with the aim of triggering mechanisms that motivate citizens to
demand greater accountability often fall closer to the confrontational
spectrum, and their limited success on realizing outcomes along the
causal chain is evident throughout the included studies. Those that
promote an explicitly collaborative process may be more effective,
particularly when they incorporate measures to improve citizens’
understanding of performance benchmarks. This was the case in
Uganda, where Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2017) found that commu-
nities were better able to identify locally‐solvable problems within
healthcare service provision and advocate for their improvements
when they had access to performance benchmarks and training on
healthcare monitoring; when local performance information was not
provided, service proiders were better able to skirt accountability by
identifying for community monitors key constraints over which they
had no control. We note, however, a difference between interven-
tions targeting individuals versus service provider institutions, and
caution that it may be more difficult to engage in collaborative
approaches to performance improvements with individuals, who are
understandably more likely to feel personally targeted. In these
situations, the synthesis suggests that ensuring the engagement of a
locally credible messenger to disseminate performance information
reduces the ability of the targeted individual to undermine, co‐opt or
discredit the information. This was the case in the Philippines, where
Capuno and Garcia (2010) evaluated the impact of a municipal
scorecard intervention wherein the municipal governments them-
selves or locally respected CSOs presented the performance
information, which prevented politicians under scrutiny from
“shooting the messenger.” In contrast, Humphreys and Weinstein
(2012) reported incidences of politicians either completely blocking
dissemination of scorecards in their constituencies, or undermining
and co‐opting the presentations of the findings by a nationally‐
respected but locally less‐well‐known CSO, such that participants
came away with an improved perception of the politician’s effective-
ness despite poor performance based on the scorecard.
Facilitating engagement by building local social capital and
capacity for collective action
Across included interventions, a key facilitator identified in the
framework synthesis was the value‐add of incorporating into
intervention design active engagement with local organized commu-
nity groups, such as CSOs or interest groups, or the inclusion of
measures that explicitly sought to build local social capital and
capacity for collective action. The role of civil society support to
communities may be critical not only for encouraging engagement in
monitoring and accountability processes, but also for shifting the
balance of power between citizens and public service providers of
indirectly delivered services. There is some evidence that CSO
engagement is particularly critical for interventions targeting
indirectly‐delivered, pure public goods. Engaging CSOs in the
intervention may strengthen the social capital of individual citizens:
the stronger voice may increase citizens’ ability to access the
information needed to hold service providers accountable; help bring
key stakeholders together in interface meetings; and increase
citizens’ bargaining power with service providers, thus strengthening
their capacity to realize improvements in service delivery quality. As
above, this was found to be the case in Afghanistan, where Berman
et al. (2018) presented qualitative evidence suggesting that the
strength of the name of the highly respected CSO in the intervention
enabled community monitors to access key documents such as
contracts that had previously been denied. The CSO was also able to
engage key actors from government in the monitoring meetings,
strengthening the risk for service providers – yet when the CSO
disengaged, the effects petered out. This suggests the importance
both of long‐term engagement and of long‐term follow‐up, as
outcomes are frequently not static.
16.2 | Implications for research
The results suggested significant heterogeneity according to study
design and implementation characteristics. Thus, RCTs tended to
have smaller effects than non‐randomised studies. Although this
finding is consistent across different literatures, and is indicate of the
types of effect estimand that RCTs produce, it is important to note
that well‐conducted RCTs are considered to provide the most
reliable estimates of outcome changes, and as a study design is
highly amenable to the types of interventions contained in this
review. The result of the risk of bias analysis has shown that the
overall quality of evidence from the randomised studies is relatively
high: risks of confounding and selection bias are low, however
researchers should rely less on self‐reported outcome measures,
which are more susceptible to biases. A majority of non‐randomised
studies were at high risk of selection bias and confounding, due to the
unclear or self‐selection of communities into the programme and the
lack of baseline data. When baseline data are available and the
appropriate analysis method is used, authors may overcome these
biases. There are concerns related to reporting; in particular, there is
a lack of transparency with regards to how analyses were conducted,
how authors responded to implementation problems (e.g. attrition),
and approaches to selecting groups for inclusion in the study
(external validity).
More evaluations are needed comparing citizen‐engagement
interventions efforts against (or combined with) interventions
focused on other aspects of governance such as by increasing access
and quality of public services through the compact between state and
service provider (e.g. Dal Bó et al., 2019; Callen, Gulzar, Hasanain,
Khan, & Rezaee, 2018). Efforts to evaluate comparative effects of
governance and other approaches could also draw on successful
approaches from other areas (McIntosh & Zeitlin, 2018). The
evidence provided usually relates to between 12 months and five
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years of follow‐up after initiation of intervention. There may
therefore be greater opportunities to measure the impact of
interventions over the longer‐term, by following‐up existing studies.
We also anticipate that there are more opportunities to conduct
rigorous natural experiments evaluating “real world” national policy
or reform over the longer‐term than have been taken so far, including
through use of regression discontinuity design (as indicated by the
study awaiting classification in this review – Tohari et al., 2017). Such
studies may be done particularly cost‐effectively where existing
survey or administrative data can be used.
Researchers should consider the following when undertaking
impact evaluations in this area:
1. Reporting of intervention and comparison group conditions: in
many cases, we had difficulties in identifying precisely what the
impact evaluation was evaluating; either due to limited reporting
of the intervention characteristics or because the status of the
citizens in the comparison group was unclear. As noted in the
search results section, we decided to exclude two studies after
identifying additional documents that alerted us to the presence
of significant co‐interventions not reported on in the impact
evaluations. This limits the amount of learning that can take place
from the studies, for implementers who may wish to take the
intervention to a new setting or for synthesis work. Authors
should consider drawing on tools such as the TIDieR intervention
reporting guidelines for health (Hoffman et al. 2014).
2. Consideration of equity: there is a lack of research on how
citizen engagement interventions affect women, ethnic groups
or other vulnerable groups. For example, few impact evalua-
tions undertook sub‐group analysis for these groups or under-
took parallel qualitative research to understand how these
groups are able to participate in this type of programme or
their perspectives. For example, we only identified two studies
that assessed how mandating the participation of women into
PITA processes affects services and wellbeing. Given that the
majority of the interventions covered by our review rely
extensively on participation of the community and frequently
do not, at least explicitly, make efforts to incorporate
vulnerable groups, it is important to understand how vulner-
able groups are able to participate.
3. Prioritisation of mixed‐methods impact evaluations: few studies
incorporated qualitative research that would allow them to
uncover the mechanisms that lead to the success or failure of
the intervention. Ananthpur et al. (2014) was one notable
exception that included a four‐year ethnography of the interven-
tion to understand the mechanisms that led to the lack of impact
in the programme.
4. Greater standardisation of outcomes collected in studies of PITA
mechanisms: in many sectors, there are common wellbeing
outcome indicators which facilitates cross‐study learning (e.g.
child diarrhoeal morbidity in studies of water, sanitation and
hygiene interventions). There does seem to have been some
standardisation already done for some governance interventions,
for example, reporting of quality of participation in community‐
driven development programmes. However, there is far greater
scope for standardisation of outcomes for commonly used
constructs for citizen engagement interventions, as shown in
the great diversity of outcomes collected.
We have attempted in this review to demonstrate that it is
possible to undertake higher‐level synthesis work to articulate
broader mechanisms at play which aimed to inform centralised
strategic planning. However, we note that systematic reviews are
usually most effective – especially in communicating findings to
programmers – when they examine a particular intervention, such as
“community‐driven development”. Hence our attempt in this study to
provide both broader‐level analysis of empirical results across
studies and within‐study findings for particular interventions. In
addition, our study identified several potential areas for future
synthesis work:
1. We focused in this review on interventions that isolated the PITA
component, and therefore did not incorporate co‐interventions
to target the resource base or capacity of the public service
providers. It would be useful for a future systematic review to
compare the findings of interventions that introduce only PITA
mechanisms alongside interventions that combine PITA mechan-
isms with co‐interventions. Future research could also explore the
comparative effectiveness of interventions instigating PITA
mechanisms within the external engagement domain of govern-
ance versus those aiming to strengthen PITA mechanisms within
the internal institutional systems of public service provision. Any
synthesis work would likely need to focus on particular aspects of
participation and accountability, or intervention groups, in order
to be both manageable and policy‐relevant.
2. We excluded studies of interventions from the education sector,
as they have been synthesised by several previous reviews.
However, we note that a similar mechanisms synthesis could be
undertaken of studies in the education sector, which constitute a
substantial body of research in this area.
3. Fully mixed‐methods systematic reviews examining the effective-
ness of particular intervention types (e.g. participatory budgeting,
water user associations) would also be valuable.
17 | ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The study protocol was developed by Hugh Waddington (HW), Ada
Sonnenfeld (AS) and Jennifer Stevenson (JS). The search strategy was
designed with John Eyers, and carried out by AS, JS and HW. Juliette
Finetti and JS did the critical appraisal with inputs from HW. JS and
HW collected the effect size data with inputs from AS, and HW did
the meta‐analysis. AS collected the qualitative data and did the
framework synthesis with inputs from HW. HW, AS and JS wrote the
report. Denny John did the cost analysis with inputs from HW.
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